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Liberia emerged from 14 years of brutal civil conflict, demobilized and 
“reintegrated” large numbers of ex-combatants, but there are still concerns 
about ex-combatants’ re-engagement in violence. Yet, adequate knowledge 
and empirical evidence about this are still sketchy. Qualitative fieldwork among 
ex-combatants conducted in five locations in Monrovia from 2012-2013, 
suggests that ex-combatants are re-marginalized. This research presents ex-
combatants’ current status, their re-marginalization, and factors indicative of 
their re-engagement in violence in post-conflict Liberia. The study contends that 
ex-combatants were apparently not satisfied with the outcome of the DDRR 
programme, as it failed to reintegrate them successfully. The study developed a 
four dimensional analytical framework that includes, (a) re-marginalization (b) 
re-criminalization (c) exploitation, and (d) economic insecurity, which are then 
applied to the outcome of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia. On the 
basis of the data collected in fieldwork, the analytical framework reveals how 
these factors and dynamics interacted and facilitated the occurrence of 
violence. The study argues that an awareness of ex-combatants’ vulnerability 
and re-marginalization should put state actors in a position to better predict 
their violent inclinations. It further notes that ex-combatant re-engagement in 
violence is largely manifested at the political and economic levels and this has 
the potential to lead to a renewed conflict if not mitigated. This study by no 
means completes the tasks of research and analysis on violence and ex-
combatants, but it outlines theoretical propositions and conclusions, which can 
hopefully spark further debate and collective efforts among researchers to push 
this field of study forward. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
I was there at the beginning 12 years ago. I observed the 
entire process, participated, reported, and analysed as a 
United Nations staff in post-war peacebuilding work, and 
now, I have documented all in a personal research 
endeavour. What I did not observe, read, reported, and 
documented may have been official government secrets 
not within my reach. What I was not told by the 
participants (Ex-combatants) in this study and therefore 
not documented, was because they did not want to let me 
know – a dilemma in research.   
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the issue of violence in the post-
conflict environment. Violent is a particularly significant concept as it sometimes 
presents something of a paradox within a post-conflict reconstruction and 
peacebuilding setting. At the end of conflict peace is restored and parties to the 
conflict begin to build new lives around them and seeking to participate and 
benefit from the new peace that has been achieved. Yet, the post-war regime 
continues to face challenges posed by ex-combatants who did not benefit from 
the reintegration programmes and therefore feels excluded, economically and 
politically marginalized. In this chapter, I discussed the context in which 
violence occurs in post-war environment, the aims and objectives of the 
research, the main arguments and rationale of the study, its genesis as well as 
the research question. The study aims to contribute to the literature by 
developing a four dimensional analytical framework which is then applied to the 
reintegration of ex-combatants in Liberia. On the basis of the data collected in 
fieldwork, the analytical framework of this study includes four explanatory 
factors: Re-marginalization, Re-criminalization, Exploitation, and Economic 
Insecurity of ex-combatants in post-war Liberia. It shows that these elements 
can be useful tool to investigate the micro and macro factors and dynamics in 
ex-combatants post-war experiences. It reveals how these factors and 
dynamics have facilitated the re-engagement of ex-combatants in violence. 
From its founding in 1847 by freed slaves from America until 1980, 
Liberia was controlled politically and economically by Americo-Liberian elite. 
These elite violently repressed and discriminated against the much larger, 
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indigenous population. In 1980, Samuel Doe overthrew President William 
Tolbert to become the first indigenous president but was himself overthrown by 
Charles Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in the context of a 
violent civil war that lasted from 1989 until 1997. The July 1997 elections 
established Taylor as president but in 1999, two anti- Taylor movements, 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the Movement 
for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), initiated a new civil war that lasted four 
years. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in August 2004 between 
Taylor’s government, LURD, and MODEL ended the war. The 1989–1997 and 
1999–2003 conflicts killed more than 200,000 Liberians and displaced many 
more (McMullin, 2013:392). 
Since the end of the civil conflict in Liberia in 2003, violence has become 
a major national issue and has continued to have impact on the sustainability of 
peace in the country. In the post-war era, despite the Disarmament and 
Demobilization, violence continues to increase in intensity. Thus, very little work 
has explained the ways in which violence linked to the DDRR of ex-combatants 
reflects or masks other forms of social struggle. In general, the ways these 
forms of violence systematically feature in post-war environments remain under 
researched. In Liberia, what look like ‘mobile-militant-groups’ have emerged, 
operating as mercenaries across the MRU region. The elite-rebel leaders 
dominated government continues to appropriate the wealth from the country’s 
rich natural resources, creating anger and frustration among the larger 
population. Violence also underlines the important issue of youth vulnerability 
and exclusion, rooted in the phenomenon of ex-combatant volatility and 
agitation. In Liberia, a country that emerged from the decade-long bloody war, 
peace is a state of restoring normal relations among people and among 
institutions directly and/or indirectly affected by the armed conflict and of 
addressing the root causes such as social exclusion, marginalization, 
deprivation, mal-governance, social disharmony and ethnic tension, as well as 
achieving social, psychological, mental, physical and spiritual wellbeing. 
Liberian society is fractured, disconnected, frustrated, and alienated due to the 
civil war and associated effects. Therefore, achieving stability and peace in 
Liberia requires an appropriate process that deals with the past and envisions a 
better future by generating hope and aspiration. In this regard, peace building is 
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crucially important in Liberia. It refers to strategies and actions to be 
undertaken to institutionalize achievements made through the implementation 
of provisions in peace agreements and the consolidation of democracy for 
sustainability. 
Civil wars are the most dangerous type of conflict in the international 
system. After the end of civil conflicts, the international community usually 
intervenes in order to offer support and assistance in post war reconstruction, 
including dealing with internal displacements, refugees and ex-combatants 
through disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR). 
The civil war saw fighting in Liberia among various warring factions from 1989 -
2003. Given that most civil wars are post-conflict relapses, recent scholarship 
has focused on ways to prevent civil war recurrence. Scholars agree that 
securing post-war peace requires settlements that address many elements, 
including protection issues, human rights, refugee repatriation, demobilization 
and disarmament of rebels and ex-combatants, free and fair elections, and 
economic growth (Stedman et al. 2002; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter 1999, 
2002). Recognizing that policy-makers under resource constraints face 
dilemmas in deciding how to address each element, a growing body of work 
contends that priority should be given to disarmament, demobilization, 
rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR).  This is because satisfying ex-
combatants is a necessary first step in moving towards long-term goals like 
protection of the population and building legitimate governance (Stedman et al. 
2002).  
Different forms of violence exist and in a particular form of what Michel 
Foucault (1982) called “governmentality” Governmentality is about the 
disciplining of forms of life. Foucault was concerned to show how the human 
species and the human body, through specific categories rather than juridical 
ones, became the object of systematic and sustained political attention. Thus, 
building on Foucauldian notions, the study argues that violence is increasingly 
present and yet frequently hidden by both the state and the perpetrators of 
violence, leaving little opportunity for the observer to make informed judgments. 
According to Astri Surke, et.al (2006:1) violence in a post-war situation, 
whether associated with ex-combatants, organized crime, disaffected war-
lords, recriminating agents of the state or marginalized groups, seems 
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widespread but poorly understood. Consequently, there is a growing 
recognition of the risks that wars can occur and spread across borders if acute 
violence in the post-conflict period is not adequately addressed (Suhrke and 
Samset 2007; Collier, et.al 2006).  Paul Collier, et.al (2003:83) observed that 
“the typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces around a 44 percent 
risk of returning to conflict within five years”.  In August 2013, Liberia celebrated 
ten years of “uninterrupted peace”. However, Collier had a different view about 
Liberia when, in 2013, he commented and gave two reasons for the country to 
be hopeful: one is the passage of time – that after ten years of peace, the risk 
of going back to war is much less; the other is economic development, when 
income doubles, the risk of civil war halves. However, Collier’s argument did 
not completely eliminate the possibility of war, but points to the potential for war 
with time and income considerations. Liberia remains economically 
underdeveloped with low national and personal income, prompting comments 
from some segments of the society that the war years offered better economic 
and livelihood opportunities.  
This study builds on existing works by examining several factors that 
might influence individuals to engage in violence and the types of violence they 
are likely to engage in. In this context, the study analyses the DDRR of ex-
combatants, the level of their satisfaction/dissatisfaction, including economic 
and security concerns, and social reintegration. My empirical tests focus on 
DDRR of ex-combatants in Liberia, which was a key component of the war-
ending Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2003. Scholars understand 
that ending a civil war does not necessarily promote positive peace. While the 
civil war may end in our datasets, a rise in crime and violence level might 
indicate a failure of DDRR in some cases (Kingma 1997; Paris 2001). These 
issues contribute to the recurrence of conflicts as dissatisfied former 
combatants make ripe recruitment targets for criminal and rebel groups (Berdal 
1996). For example, the M23 rebel group in the Democratic  Republic of Congo 
was formed by ex-combatants who were dissatisfied with poor living  conditions 
and a lack of regular salaries, which they largely blamed on DDRR (Wilen 
2013:122).  Their subsequent rearmament and fighting has wreaked havoc in 
the North Kivu region, leading to the displacement of 500,000 civilians (IRIN 
2012).  Liberian ex-combatants and mercenaries were activated on at least two 
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occasions to fight in Cote d’Ivoire: first during the 2010/2011 post-election crisis 
in that country, and then in a series of cross-border attacks that occurred during 
2012, 2013 and 2014 respectively. The ability of recruiters in Cote d’Ivoire to 
contact and activate rebel leaders in Liberia, and for those leaders to, in turn, 
recruit their former fighters to join them during the 2010/2011 crisis presents a 
potential domestic and regional threat to security. Internally, there has been an 
intensification of agitation by tens of thousands of unemployed ex-combatants. 
This situation creates an environment where this vulnerable population can be 
easily mobilized for a variety of purposes. This potential is particularly 
concerning when one considers that ex-combatant networks remain intact, at 
least in terms of communication between ex-leaders and former fighters, and 
that most ex-combatants are familiar with weapons. In this context, former 
fighters could be quickly recruited for violent activities that could threaten peace 
in the nascent democracy. The havoc caused by armed groups, Charles 
Taylor’s repressive rule, and the excesses of Samuel Doe are among the 
horrors graphically described. Other leaders have also shared the blame for the 
problems of Liberia. William Tubman is blamed for establishing a benevolent 
dictatorship, William Tolbert for being tight-fisted and nepotistic, and the so-
called radicals of the 1970s for trying to shape the debate and bringing the 
system down (Sawyer, 2005:2) Even if one accepts the view that the roots of 
the Liberian tragedy lie wholly in a sustained crisis of leadership and embraces 
the “bad man” theory of history, one must still see such crisis through the prism 
of history and, at least, as a project of many accomplices,  internal and foreign, 
witting and un-witting (Sawyer, ibid). Therefore, this study sets out to examine 
the role of individual agency and the importance of analysing individual actions 
within the context of post-war development. Failure to deal with violence can 
lead to a resumption of war as was the case in Angola in 1992, or genocide as 
in Rwanda in 1994. 
Given the strong link between ex-combatant reintegration and long-term 
peace in post- conflict states, researchers must understand as much as 
possible about how to implement programmes that produce ex-combatants 
who are satisfied with DDRR. This is not to say that understanding ex-
combatant satisfaction with DDRR is the most important subject deserving 
study for researchers interested in post-war stability and development; the 
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focus of this study on violence and the DDRR of ex-combatants is an attempt to 
uncover a part of the micro-level process, as successful reintegration of 
combatants may contribute to positive peace-building and discourage resort to 
violence. The study does not guarantee either that a satisfied ex-combatant will 
be unwilling to engage in violence and re-join a rebel group, or that an 
unsatisfied ex-combatant will return to violence and fighting. In a study on post-
conflict Sierra Leone, Humphreys and Weinstein (2007) suggest that 
participation in formal DDRR programmes may do little to improve reintegration 
outcomes along social, political, and economic measures.  It may therefore be 
fruitful to focus our attention on other sources of ex-combatant livelihood rather 
than formal DDRR programmes. This study recognizes these limitations, but it 
contends that DDRR is an integral component of post-war reconstruction if well 
planned and successfully implemented.  
DDRR has been at the forefront of multidimensional peacekeeping 
efforts in recent years, with its primary objective to “contribute to security and 
stability in post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can 
begin” (UN IDDRS 2010:24). Despite the overwhelming consensus that DDRR 
serves as a necessary first step in assuring post-war peace, we know very little 
about the effectiveness of DDRR.  Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis’s (2010:4) 
assessment of DDRR programmes critique past research for over-emphasis on 
implementation issues and technical details, and for promoting ‘best practices’ 
with little empirical assessment. The UN, ECOWAS, AU and other regional and 
international organizations, including donor countries, have been at the 
forefront of this policy oriented endeavour. There is limited analysis on what 
alternatives could be deployed at national levels when the DDRR process fails, 
particularly if viewed against the background of resource endowment available 
in most African countries to capacitate former combatants. Underscoring this 
argument is the recognition that the causes of most African conflicts are due to 
greed for power and the desire to loot the wealth and resources available in 
these countries. At the continental level, except for political-military support and 
interventions, there have not been any coherent regional efforts in pulling 
resources together to address post-war challenges posed by ex-combatants as 
alternatives to the DDRR strategy. Further, there is limited knowledge on the 
perpetrators of violence in post-war environments and their motivation, 
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particularly at the conclusion of the DD components and “reintegration” of 
former combatants. Notwithstanding this reactive disposition and the policy 
dimensions, there  are literatures which seek to address the issues of how to 
deal with ex-combatants in post-war societies (Muggah 2009); Ozedem 2009; 
Humpherys and Weinstein, 2007); (Spear, 2006); Berdal and Ucko, 2009). This 
study aims to explore these significantly. 
The topic of this research is important in understanding violence, DDRR, 
and ex-combatants in post-war Liberia, and how this has impacted on the 
country’s reconstruction and development, including the risks of relapse to 
conflict. It addresses the underlying causes of violence linked to the processes 
of the DDRR of ex-combatants. The study is equally important regionally, 
continentally, and internationally because of the linkages and role of external 
actors in the Liberian conflict. The study notes that violence (settler wars) in 
Liberia pre-dates the foundation of the country as an independent republican 
state in 1847. The context in which violence occurred in pre-Liberia was sharply 
different from the nature of violence in the contemporary post-war Liberian 
state. Liberia is both an aberration and an archetype: in the African context, its 
political history is unique, yet its contemporary record is typical of other African 
states (Levitt, 2005:3). It does not have a colonial legacy, except for the quasi-
colonial period in which the American Colonization Society (ACS), an American 
pseudo-humanitarian association governed by white American slave owners, 
ruled the dominion (1822-1847). In 1847, the settlers (black emigrants, re-
captives) declared independence from the ACS thus marking the advent of 
African settler rule (Levitt, ibid). Therefore, it is important to interrogate such 
post-war violence and its manifestations. 
At the regional level, Liberia has been described as the epicentre of 
conflict in the Mano River Union (MRU) comprising of Cote d’Ivoire, Sierra 
Leone, and Guinea (Sawyer, 2005: xi). An escalation in violence in Liberia 
could have great security impacts on the countries of the MRU. Liberia 
provided a source of recruits and resources that helped to prosecute the civil 
conflicts in Cote d’ Ivoire and Sierra Leone, facilitated by the role of predatory 
leaders in the sub-region and the porous contiguous borders of the MRU 
countries. Continentally, the Liberian conflict witnessed the involvement of 
governments and leaders of ECOWAS, Libya, Cote d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso. 
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This makes Liberia an important research focus. Finally, at the international 
level, Liberia accounted for one of the largest peacekeeping missions from 
2003, with a deployment of 15, 000 troops and over 16 troop contributing 
nations. Foreign powers and individuals have huge business and economic 
interests in Liberia, particularly the United States of America which sometimes 
positions Liberia as its colony in Africa, and has provided political, economic 
and technical military assistance to the country. An attempt by the United 
States to deploy its military Africa Command (AFRICOM) structure in Liberia 
failed due to resistance from some African leaders, namely those of Nigeria, 
Libya and South Africa (Agoha, 2013:205).  
The research focused on the most violent occurrence in Liberia, thought 
to be the handiwork of ex-combatants. This research takes as a starting point 
the uniqueness of Liberia in the following ways: 
1. Liberia defies some discernible characteristics of a West African state, 
including the character of its citizens. 
2. It adapted or copied the American system of government, but mutilated the 
system in its implementation to serve the interest of the capricious and 
patrimonial elites. 
3. Further down the hinterland, cultural and traditional practices are expressed 
in masculinity, with the torture and brutality of the weak and vulnerable, 
particularly women and children.  
 
Research Question 
In understanding the DDRR of ex-combatants and the causes of violence, it is 
important to underscore the transition from civil war to peace, and how the 
legacies of war tend to linger after “peace” has been achieved. Insecurity and 
unresolved grievances mean that political elites as well as civil society remain 
polarized and that the basis for inclusive ideologies is weak. In turning from war 
to peace, protagonists in civil war face difficult challenges because the 
international system fails to adequately and consistently provide external 
security guarantees, protagonists face difficult dilemmas of uncertainty. 
Comprehensive peace agreements do not end conflicts, or even give peace a 
chance to unfold over time (Hoglund, 2008:8). Consequently, following the end 
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of the Liberian civil war in 2003, critical questions emerged for academics and 
policy makers seeking to secure sustainable peace: how can the international 
community assist Liberia wracked by internal war to transform in such a way 
that deep-rooted conflicts can be ameliorated through non-violent means? 
Finding ways to hinder demobilized combatants and soldiers from undermining 
the security of post-war Liberia has been identified as one of the main 
challenges facing successful peace implementation and peacebuilding. Despite 
this, there is limited or no theory explaining this problem at hand. As a result of 
the above, this thesis is based on the answering of the following research 
question: 
 
 What are the perceptions among ex-combatants about their re-
engagement in violence in post-war Liberia?  
 
Genesis of research focus 
This research is a product of over ten years’ experience working in a multi-
dimensional peacekeeping/peacebuilding operation in Liberia, under the 
auspices of the United Nations. It is an attempt to document un-researched 
and/or limited aspects of Liberia’s post-war challenges and problematic.  My 
academic interest is in peace and conflict analysis, and this led me to embark 
on this research with focus on the topic: “Violent Peace in Liberia: A Study of 
the Roles and Ambitions of Ex-Combatants”. The aim is to reveal aspects of 
the post-war problematic that have either been un-researched or under-
researched. The research reflects a genuine desire to understand the dynamics 
of conflict, the behaviour of conflict actors, and the “bargaining game” and 
competition among different actors in the post-war setting. I personally became 
interested in the study of violence and DDRR when I had the opportunity to 
observe and report on DDRR activities in Liberia. My contact with ex-
combatants was one of friendship and reminiscence. I had no formal 
background in DDRR and had not been part of any DDRR programming. 
Rather, I was a UN staff member deployed in the field to monitor and report on 
the processes of the DDRR. Later, under a UN assistance programme, I 
undertook a volunteer teaching assignment at the graduate school of the 
University of Liberia where I taught Peace and Conflict Studies as well as in 
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Africa in World Politics. Thus, my lens was one of seeking to understand how a 
group of men and women who experienced first-hand the taking up of arms for 
political, economic, and social causes, came to “reintegrate” after negotiating a 
cease-fire with their political opponents.  
Aims and objectives of the study 
This study aims to accomplish the following objectives:  
1. To investigate perceptions about ex-combatants’ re-engagement in violence 
in post-war Liberia; 
2. To investigate the process of ex-combatant reintegration; 
3. To explore the linkages between DDRR, violence, and ex-combatants in 
post-war environments through the analysis of data gained from the case 
study; 
4. To develop an effective conceptual framework for the understanding of the 
phenomenon of violence in a post-conflict environment. 
 Main argument and rationale for the research 
 The central argument in this study is the understanding of “post-conflict 
development violence” and the role of ex-combatants. I use this phrase to 
distinguish such violence from perceptions of violence drawn from pre-war and 
war eras. It is also an effort to understand violence, and how its occurrence and 
reproduction could undermine development with risks of reverting to conflict in 
Liberia. I argue that the occurrence of violence in post war Liberia remains one 
of the greatest challenges to economic and political development. Since the 
establishment of democratic government in 2006, violence has become more 
pronounced and has reached new heights, always with the perception that 
such violence is being carried out by ex-combatants. Working as a staff of the 
United Nations, my lived experience led to my academic engagement with 
violence, DDRR and ex-combatants. Based on the stories I heard in Liberia, my 
reviews of the extant literature left me unsatisfied that the voice of the ex-
combatant was adequately captured. For example, many researchers 
constructed identities that included an explicit degree of mistrust and negativity 
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of ex-combatants. Labels such as “spoilers” (Stedman, 1997), “belligerents” 
(Krampe, 2009), “obstacles” (Hauge & Thoresen, 2007), and “drug addicts” 
(Collier, 2007) were used by researchers and DDRR evaluators. In Liberia, ex-
combatants were generally viewed as “uprooted urban youth with a history of 
unemployment, underemployment, and idleness (Boas & Hatloy, 2008), prone 
to criminal behaviour (Abdullah, 1998). 
While violence is a common feature, its intensity, forms of organization 
and motives vary. Violence may be seen as critical security challenge in fragile 
environment such as in Liberia where there is lack of capacity (effectiveness), 
and willingness (will, legitimacy) to perform key government functions for the 
benefit of all (OECD,2008:14). Violence and insecurity in post-conflict 
environments may prove to be adaptive and often very resilient. Post-conflict 
situations may be characterized as “no peace, no war” (MacGinty 2008) 
contexts where the use of violence might have been reduced but is 
nevertheless an option or a strategy for some actors. In this study, the term 
violence will be used only for direct physical violence as defined by the World 
Health Organization “The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened 
or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, 
that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, 
psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation” (WHO, 2002:5).  Even 
when adopting a limited definition for this research focus, violence shows very 
different and manifold forms and expressions. Distinctions can be made 
according to criteria related to organization, relationship, space and goals, 
based on:  
1. The level of organization of the perpetrators: individual versus collective 
violence;  
2. The relationship between victim and perpetrator: intimate versus anonymous 
violence;  
3. The space where violence happens: domestic/private versus public or urban  
versus rural violence; 
 
4. The goals violence is used for: economic, social, political violence (WHO, 
2002:7). 
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The emphasis in this study is on political and economic violence motivations in 
Liberia, and this forms an important part of the analytical framework in chapter 
three.  
 Stovel (2008:310) expressed concern that rebel groups are portrayed as 
terrorists, while Metsola (2006) suggests the reason why ex-combatants are 
viewed with a great deal of suspicion, rather than focusing on their positive 
potential, is fear that their organizational capacity, strategic knowledge, and 
military skills might be used against the ruling class, and this fear extends to 
the international community and donor countries. Therefore, due to these 
pervasive negative images, ex-combatants may potentially, as Gergen 
(2009:59) states, become “morally condemned by the research”. Outside 
observers, under the guise of objectivity, appear to have depicted the ex-
combatants as a potential threat to their nation’s future security and peace. 
Although this may not be totally baseless in certain historical contexts, as has 
been the case with Liberia and its neighbours, my lived experience in Liberia 
suggested to me that this perspective is quite different from the way in which 
ex-combatants view themselves. Stovel (2008:307), for example, questioned 
the international peace brokers’ claim of the reconciliation process in Sierra 
Leone as successful, while her in-depth interviews with the ex-combatants 
themselves revealed a contradictory view. 
Every single phase of violence is different from the others yet carries 
within it some elements of the old. My task here is to discern continuities and 
ruptures in the functions of violence within the socio-historical context of this 
study. The success of the DDRR efforts has been mixed. While previous 
studies focused largely on procedural aspects of post-conflict reconstruction 
and development, this study shifts the focus to understanding how violence is 
linked to DDRR and its participants. It aims to explore “militarized” masculinity 
and its impact on violence. A multiplicity of political, social, historical and 
economic agendas must be explored to simultaneously understand the 
dynamics of factors that produce violence. The demands that result from 
having to cope with a post-war context are multifaceted and inherently 
contradictory. It therefore seems appropriate to posit that though violence is 
socially constructed, the state still possesses distinctly pragmatic and expedient 
ways of responding to radical and economic problematics of violence. Thus, it 
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should be noted that the adaptive and coping style of ex-combatants in the 
post-war era could be ventilated through violence and this has implications for 
peace and development. The study argues that ex-combatants’ dissatisfaction 
with DDRR could worsen their economic conditions, create conditions of 
insecurity, and elevate the level of violence in post-war Liberia.  
 The war in Liberia was fought for 14 years and remains one of the most 
painful problems of Liberian society. For various reasons, mainly of 
humanitarian concerns, it has attracted the attention of other states and of 
major international organizations globally. The conflict has been the subject of 
many journalists’ descriptions and academic studies. The latter mostly include 
historiographical or political science analysis. Some authors provided 
anthropological backgrounds and they suggest valuable insights into Liberian 
war ethnography. The study is done primarily in the multidisciplinary framework 
of political science, sociological, anthropological, historical, and analytical 
conflict studies. I do not place my analysis into any holistic theory of conflict nor 
do I find any useful scholarly results in costly and widely claimed war-torn 
society projects. As Valery Tishkove observed,  the weakness of dominant 
conflict theories lies primarily in their ontological vision of groups as collective 
bodies with ‘needs’, ‘will’, and ‘universal motivations’, not as a situation, a 
feeling, and a speech act or a criminal action. One view of these meta-
approaches is that their real intention is to formulate prescriptions rather than 
produce new knowledge (Tishkove, 2001:12).   
As is the case with post-conflict problematics, most research 
undertakings deliberately ignore any analytical value and prefer to use a kind of 
proxy ‘group research’ for organizing the very process of post-conflict 
reconstruction and development. I cannot claim to provide a complete response 
to Liberia’s post-war problematic, but my aspiration is to bring clarity, to make 
contributions to the literature on violence, DDRR of combatants, that are 
profoundly different from what has been written on Liberia. This, I hope, will 
stimulate the intellectual debate on the part of those who have already invested 
their sentiments, intellect, and career in study of the Liberian cause. My primary 
goal is to bring to the fore the direct voices of the participants (ex-combatants) 
in the crisis, give vent to ‘their’ (marginalized) versions of the events, and to 
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compare them with my own understanding of the story as recorded in my 
collected data and observations.   
In spite of the growing academic debate on violence and DDRR, our 
knowledge of this area remains limited. We lack sufficient insight regarding the 
myriad of activities – violence – which actors use in their efforts to revive, 
modify, or undermine peace. In particular, we lack the analytical tools for a 
better understanding of a violently divided society, within the context of “peace’. 
From a scholar – practitioner lens, there is a preponderance of policy research 
and minimal academic inquiry into the violence continuum, and the implications 
for post-conflict Liberia. Further rationale for the study is how to make sense of 
violence in peace time: its productive, destructive, and reproductive nature. In 
addition, from a participant observer perspective, there is a motivation to 
document my experiences of over ten years in Liberia, from the transitional 
arrangement to democratic governance regime, particularly on how violence 
has manifested at different levels. Also, little research has yet been undertaken 
to identify the specific risk factors that might condition the onset and nature of 
post-conflict armed violence, whether or not it erupts into outright war. The 
research is also relevant in trying to understand public perceptions that the 
strategy and implementation of the DDRR programme has infused a new wave 
of violence in post-conflict Liberia. The question may be asked: why the focus 
on ex-combatants as the primary participants in the research and not other 
post-war elements/groups such members of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), 
and other security personnel, who were disbanded under the security sector 
reforms established by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In the 
restructuring and security sector component, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) referred to the disbanded group as those who may have 
problems with their educational, professional, medical, and fitness 
qualifications, as well as prior history of human rights abuses. Therefore, the 
disbanded category have been included in this study not strictly as ex-
combatants, but because they continue to show the traits of ex-combatants, 
and sometimes express their grievances for being disbanded through violent 
protests in seeking for recompense. (Article VII CPA 2003).  
I noted that the ex-combatant dimension in this study is important 
because, following the failed DDRR of the first Liberian civil war (1989-1997), 
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ex-combatants were massively re-mobilized to fight in the wars of 1997-
1999;1999-2003, and remain a source of security concern in the post-war era, 
including engaging in acts of destabilization within the sub-region (New 
Democrat, 2012). The threat posed by ex-combatants in post-war situation due 
to failed or poor reintegration is probably a key factor preventing the 
achievement of durable peace. There are several reasons why ex-combatants 
are viewed as a major source of insecurity in post-conflict societies. First, they 
are often known to have military “know-how”; second, the experience and 
shooting skills, third, they are the most feared in the society; and fourth, their 
capacity to re-group and resort to violence. Beyond overcoming the threat from 
spoilers, the demobilization of ex-combatants and their reintegration into civilian 
life is the single most important sub-goal of peace implementation (Stedman, 
2003:109). Ex-combatants pose the greatest threat to post-conflict societies 
when they re-engage in violence as members of illegal armed groups either 
operating openly or discretely outside the confines of the law. These types of 
violence not only inflict the greatest loss of lives and property, but also have the 
potential to undermine the legitimacy of the peace that has been achieved. 
Given the harmful effect that ex-combatants’ activities can have on post-conflict 
stability; the international community has increasingly emphasized the resort to 
disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) of ex-
combatants, as a key component towards lasting peace. In addition, the 
concept of peacebuilding has gained important recognition as a tool for post-
war reconstruction and a number of initiatives have been launched to 
systematically collect and analyse best practices on DDRR. These include the 
Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 
and the Stockholm Initiatives on Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (SIDDR).  
This research seeks to understand the nature of violence in post-conflict 
state and how peace can be achieved. Previous research in the field has 
generally discussed violence from a broader perspective, sometimes alluding to 
a continuation of war mentality, without looking at the specificity of causal 
factors. The systematic and empirical analysis of incidents and perpetrators will 
bring rigour to the conclusions. In addition to the academic gains from this 
research, furthering our theoretical and empirical knowledge of violence in post-
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war settings is imperative. A flawed understanding of the phenomenon can lead 
to ineffective implementation of post-war reconstruction and development. The 
aim is that this study will result in a theory explaining which combination of 
incentives and contextual factors explains the motivation to engage in violence. 
Finally, the research hopes to make a clear contribution to the literature on 
violence and the DDRR of ex-combatants in a post-conflict environment.  
 
Thesis Structure  
Chapter 1: is the introduction that provides a description of the context of 
violence in a post-war environment, and Liberia in particular. It focuses on ex-
combatants as the perceived perpetrators of violence. The chapter also 
provides an overview of the research problems, the genesis of the research, its 
objectives and rationale. It introduces the analytical framework of the study. 
Chapter 2: looks at previous research in order to understand more about the 
factors that influence the dynamics of violence in post-war environment. It 
therefore focuses on the discussion of civil wars and post-war violence, their 
interpretation, and the linkages between civil wars and post-war violence, which 
has made violence an important academic area of study. In this particular case, 
it is violence that is thought to be perpetrated by elements that were part of the 
peace agreement that ended the war. Chapter 3: discusses the analytical 
framework and conceptualizes violence in post-conflict settings. It explains in a 
broader context political economy and neo-patrimonialism, and in specific 
terms, how this led to institutionalized patterns of governance and helped in 
facilitating the occurrence of violence in Liberia. Importantly, the chapter 
discussed the four analytical framework praxis: Re-marginalization; Re-
criminalization; Exploitation; and Economic Insecurity of ex-combatants. 
Chapter 4: discusses the research methodology and the approaches adopted 
in the collection of data. Chapter 5: This is the Liberia Case Study chapter 
which focuses on its political history and how it produced violence. It examines 
the nature of the domestic political economy, the outcome of DDRR for the 
participants and how they have created conditions for violence and its 
reproduction. Chapter 6: is the empirical chapter which presents and analyses 
the research data. Chapter 7: is the conclusion. The chapter provides a 
summary of key research findings and issues for further research. 
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 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have discussed the objectives and rationale for the study. I 
have also introduced the research question which identified key objects of the 
study, and in offering answers to this question I hope to make an important 
contribution to the literature on ex-combatants and violence in post-war Liberia. 
The research question also determines the selection of the methodology used 
in this study. The background information provided here sets the stage for the 
discussion of other chapters of the research, and in particular, it has provided 
an insight into the next chapter on what has been previously done in this field of 
study. 
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Chapter Two: Civil Wars and Post-War Violence – Previous 
Research 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the concept of civil wars, specifically in relation to the 
Liberian civil conflicts and the actors in the wars. The chapter is important 
because it explains the context in which wars have occurred, their causes and 
interpretations, as well as the fact that the actors being researched on are the 
product of the civil wars. Specifically, it explains the linkages between civil wars 
and post-conflict violence, and what motivates actors to engage in violence, 
particularly when looking at the successive wars in Liberia (1989 – 2013). The 
material profit gained in these wars by the participants sustained their 
occurrence, and arguably was key in the motivation and action in post-war 
Liberia. In other words, the chapter provides an understanding of why ex-
combatants may find it necessary to re-engage in violence if they look back on 
the war years and feel that the spoils of war are not forthcoming in the post war 
era despite promises of better reintegration opportunities made to them at the 
end of the war. 
 
Explaining Wars and Civil Wars 
I will use the terms civil wars and civil conflicts interchangeably. Broadly, 
I try to explain the nature of wars and how they affect or are linked to the 
continuation of post-war violence. The first section of the chapter attempts to 
explain and analyse the meaning of civil wars from different perspectives. I 
discuss the broad categorizations of civil wars and the debates that have 
informed the interpretations of wars, as well as the consequences of wars on 
individuals, groups, nationally, and continentally. In this section, I try to 
conceptualize civil war, its interpretations, and then link it with the occurrence of 
violence in post-war eras. The chapter further discusses the extent and reach 
of violence, peace agreements and actors in peace negotiations, and the 
implementation of peace agreements in post war era.  
Carl von Clausewitz (1976) wrote that war is a ‘remarkable trinity: 
composed of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, which are to be regarded 
19 
 
as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the 
creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an 
instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone’. Clausewitz 
allocated each of these ‘dominant tendencies’ to a different group of people. 
The passions of primordial violence he attributed to ‘the people’. Creativity, 
imagination, strategy, improvisation and adaptability are the preserve of armies 
and their commanders. Reason and policy is the domain of government. But I 
raise the question about Clausewitz’s notion of ‘reason and policy’ by the 
government. For instance, can the government be reasonable in its decisions 
and policies without them having some negative impact on the population? 
What constitutes reasonability and what type of policy should be of interest to 
the society? However, Clausewitz went on to argue that no explanation of war 
that relies on one of these parts of the trinity would make sense. Only in their 
combination could they have an explanation: 
“These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, 
deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship 
to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to 
fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with 
reality to such an extent that for this reason it would be totally 
useless. The task therefore is to develop a theory that maintains a 
balance between these three tendencies, like an object 
suspended between three magnets (Clausewitz” (1976:89). 
 Peace researcher Quincy Wright noted that: 
To different people wars have different meanings. To some it is 
a plague which ought to be eliminated; to some, a mistake 
which should be avoided; to others, a crime which ought to be 
punished; to still others, it is an anachronism which no longer 
serves any purpose. On the other hand, there are some who 
take a more receptive attitude towards war and regard it as an 
adventure which may be interesting, an instrument which may 
be useful, a procedure which may be legitimate and appropriate, 
or a condition of existence for which one must be prepared 
(Wright, 1964). 
 
If wars are to be understood and, ultimately, overcome, we must agree as to 
what they are. Wright considered a war to have taken place either when it is 
formally declared or when a certain number of troops were involved; he 
suggested 50,000 as a baseline. Lewis Richardson (1999), another pioneering 
peace researcher, sought to define wars by the number of deaths incurred. 
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Singer and Small (1982) have focused on a minimal number of 1,000 combat-
related fatalities. Whatever the technicalities involved, most people might agree 
that war can be described in much the same way as a jurist’s observation about 
pornography: “I may not be able to define it, but I know it when I see it” (Barash 
and Webel, 2009:15). Psychologically, the essence of war is found in the 
intensely hostile attitude among two or more contending groups. Economically, 
war often involves the forced diversion of major resources from civilian to 
military pursuits. Sociologically, it frequently results in rigid structuring of 
society, with prominence given to military functions (ibid). Yet, some influential 
Western philosophers, including Hobbes and Hegel, have at times expressed 
views that seem to deem war as not merely natural but beneficial to humanity 
because, in Hegel’s words (which are also a critique of Immanuel Kant’s path 
breaking essay “Perpetual Peace”), “war prevents a corruption of nations which 
a perpetual, let alone an eternal peace would produce”, (Hegel, 1942). 
Although this view may be in disrepute today, throughout most of the civilized 
world, the fact is that wars have frequently shaken up the existing, and often 
unjust, socio-political order and have resulted in many changes, not all of them 
for the worse. Finally, within the liberal school, war is viewed as a deplorable 
interruption in the linear progression of our species to a better, more peaceful 
world. Many liberal views on the reasons for war emphasize the role of 
misperceptions and cognitive errors, rather than human iniquity on the part of 
political leaders who initiate wars. War in their view is a blunder, the 
consequence of human fallibility: if decision makers would only operate more 
carefully and thoughtfully, most wars would be prevented (Barash and Webel, 
2009: 37). 
Other writers have tried to understand war in different motivations for 
different classes of people. First, there was the ‘craving for power which 
characterizes the governing classes in every nation. This group is supported in 
its hunger for power by another group ‘whose aspirations are on purely 
mercenary, economic lines. A third group arises because man has within him a 
lust for hatred and destruction (Nathan and Norden, 1960). This is only really 
possible because of the interplay of these three groups. Yet, others think 
differently, and emphasize the interdependence of motives.  According to 
Christopher Cramer, all human motivation can be divided into two broad 
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categories: those that conserve and unify, and those that destroy and kill. 
“these are, as you perceive, the well-known opposites, Love and Hate, 
transformed into theoretical entities; they are perhaps, another aspect of those 
eternal polarities, attraction and repulsion, which fall within your province’ 
(Cramer, 2006:5). However, there is no neat distinction between these two 
categories such that just one is involved in the promotion of violence and war. 
But, opinion remains divided on the attribution of motives or causes to specific 
types of individual or group. The challenge in trying to explain and make sense 
of violence and war, and their relationship to profound societal changes at 
local, national, regional and global levels, is to steer between mystifying and 
over-rationalizing. ‘To counter pose the eroticization and “romanticisation” of 
violence by the same means or by forms equally mystical is a dead end 
(Taussig, 2004). 
I will now discuss the categories of civil war. Those interested in violence 
in developing countries have been particularly concerned with the categories of 
‘civil war’ in the light of its proliferation and manifestations. Civil wars are 
grouped together into one category and studied separately from other conflicts. 
Yet there may be more variation within a group of civil wars than between some 
civil wars and other cases of violent social conflict. How then, are civil wars 
defined? What order of diversity is there within the category of civil wars? And 
what kinds of overlap might there be between civil wars and other commonly 
used categories of conflict? Christopher Cramer has posited three criteria for 
categorization of civil wars. First, conflicts must involve fighting between agents 
of or claimants to a state and organized non-state groups from within the same 
country but seeking to replace the government, to secure power in a region or 
even secession from the country, or to change government policy. Second, to 
be classified as a civil war, a conflict of this type must produce enough deaths 
to cross the casualty threshold. Third, at least 100 of these deaths must be on 
the government side (Cramer, 2006:62) However, some classification exercises 
will allow into the camp of civil wars those which foreign troops are involved, so 
long as the other main criteria are satisfied, but others will treat a case like this 
as a distinct category of ‘international internal wars’. The other important 
dimension to the understanding of civil wars is the debate about rules of entry. 
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Nicholas Sambanis put together a definition of civil wars, adopting nine 
criteria as follows: (1) the war must take place within the territory of an 
internationally recognized state with a population of more than 500,000. (2) The 
parties to the conflict must be politically and militarily organized, with 
identifiable leadership and publicly stated objectives – this enables the 
exclusion of organized crime. (3) The government must be a principal 
combatant – or at least, the party representing the government internationally 
and claiming government power must be involved as a combatant. (4) The 
main rebel group(s) must be locally represented and composed of local 
recruits, though there may be international involvement in the war. (5) The war 
is deemed to begin in the first year that the conflict causes 500-1,000 deaths 
and the war is only classed as a war if cumulative deaths over the next two 
years exceed 1,000. (6) The civil war must involve sustained violence, with no 
single year having fewer than twenty-five deaths and no three-year period 
having less than 500 conflict-related deaths. (7) The weaker party must be able 
at all times to inflict at least 100 deaths on the stronger party, though this 
criterion should be adjustable according to the overall insecurity of the war. (8) 
The war ends if it is interrupted by a peace treaty, cease-fire or decisive military 
outcome producing two years or more of peace. (9) If new parties enter the war 
fighting over new issues, a new war is then begun (Sambanis 2002a).  
These definitions and rules of entry may have left out a lot of issues and 
raised questions for further academic debate. Some criteria may apply while 
others will not due to the dynamics in contemporary civil wars. For instance 
many civil wars have displayed in recent years characteristics of non-violence. 
For instance, from 2010 to present, the Arab Spring non-violent uprising 
resulted in the ouster of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, and in Burkina Faso 
where the population rejected the continuous repressive rule of Blaise 
Campaore who was forced out of power. There are also ongoing struggles by 
unarmed civilian population in Syria and other Middle Eastern Countries. Thus 
if the modes and causes of contemporary warfare often resemble non-violence, 
that is, if wars are defined as ‘apolitical’ or ‘criminal’, this is one way in which 
the analytical category of civil war is unrealistic and problematic. Every society 
has its own characteristic form of war. What we tend to perceive as war, what 
policy makers and military leaders define as war, is, in fact, a specific 
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phenomenon which took shape in Europe somewhere between the fifteenth 
and eighteenth centuries, although it has passed through several different 
phases since then (Kaldor, 2012:15).  However, Sambanis’s postulation seeks 
to find a definitive idea of the contours of a civil war, and it appears that the 
effort is to understand civil wars through statistical analysis.  
 The above criterion resembles Peter Wallensteen and Karen Axell’s 
three classifications of armed conflict: 
1. Minor armed conflict: where battle related deaths during the course of 
conflict are below 1000 
2. Intermediate armed conflict: where there are more than 1000 battle-
related deaths recorded during the course of the conflict, and where 
more than 25, but less than 1000, deaths have occurred during a 
particular year. 
3. Wars: where there are more than 1000 battle-related deaths during the 
course of a particular year (Francis, 2006:71) 
However, Francis underscores the problematic nature of this categorization, 
particularly in the context of wars in Africa. He argues that it is not only difficult 
to secure reliable statistics on battle-related casualties, but these ‘civilian-
based’ warfares have also induced starvation, disease and appalling human 
misery, resulting in deaths. Furthering his argument, he notes that civil wars 
also constantly swing from ‘low-to high-intensity’ warfare. The low-intensity 
period may sometimes last two to three years with fewer than 25 battle-related 
deaths for a variety of reasons, including cease-fire, an ongoing peace process 
and a relapse into further war (Francis, 2006-71-72).   
Mary Kaldor (2012) described the new type of organized violence that 
developed in the twentieth century, especially in Africa and Europe, as ‘new 
wars’. She outlined some of the features of ‘new wars’ as described in most 
literature, as internal or civil wars or else ‘low-intensity conflicts’. Although most 
of these wars are localized, they involve a myriad of transnational connections 
so that the distinctions between internal and external, between aggression and 
repression, or even between local and global are difficult to sustain. Some 
scholars describe the new wars as privatized or informal wars (Keen, 1995), 
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yet, while the privatization of violence is an important element of these wars, in 
practice, the distinction between what is private and what is public, state and 
non-state, informal and formal, political or economic motives cannot easily be 
applied. A more appropriate term is perhaps ‘post-modern’, which is used by 
several authors (Duffield, 1999), and it offers a way of distinguishing these wars 
from the wars which could be said to be characteristic of classical modernity. 
However, the term is also used to refer to virtual wars and wars in cyberspace 
(Gray, 1997). A more recent term used by Frank Hoffman (2011), which has 
gained currency, particularly in the military, is ‘hybrid wars’, which captures the 
blurring of public and private, state and non-state, formal and informal that is 
characteristics of new wars.  
 
Interpretations of civil wars 
The crisis in the 1990’s, notably the resistance to US intervention in Somali in 
1992-3, and the Rwandan genocide of 1994 appear to some  writers to signify 
that Africa had turned its back on progress and was sinking into an anarchy 
marked by savagery and superstition. Richburg (1997) stated: ‘Welcome to 
Liberia, scene of one of the wackiest, and most ruthless of Africa’s uncivil 
wars’.  Stephen Ellis (2006) provided an analytical perspective on a number of 
influential works as dominant purveyors of the point of view that the Liberian 
civil war represented some sort of chaos. Ellis examined the essay of Robert 
Kaplan published in the Atlantic Monthly in 1994 entitled “The Coming Anarchy’ 
which began with a discussion of war in Sierra Leone and a brief mention of 
Liberia before going on to consider Turkey, Pakistan, and other parts of the 
world. Kaplan’s argument was that in various parts of what used to be called 
the third world, vast population movements from the countryside to the city, 
caused partly by environmental degradation and high birth-rates, were resulting 
in the appearance of large numbers of desperate, deracinated, unemployable 
youths who were the driving force behind wars like those in West Africa. Kaplan 
suggested that it could be that wars like these could soon be breaking out in 
other parts of the world too, and that West Africa was ahead of the trend. The 
writing of Kaplan received political applause, particularly in the United States, 
and in the Western world in general. In France, an academic had argued in 
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reference to the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, that Western civilization 
was once more threatened by warlike and aggressive barbarism at its gate 
(Ellis, 2006). 
 Contribution to this debate also came from Samuel Huntington in his 
article in Foreign Affairs, the house journal of the Washington foreign policy 
establishment, entitled “The Clash of Civilizations”, in which he argued that, all 
over the world, wars between ideological blocks were now giving way to wars 
between broadly defined cultural blocks or civilizations (Huntington, 1993:22-
49). According to Ellis, academics who specialize in African studies, as well as 
African intellectuals, almost all reject these views, (e.g Nuruddin Farah, 
1996:60-70). Paul Richards, author of a study of war which spread to Sierra 
Leone from Liberia in 1991, suggests that the work of Kaplan and Huntington 
amounts to a school of thought concerning wars in Africa, and perhaps some 
parts of the world, which he terms the New Barbarism thesis ( Richards, 
1996:xiii-xxix). 
 Richards refutes this assertion by demonstrating that the causes of the 
war in Sierra Leone stem more from a collapse of the patrimonial state erected 
in the late colonial times than they do from either environmental decay or a 
crisis of cultural identity. He argues passionately that war is always horrible, 
and that this is so whether it is fought with machetes and light machine-guns, in 
which case killing is at close quarter, or with computer-guided bombs. “‘It 
makes no sense to call one kind of war “barbaric”, when all that is meant is that 
it is cheap” (Richards, 1996: xxv). His argument is that war is war and that 
attempts to portray West African wars as unusually barbaric amount to no more 
than the revival of some old clichés about the Dark Continent (ibid). But, 
Richards too has been criticized by other African scholars who accuse him of 
overlooking empirical evidence, and idealizing the main rebel movement in 
Sierra Leone while ignoring its cultural origin and assigning single causes to 
events which have complex roots (Abdullah and Bangura1997). 
There is no doubt that the Western press (Richburg and Kaplan are 
Western Journalists) has generally represented the Liberia war with ‘bizarre 
documentary-style coverage from the “Heart of Darkness” rather than news of a 
serious threat to international peace and security (Ellis, 2006:21). According to 
Ellis, those who would argue simply that wars such as that in Liberia are 
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represented by fickle journalists as being more anarchic than is really the case 
are missing a number of important points. The observation that wars like that in 
Liberia result from the breakdown of a specific political order begs question 
about why such an order breaks down, and why the resulting conflict takes a 
certain pattern. He contends that some African academics who have 
themselves lived through recent civil wars in the continent have suggested that 
the disruption of whole societies as a result of massive failures of social 
engineering may be a cause of violence in the continent, and that at least some 
African wars have to be understood as complex social phenomena (Ellis, 
2006). In reality, many Liberians and other West Africans consider the Liberian 
war to have been particularly horrible. Ellis has documented the comments of 
one survivor as follows: 
“In all frankness the Liberian civil and guerrilla war topped and 
surpassed {all other wars} in form and character, in intensity, in 
depravity, in savagery, in barbarism and in horror. {…..} As far 
as the men behind the war were concerned, one should be 
forewarned that the world could be breeding a new species of 
mankind with no contrite hearts, with no compassion, with no 
regard for law and order and whose ambitions in life have no 
bounds at the perils of others. It has started off in Liberia, but 
one should beware that there are many more Charles Taylors 
and Prince Johnsons, the new species of human kind, around 
not only in Liberia, but in other places, especially in Africa today” 
(Ellis, 2006:21-22).  
 
I then ask the question: was there any religious dimension to the Liberian civil 
war? Stephen Ellis’s book entitled “The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of 
Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War” probably provides 
an answer. Some of the acts of the Liberian civil war, have been considered 
particularly atrocious, in the views of many Liberians this reflects known 
repertoires of spiritual symbols. Most notably these repertoires are those 
relating to religion. In this book, Ellis noted that many of the main protagonists 
in the war have claimed, some with obvious sincerity, to have been in direct 
communication with God at various stages of their bloody careers. This is not 
just a personal quirk, but is situated in a history in which religious belief has 
functioned as a mainstay of political and social order. Religion, per se, is not 
the focus of this study, but it is important to underscore its inevitable role in 
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most African wars, particularly when the breakdown of a given political order is 
rooted in religion.  
Faced with a post-Cold War decline in superpower support, both rebels 
and governments have sought alternative sources of revenue to sustain their 
military campaigns. In addition to the traditional means of pillage and plunder, 
the trade in lucrative natural resources, diaspora remittances, and the capture 
of foreign aid have become increasingly important sources of combatant self-
financing (Ballentine and Nitzschke. 2005). Facilitated by weakly regulated 
globalization and weak states in the developing world, combatants benefit from 
business deals with criminal networks, arms traffickers, and unscrupulous 
corporate entities, reaching well beyond the war zones to the world’s 
commodity markets and major financial centres (Duffield 1999). Given the role 
of lucrative natural resources in fuelling war economies, the term “resource 
wars” (discussed in chapter three) has become popular among analysts and 
policy makers. Some even see these as a new type of armed conflict (Colliers 
2000; Renner 2002). More broadly, however, attention on the economics of 
conflict has found expression in the concept of “war economies”. The distinctive 
features of war economies include, but are not limited to the following:  
1. They involve the destruction or circumvention of the formal economy and the 
growth of informal and black markets, effectively blurring the lines between the 
formal, informal, and criminal sectors and activities;  
2. Pillage, predation, extortion, and deliberate violence against civilians are 
used by combatants to acquire control over lucrative assets, capture trade 
networks and diaspora remittances, and exploit labour;  
3. War economies are highly decentralized and privatized, both in the means of 
coercion and in the means of production and exchange;  
4. Combatants increasingly rely on the licit or illicit exploitation of/trade in 
lucrative natural resources where these assets obtain;  
5. They thrive on cross-border trading networks, regional kin and ethnic groups, 
arms traffickers and mercenaries, as well as legally operating commercial 
entities, each of which may have a vested interest in the continuation of conflict 
and instability (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005:2).  
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Viewing intrastate conflicts from a political economy perspective can 
improve understanding of the key dynamics of many of today’s civil wars. It can 
also lead to a more systematic understanding of how these dynamics impact on 
conflict resolution and post-conflict peacebuilding. As such, the political 
economy of armed conflict should be seen as an important addition to 
contemporary conflict analysis and policy development by those in 
governments, international organizations, donor agencies, NGOs and the 
private sector who are concerned with war and peace. 
In his book, Uniting Africa: Building Regional Peace and Security 
Systems, David Francis (2006) discussed the diverse theoretical interpretations 
and labelling that different writers have been used to explain and describe wars 
and armed conflict in Africa, in particular in the post-Cold War conflicts. He 
described them as ‘protracted social conflict’; ‘asymmetrical warfare’; ‘civilian-
based civil wars’; ‘international social conflicts’;  ‘regional security complex’; ‘fire 
next door’; ‘complex political emergencies’; ‘new wars’; ‘ethno-religious wars’; 
‘retreat from modernity’; ‘greed and grievances’; ‘guerrilla/insurgency warfare’; 
‘low-intensity conflict’; and unconventional warfare; and  what Kaldor (2012) 
described as technology-intensive old wars, etc.. These interpretations are 
sometimes used interchangeably depending on the particular context. They 
also have much to do with the different strategies, tactics, and war weaponry 
used in order to prosecute the war or conflict. The extent and reach of the 
Liberian civil war sometimes defy specific categorization and interpretation, and 
have been viewed from different contexts by different writers. Regrettably, there 
has not been a single inquiry into the historical sources and interpretation of 
wars in the Republic of Liberia. Most of the literature fails to examine the 
dynamics of conflict in the pre-1980 period. As a result, there are few 
comprehensive, authoritative, and convincing ‘hypotheses about the causes 
and interpretations of conflict in Liberia.  As Michael Brown stated: 
“One of the keys to advancing knowledge in this area  will be the 
production of detailed case studies carefully focused on 
proximate causes of internal conflict – more specifically, on the 
precise moments when political disputes become violent 
confrontation. Most case histories lack sharp focus……. In short 
much work needs to be done” (Brown, 1997:25). 
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Brown’s comments have particular significance to the case of Liberia because 
very few African states have endured the same number of domestic wars, 
revolts, and uprisings or have a comparable authoritarian tradition. In the light 
of this, it is essential to examine all the micro and macro-wars that 
characterized the republic. Generally such an approach is important because 
“existing literature on internal conflict is weak when it comes to identifying the 
catalytic factors” or the triggers of internal conflict (ibid), and the root of socio-
political and core institutional factors that create enabling environments for the 
triggers. Therefore, the analysis presented in this study attempts to fill this gap 
in the literature and perhaps will serve as a framework for the study of conflict 
in other states that have similar legacies of minority rule, ethnic conflict, and a 
patrimonial establishment.  
I begin by examining Levitt’s (2005) horizontal and vertical nexus. The 
horizontal syllogism derives from the historical, social, cultural, political, and 
economic processes that have shaped Liberia’s socio-political landscape since 
its theoretical inception. Its vertical logic stems from the linear and 
chronological examination of the eighteen conflicts that have taken place in 
Liberia. Both modes are intimately intertwined and join to provide a conceptual 
framework for determining the sources and interpretations of wars in the 
country. Primary attention has been given to the study of ‘indigenous-settler’ 
warfare with occasional reference being made to ‘inter-indigenous’ and ‘inter-
settler’ war. Thus, these wars represent ‘all’ wars that resulted in fatalities 
between 1822 and 2003, including the 1980 coup d’état against the William 
Tolbert regime and the “Great War”. The wars have been interpreted and 
labelled in different terms as ‘Water Battles’; ‘Settler Wars’; ‘Settler Fish men 
Conflict’; ‘Settler Battles’; ‘Government Indigenous Wars’; ‘Reunited Kingdom 
Revolution’; ‘Kru Confederacy-Government Wars’; and the Great Wars; 1989-
2003, etc. (ibid). 
A further interpretation of wars relates to the “just war theory”. War has 
been a central feature of civilization throughout recorded time and it is hardly 
surprising, therefore, that a concern with, or anguish over its moral justifications 
should feature so prominently across cultures, in so many past and present 
theories of morality. The term “just war theory” is usually employed to denote 
that specific body of moral doctrine found within Christianity, even though it can 
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be presented with different theistic bases as well as in purely secular terms 
(Evans, 2005:1). It is Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) who is generally credited with 
the completion of just war theory’s secularization in his comprehensive 
treatment of a natural law-based account of international law in The Law of War 
and Peace (Grotius, 1925). His emphasis against defence or threatened or 
actual attack as the just cause for war acquired refocused meaning and 
increased resonance in the 17th century with the development of the modern 
state and the international system of state from the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia 
(Evans, 2005:4). Just war theory is no more an ‘apology’ or ‘excuse’ than it is 
supposed to be a purely descriptive explanation of why war has actually broken 
out. This is because if we excuse our doing of X, we are in general giving 
reasons for doing X when in fact X is not something that we should have done. 
There may be mitigating reasons that reduce our culpability in having done X, 
but they do not fully justify it; that is, they do not show that we should have 
done, or at least permissibly did, X after all. Just war theory identifies the 
grounds on which we may justify waging war, the reasons which give us 
warrant – good, legitimizing reasons – for this act (Evans, 2005:7). This has 
been frequently invoked as an excuse for waging war, when in fact there was 
no justification for such. Therefore, the theory or principle can be misused, and 
the propensity for misuse cannot in itself be a reason for rejecting it.  
The diverse theoretical interpretations and generations of conflict 
analysis underscore the multi-dimensional and multi-level nature of conflict and 
its causes in Africa. Any analysis of the causes of conflict in Africa should 
involve an exploration of the root causes, and secondary and tertiary causes, 
the historical legacies and particular conflict situations, and external factors 
(Francis, 2006). Francis argued persuasively that this analysis should be 
combined with an analysis of the structures that predispose communities to 
violent conflict, in particular, the perceptions and meanings attributed to these 
institutions, events and policies, and how these are mobilized to instigate 
conflict. In addition, analysis of the causes and structures should also include 
analysis of the actors, that is, individuals, groups, community incentives and 
motivations at local, national, regional and international levels, and the 
dynamics of conflict, that is the changing nature of conflict and its destructive 
process, and how this reshapes perceptions of causes of war, transforms 
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relations and serves as a trigger for new armed conflict, or creates 
opportunities for resolution of conflict. Francis concluded with two important 
elements relevant to conflict analysis; these are, the role played by external 
factors and the link between poverty, underdevelopment and conflict. He noted 
that external factors continue to play considerable and, sometimes, decisive 
roles in instigating violent conflict in Africa. The development paradigms 
prescribed for Africa, in particular the latest stage of neo-liberal development 
orthodoxy, the ‘Washington Consensus’ Structural Adjustment Programs 
(SAPs) have instigated or exacerbated conflicts in Africa. The imposing of 
SAPs and their negative effects sparked, and in some cases fuelled, conflicts 
and hastened the collapse of states in Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC, Somalia and 
Cote d’Ivoire. The international economic environment has in most cases 
aggravated the problems of these weak economies in that unfavourable trade 
restrictions and lack of access to the world market for primary producers, 
fluctuating terms of trade, increasing debt burden and debt service obligations 
have all contributed to the poor performance and devastation of African 
economies. This has inevitably produced increasing poverty and depressed 
social and development indicators.  
 Thus, developmentalists see a positive correlation between conflict and 
the nature and dynamics of under-development, hence the only way to prevent 
and reduce armed conflict and its ‘associated pathologies of crime and 
terrorism’ is to respond with development programs to remedy the 
underdevelopment malaise (Francis, 2006:85). Arguments have been made 
that poverty may not necessarily be a direct cause of conflict, it may however 
increase its probability. This is why the eradication of poverty is an overriding 
goal of the international community, led by the UNDP, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa. The magnitude and expansion of poverty in Africa and the 
grave threat it poses to social, political, and economic stability makes it one of 
the biggest challenges facing the region. Recent estimates put the number of 
poor people living in Sub-Saharan Africa at 250 million, which is around 45 
percent of the region’s population. And poverty continues to spread in Africa at 
an alarming rate because of virtual stagnation of per capita income growth and 
limited prospects for economic growth (Kankwenda, et.al 2000).  
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Causes of civil wars – “Greed and Grievance Perspective”  
In his discourse of conflict analysis, David Francis (2006) identified 
distinct types of war and armed conflict within the African context. These 
include; Wars of national liberation; Cold wars and proxy wars; Secessionist 
wars; Inter-state and conventional wars; Identity-based wars; and Resource-
based wars. Where then does the Liberian civil war fall? The Liberian civil war 
is a combination of proxy war, identity-based war, and resource-based war, and 
to this one may add, though not included in Francis’s typology, intra-state wars. 
Former President Charles Taylor of Liberia’s surrogate war in Sierra Leone 
through the RUF-backed rebels, (Francis) the Samuel Doe orchestrated ethnic 
animosity between his Khran ethnic group (Grand Gedeh County), the 
Gio/Mano (Nimba County), and the Mandingos (cut-across counties), are 
examples of proxy, identity and resource-based wars.  The inclusion of intra-
state war is important and provides further clarity. Intra-state war is often linked 
to identity-based war. Here, however, I provide a different explanation. Identity-
based war relates to a situation where one ethnic group tries to destroy another 
ethnic group in the same country. This could potentially be genocide rather 
than civil war. On the other hand, armed insurrections, internal struggles for 
power, and popular uprisings are intra-state conflicts regardless of whether 
they count as civil wars, because they all occur within a state. Thus, intra-state 
war can occur any time two groups in the same country have irreconcilable 
goals. 
In the early 1990s and 2000s new theories emerged that depicted 
African wars as “resource wars” and this was driven by the logic of predation, 
greed, and grievances. Some of the wars that devastated African and 
extractive economies in the global south were described as “paradox of plenty” 
or “resource curse” (Karl, 1997). Perhaps no other work has had more impact 
on the policy discourse on economic causes of civil war than the econometric 
studies by Paul Collier, and his introduction of the “greed or grievance” 
dichotomy. Among the many important findings, the most widely reported was 
that a moderate to high natural resource dependence of a country (measured in 
terms of primary commodity exports as part of GDP) is correlated with a higher 
risk of conflict. According to his controversial “greed thesis”, economic 
motivations and opportunities (“loot-seeking”) are more highly correlated with 
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the onset of conflict than ethnic, socio-economic, or political grievances 
(“justice-seeking”). This led to the hypothesis that resource wealth makes 
rebellion feasible by providing the opportunity and even the motivation for 
rebellion. As far as grievances are concerned, Collier asserts that they amount 
to little more than a rebel discourse used to mask and to justify their predatory 
activities among those whose support they seek (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 
Collier 2000). The idea that civil war is driven by rebel greed was particularly 
appealing to some policy-makers, discouraged by the complexity and seeming 
intractability of “ethnic” and religious conflicts of the early 1990s. If many 
contemporary conflicts are driven by contests over economic resources, then 
“resource wars” should be more amenable to resolution than conflicts over 
such indivisible identity issues as ethnicity, religion, or ideology. The greed 
thesis shaped politics as well as policy, as corrupt and repressive leaders in 
conflict countries found in it a useful argument to deflect attention from their 
own wrong-doings by putting the blame for their countries’ misery on “greedy 
rebels”. 
Proponents of the greed and grievance theories like Collier and Hoeffler 
are of the view that protagonists of war such as strong men, warlords, rebel 
forces and combat-mobilisable youths are driven by the enormous economic 
opportunities presented by lootable natural resources in “war economies” as 
opposed to what many previous analysts have identified as objective or 
genuine grievances – e.g. political exclusion, marginalization and repression, 
social and legal injustice, etc. However, natural resources do not always play a 
primary role in starting armed violence.  Conflict erupts for a variety of inter-
related reasons, but can be perpetuated by greed when a state is weak and 
unable to protect its porous borders from state and non-state armed 
combatants (Fearon, 2004; UN, 2001). Collier’s greed and grievance thesis of 
lootable and non-lootable components is presented in table 1 below:   
The types of resources and how “lootable” they are also shapes the 
nature of conflicts. Easily lootable resources – for example, minerals and 
diamonds – tend to encourage conflict for non-secessionist purposes, such as 
in Liberia, while in South Sudan, non-lootable resources – such as mineral ores 
and oil – tend to encourage secessionist conflicts (Ross, 2004). 
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 Separatist Conflicts Non-Separatist Conflicts 
Lootable 
Resources 
Burma- timber, gems, opium Afghanistan - gems, opium 
Angola (UNITA) – diamonds 
Cambodia – timber, gems 
Colombia – opium, coca 
DRC – coltan, diamonds coffee 
Liberia – timber, diamonds, 
cocoa, coffee, marijuana, 
rubber, gold 
Peru – coca 
Sierra Leone – diamonds  
Unlootable 
Resources 
Angola (Cabinda) – oil 
Indonesia (Aceh) – natural gas 
Indonesia (West Papua) – 
copper, gold 
Papua New Guinea – copper, 
gold 
Sudan – oil  
Angola (UNITA) – oil 
Colombia – oil, gas 
Congo Republic – oil 
DRC – copper, cobalt  
Table 1: Resource Wealth, Lootability, and Types of Conflict (adapted from Ballentine 
and Nitzschke, 2005).  
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LOCAL, NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL 
  
CLIMATE 
CHANGE 
GREED/GRIEVANCE 
OVERLAP 
TRIANGLE 
MINERAL 
METALS 
DIAMONDS  
Lootable 
Non/lootable  
ENVIROMENTAL 
FACTORS 
NATURAL RESOURCE 
FACTORS/ENDOWMENTS  
NATURE OF 
THE STATE  
NATURAL RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE 
E.g. mineral rights 
WEAK/ 
UNACCOUNTA-
BLE 
BRODER 
POLICY 
GOVERNANCE 
DEVELOPMENT 
SECURITY 
IDENTITY 
HUMAN 
MOVEMENT 
POPULATION 
GROWTH 
LIVELIHOODS 
POWER  
INEQUALITY 
ENVIROMENTAL JUSTICE 
TIMBER, OIL, FISH 
SUSTAINABLE 
ENVIROMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT  
E.g. Land Tenure 
Rights and 
Government  
Policy 
LAND 
MARKET
S 
E.g. ECONOMIC 
ACTORS 
MARKETS 
REFUGEES 
WATER CONFLICT 
CIVILIANS 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 
REBELS 
AGENCY 
MNC’S 
Greed Grievance 
OVERLAP 
Greed & grievance 
SUBSISTENCE       
FARMERS 
 GREED AND GRIEVANCE AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS 
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Diagram 1: Greed and Grievance, and Conflict (adapted from Alida Kok, et.al 
2009) 
 
The diagram above explains the greed, grievances and conflict framework. The 
right side of the diagram focuses on natural resource factors and ‘greed’. It 
highlights the importance of natural resource governance, the capacity of the 
state and the control of borders. The left side of the diagram highlights 
environmental factors and ‘grievances’. Here, sustainable environmental 
management is central. The triangle indicates the overlap of the two factors, as 
the merging of greed and grievance. Factors such as timber, oil and fish relate to 
both greed and grievance. The triangle also contains concepts that apply to both 
greed and grievance in conflicts, such as livelihoods, power, inequality and 
environmental justice. Also in the overlap, the agency of refugees, subsistence 
farmers, armed factions and local, regional, and international markets, and MNC’s 
are critical. Concerns about political and economic governance, displayed on the 
outer layer apply to all types of conflict. In general, the diagram considers that 
conflicts and the factors that may fuel them can play out at the local, national, 
regional and international levels. Essentially, the framework, as shown in the 
diagram above: Greed and Grievance and Conflict Analysis, acknowledges the 
distinctions between greed and grievance, while addressing the overlap of greed 
and grievance, which fuels conflict. This diagram is not exhaustive, but is an effort 
to explain the possible linkages of greed and grievance factors in most African 
civil wars. 
However, among scholars - and not only those who distrust the 
reductionist tendencies of quantitative studies - there has been growing 
recognition of the methodological and analytical shortcomings of the greed thesis 
that renders Collier’s findings and interpretations problematic (Francis 2006; 
Ballentine 2003; Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; Berdal 2003 and 2004). 
Leading this scholarly argument is David Francis, who sees Collier’s 
“greed and grievances” thesis as an over-simplification of the causes of conflict in 
Africa. He commented extensively on the apparent gaps in Collier’s postulation, 
and in particular, stressed that the popularization of the ‘greed and grievance 
thesis is not helpful in conflict analysis in Africa.’  Below are salient points of 
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Francis’s argument and how they may fit into the Liberian situation, and conflicts 
elsewhere in Africa: 
1. There is a neglect of the importance of fundamental grievances such as 
socio-economic inequality, political repression and social fractionalization 
of communities. 
2. In the so-called proxy economies such as Sierra Leone, DRC and Angola, 
evidence shows the importance of grievance as the root cause of conflict 
rather than ‘greed’. 
3. Although greed plays a role in fuelling and prolonging wars in Africa to 
single it out is too simplistic, and no single interpretation can explain 
conflict situations in Africa.  
4. Identity-based and resource-based analyses of conflict have demonstrated 
the greatest potential for spill-over of effects of civil wars or the 
regionalization of domestic armed conflicts. 
5. No two conflicts are the same despite some commonalities, and there is a 
need to focus on a case-by-case understanding of conflict within the 
framework of identity and resource-based analysis (Francis, 2006).  
The conflict in Liberia is often described as a 'resource war'. Looking more 
closely, however, one can find more differentiated reasons. During the 
dictatorship of President Samuel Doe, access to political decisions was 
monopolized by the clan of the President and its ethnic group. The exclusion, 
both socially and politically, from power due to ethnic considerations played a 
leading role in the cause of the conflict. After the overthrow of Doe, the conflict 
became increasingly 'commercialized' and criminalized by rival warlords who 
financed their activities through looting resources. The end of the conflict was 
characterized by more political activity when the rebel movements LURD and 
MODEL, and those parts of society and ethnic groups represented by them, again 
fought against the monopoly of power by Charles Taylor. This example illustrates 
how political and economic reasons for a conflict can be superimposed on each 
other and can take turns in the framework of one or more transformation 
processes.  
The categories 'greed' and 'grievance' represent the difference between 
conflicts that are driven by profit from lootable resources and conflicts which can 
be traced back to political and social opposition. The dichotomy 'greed vs. 
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grievance' must not, however, be allowed to lead to reductionist attempts at 
finding an explanation for the conflict. Critics, for instance, blame the UN for 
having concentrated far too much on the 'greed' approach in the mid- 1990s in 
the framework of their efforts to bring peace to Sierra Leone and Angola, thus 
neglecting underlying socio-political causes for and the complexity of the conflicts. 
A differentiated analysis therefore has to ask questions beyond the immediately 
visible motives for a rebellion, questions about the condition of state structures at 
the time the conflict started and possible hidden reasons for conflict. 
In the case of Liberia, the deepening of the crisis which then made it 
unique was founded in what I have referred to as three predatory factors:  first, a 
patrimonial order established at the mid-nineteenth century which reposed 
considerable powers in the presidency and has been sustained in a neo-
patrimonial order; second, presidential autocracy (partly derived from the 
constitution) which fostered violence; and third, brutal dictatorship whose 
excesses accelerated the disintegration of the Liberian social order. This occurred 
at a time when significant change in the global order provided opportunities for 
the emergence of a gangster regime that inflicted terror in Liberian society and 
ignited violent conflict in the entire Mano River basin area.  Perceived to be 
presenting no threat to international peace, gangster rule gained international 
acquiescence and, with the support of the international community, was legalized 
through elections (of Taylor) in which ordinary Liberians were constrained to 
surrender their struggle for freedom and democracy in exchange for a period of 
peace. Such a trade-off brought neither peace nor unchallenged control by the 
government, instead it created conditions for continued violence not only in 
Liberia but also in the wider Mano River basin area (Sawyer, 2005). These tragic 
developments are readily visible and well known. For instance, Kamara (2003:1) 
argued that Liberia link to the conflict in Cote d’Ivoire shows the extent to which 
Liberian remains at the centre of regional instability. 
Other writers have also criticized Collier’s “greed and grievances” thesis. 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003.) point to a danger in inferring individual 
motivations from statistical correlations. The mere fact that combatants engage in 
predatory economic activities is seldom a reliable guide to their central 
dispositions. While some may participate in war economies to “do well out of war” 
others may do so out of the sheer need to survive, while still others may be 
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coerced for their labour and land. Furthermore, individual motivations may 
change over time as conflicts mutate. Conflicts that begin as predominantly 
“grievance”-based may over time be complemented and, for some, even 
surpassed by pecuniary motives. In fact, such mutation can be witnessed in the 
protracted conflicts of Colombia and Angola. Determining just which motivations 
matter where and when requires more careful categorization of different 
behaviours and empirical validation (Ballentine and Sherman 2003).  
Much of the early research, and explicitly that of Collier, was overly “rebel 
centric”, neglecting the role of the state both as an actor and institution in causing 
or prolonging conflict. The unexplored assumption was that “rebels - not state 
actors cause conflict”, leading to a pro-state bias in analysis and policy action. 
Theories of rebellion thus provide only an incomplete picture of conflict onset. 
Neglecting an analysis of state behaviour may in fact legitimize repressive and 
corrupt state elites who may also profit from war at the expense of the population. 
Indeed, this state bias was evident in UN sanctions efforts to curtail the trade in 
conflict diamonds, which are narrowly defined as diamonds used by rebel 
movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate 
governments (United Nations 2001). Again, for some observers many of today’s 
insurgencies, such as the so-called, “narco-guerrillas“ in Colombia, have evolved 
into criminal enterprises and should be treated accordingly (Collier 2000). Yet, 
however much insurgency and criminality overlap in today’s conflicts, they are not 
the same. Whereas criminal organizations employ violence in the sole pursuit of 
profit, experts agree that combatant groups engage in economic activities to 
pursue military and political goals (Gutiérrez Sanin 2003). Casting rebellion as a 
merely criminal rather than political activity may foreclose opportunities for 
diplomatic solutions. The opportunity structure for rebellion does not depend on 
the availability of resources per se. Rather, critical governance failures are the 
mediating variable. Systemic corruption and the inequitable distribution of 
resource rents, patrimonial rule, and the systematic exclusion of ethnic or other 
minority groups (“horizontal inequalities”) can create conditions conducive to the 
onset of conflict (Steward 2003; Nafziger and Auvinen 2003). At the same time, 
the corrosive effects of resource rents – often called the resource curse – on the 
relative military, political, and economic strength of a state make rebellion more 
feasible (Ross 1999). The weaker the state, the more feasible becomes rebellion, 
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whether the goal is to overthrow a kleptocratic system or simply to get a piece of 
the pie. 
While the availability of lucrative natural resources has important 
consequences for conflict dynamics, explanations of conflict should avoid 
“resource reductionist” models in favour of more comprehensive approaches that 
focus on the wider range of political and economic interactions that drive conflict. 
Indeed, qualitative studies suggest that economic motives of self- enrichment and 
economic opportunities for insurgent mobilization are not the sole or even primary 
cause of conflict. Rather, the outbreak of conflict tends to be triggered by the 
interaction of economic motives and opportunities with socio-cultural, political, 
and economic grievances (Ballentine and Sherman 2003). Broadly, three 
arguments have been put forward to further explain the causes of civil war, 
namely; the cultural argument, the economic argument, and the political-regime 
explanation (Woodward, 2007).  
Cultural argument: For the proponents of this position, the root causes of civil war 
are cultural differences and especially political discrimination against minorities 
defined in cultural terms – leading some to adopt the general term ‘grievance’ for 
the cause. It is often summarized as ‘ethnic conflict’. By this argument, cultural 
pluralism or divided societies are violence-prone due to long standing primordial 
identities (sometimes called ‘ancient hatred’) and recurring conflicts over status, 
treatment and rights between groups so identified (Peterson, 2002; Kaufman 
2001; Gurr 2000). For some analysts, these identities are not given, but socially 
or politically constructed, and thus the source of the conflict is not different per se, 
but political leaders called ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ who manipulate identities and 
feelings of discrimination by appeals to nationalism in ethnically heterogeneous 
societies for political gain (Gagnon 1994/95; Mansfield and Singer 1995).  
Economic argument: Collier and his colleagues began their analysis with the 
motivation for rebels and the opportunities for their action. They argued that civil 
war is caused by ‘greed’ and the opportunity provided by war ‘to loot’, especially 
where huge profits could be made from natural resources like diamonds or 
timber, called ‘resource predation’. 
Political regime argument: In this framework, civil war is caused by authoritarian 
rule, or the absence of democracy. Public attention to this argument may well 
have more to do with its strong affinity to an equally public argument during the 
41 
 
1990’s, that of democratic-peace theory in international relations, but its empirical 
base is the minorities-at-risk and Polity datasets developed at the University of 
Maryland by Ted Robert Gurr and associates (1993; 2000) and the political 
problems of culturally fragmented or polarized societies. Further argument is that 
‘partial democracies’ and a particular sequence of democratization, not the 
process of democratic transition in general, are most prone to political instability 
and even violence (Goldstone et.al. 2005). 
Finally, in spite of these criticisms, the greed versus grievance debate 
made important contributions to the study of civil war and to policy development. 
The quantitative studies undertaken by Collier and others have played an 
important role in advancing more systematic research and policy analysis on the 
much- neglected economic dimension of violence and civil wars. Importantly, they 
have established civil wars as a subject for economic research beyond the prior 
focus on measuring the costs of war and peace. According to Ballentine and 
Nitzschke (2005) by using the methods of rational choice in conflict analysis, both 
the functionalist and the greed models of civil war offer a powerful counter-
argument to the “ancient hatred“ explanations of conflict popular in both research 
and policy discourse in the mid-1990s. And the focus on the role of natural 
resource wealth rather than scarcity as a permissive cause of armed conflict 
provides an important new explanatory framework for studies of war and peace, 
and underscores the conflict prevention potential of development policies that 
target strategies of economic diversification.  
Link between Civil Wars and Post-War Violence 
This section discusses how violence in times of war-ended, is linked to post-war 
violence. Violence during civil war manifest in different forms.  Research on civil 
war sometimes overlooks the issue of violence. Most studies have focused, 
explicitly or implicitly, on the causes of civil war (Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978), civil 
war termination (Walter 1997; Licklider 1993), the political and social 
consequences of civil war (Rich and Stubbs 1997), the factors accounting for the 
success or failure of the belligerents (Race 1972; Leites and Wolf 1970), and the 
individual and group motivations underlying rebellion (Popkin 1979; Scott 1977). 
Violence is a key political resource in the conduct of civil wars. One of the major 
(if not the major) aspects of civil war, violence against (and between) civilians, 
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has been severely neglected. The centrality of violence in civil wars has been 
emphasized by observers and participants alike since Thucydides, who describes 
the civil war in Corcyra (Greece) as a situation in which “there was death in every 
shape and form.  
In modern civilization, since about 1500, Quincy Wright (1942-1965), found 
there had been at least 284 wars and some 3,000 battles. He defined a battle as 
involving more than 2,000 casualties on land or more than 500 at sea; a war was 
a hostile encounter which involved more than 50,000 troops or which was legally 
declared as war (Van der Dennen 1981), but he warned that there were 
inadequate measures of human violence. According to Lewis Richardson, there 
were at least 59 million deaths from human violence between 1820 and 1946, of 
which fewer than 10 million were attributable to individual and small-group 
violence; the remainder occurred as a result of wars (Richardson, 1999). During 
civil wars, there are direct and indirect casualties. Direct casualties involve deaths 
recorded during fighting in the battle field with the use of weaponry and other 
lethal means. War kills indirectly, particularly by diseases among armed forces 
personnel as well as by starvation as a result of disrupted food production and 
distribution services. For example, more than eight million soldiers and one 
million civilians died during World War 1, with approximately 18 million additional 
people dying during the influenza epidemic of 1918. Historically, in fact, more 
soldiers died of diseases and of exposure than from enemy fire (Barash and 
Webel 2009:16).  
According to Francis (2006), the widespread wars in Africa have led to 
forced migration and massive refugee flows, i.e. ‘push-factor. Ethno-religious 
persecution, political oppression, the search for economic and employment 
opportunities (the ‘pull-factor’), environmental degradation, and natural disasters 
such as flood, drought and famine have led to large-scale migrations. An 
estimated 13 million people are internally displaced in Africa, with 4 million in 
Sudan. Population movements and refugee flows have created insecurities and 
also threatened the peace and security of the continent. In several cases, it has 
led to violence and tension between communities and threatened the economic 
security of the recipient state, with a huge burden on domestic social services and 
infrastructure. Apart from the migration and environmental conditions occasioned 
by wars, at the domestic level, civil wars not only lead to deaths, destruction of 
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property, and looting, they are also sources of mass poverty, hunger, disease and 
suffering among the population. In some instances civil war produces 
fundamental social changes, which in turn erode the whole social context of 
religion and lead people to abandon their established religion and turn to new 
beliefs and rituals. The internationalization of civil wars with the involvement of 
different actors with different interests ranging from the support of an incumbent 
to protecting business interests, supply/sale of arms, exploitation of natural 
resources, protection of foreign nationals, expression of neo-colonial support, and 
the eventual multinational peacekeeping intervention, all lead to the degrading or 
erosion of national sovereignty. 
 The most important consequences of state failure and the resultant violent 
conflict can be seen in the toll they have taken on human beings, especially the 
magnitude of conflict-related deaths, injuries, and displacements. Though no 
scientific count has been taken, an estimated 200,000 people are said to have 
died, hundreds of thousands more were wounded, and about 1.8 million were 
displaced, more than half  of whom were internally displaced in the Liberian civil 
war (Sawyer, 2005:42). When considered against the background of Liberia’s 
total population of 2.6 million at the outset of the conflict in 1989, these figures 
paint a picture of immense loss. Human toll of such proportions can be staggering 
for any country. The sad fact is that several other African countries have 
experienced losses of human lives of comparable magnitude. In the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, nearly 4 million people, or 6 per cent of the population, died 
from war-affected causes between 1998 and 2004 (IRC 2004). Rwanda lost 
about 4 per cent of its population to genocide and war-related causes between 
1994 and 1999. Two million Sudanese, accounting for 6 per cent of that country’s 
population, have perished as a result of war since 1983; and over the last 
decade, Angola has lost about 12 per cent of its population to war-related causes 
(ibid). In the Sudan, particularly in Darfur, millions of displaced and prematurely 
deceased civilians have been casualties of a multisided civil war (ibid). The 
extraordinary horror and the impact of wars derive from their extraordinary 
violence and the scale and intensity of needless human sufferings that result.  
A high level of displacement was also sustained in Liberia for several 
years. More than 40 per cent of Liberia’s population was internally and externally 
displaced from 1991 to 1997. Hundreds of Liberians lived in refugee villages in 
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Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria. By 2003, more than 
400,000 people had been displaced; 280,000 of these were refugees in 
neighbouring countries. At the same time, Liberia became host to Ivoirian 
refugees and continued to host Sierra Leone refugees (Sawyer, 2005:44). 
A fundamental problem in the study of civil war violence is the dearth of 
systematic and comprehensive data. Although, I have indicated some data 
earlier, however in the case of Liberia there are missing data on the civil war, 
particularly those related to the exact numbers of deaths, displaced, ethnic and 
religious fractionalization of rebel groups etc. For these reasons, records of the 
wars were based on estimation, accounts for the difficulty in gathering such data. 
Competing sides have a vested interest in minimizing the atrocities they have 
committed or are committing, and inflating those committed by their adversary; 
civil wars tend to be decentralized processes often taking place in remote areas 
of poor countries where few means of communication are available even in times 
of peace; as a result, an important proportion of violence remains invisible and 
under-reported. The rural societies in which civil wars typically take place lack 
adequate “record-keeping” institutions even in times of peace. The obstruction of 
systematic investigation is reinforced by a number of additional factors once the 
war has ended. These range from the unwillingness of the war’s winners to allow 
an investigation of the violence they are responsible for, to the reluctance of 
social and political actors on both sides to stir painful and potentially hazardous, 
memories (Fernández 1996). However, human rights organizations continue to 
strive in collecting information and publicizing human rights violations, as well as 
the “truth and reconciliation commissions” formed in a few countries after the end 
of the war, such as in Guatemala, El Salvador, South Africa, and in Liberia (ibid). 
One feature that sets interstate and civil wars apart is that in the latter 
civilians are the primary and deliberate targets: at least eight out of ten people 
killed in contemporary civil wars have been civilians (Kriger 1992:1). What is 
more, violence in civil wars is frequently exercised between people who already 
know each other and have had a long record of peaceful interaction: neighbours, 
friends, even relatives. The great majority of civil wars are fought as “irregular” or 
“guerrilla” wars. Usually, there are two competing actors: insurgents and 
incumbents. On the one hand, incumbents tend to rely on regular armies which 
undertake large ‘mopping-up’ operations to eliminate pockets of insurgency. 
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Insurgents, on the other hand, shy away from direct confrontation and rely on 
ambush and attacks against isolated garrisons in order to set-up “liberated areas” 
or “bases” (Kalyvas, 2000:5).  
Contrary to conventional war, civil war displays a ‘triangular’ character. 
This is a war that involves not just two (or more) competing actors, but also 
civilians. Civilian support (or collaboration) matters for the outcome of the conflict. 
Civil war is, hence, fundamentally different from conventional war in that it 
involves little military action between combatants, and much action, military or 
non-military, in which civilians play a prominent role. Although material and non-
material benefits matter in initial stages of the war, once violence escalates 
individual survival becomes the main priority for most people irrespective of their 
political preferences. Most civilians will come to increasingly value their own 
survival and this consideration will weigh on the choices they will make. 
Nordstrom (1992:266) quotes a peasant from Mozambique: “The only ideology 
the people have is an anti-atrocity ideology.” Likewise, as the war develops, 
violence becomes an increasingly important tool (often even the only one) in civil 
war; and as violence escalates, even political actors who initially emphasize 
selective incentives, be they material goods or ideological ones, also need to 
resort to violence in order to “match” their opponent’s violence. In short, the 
central effect of civil war is the primacy of violence as a political resource, “the 
virtual equation of power and injury” (Berry, 1994: xix)).  
Incumbents and insurgents rely on a variety of. In the course of civil wars, 
political actors tend to escalate the violence they use. They also switch from more 
indiscriminate to more selective violence. Political actors don’t want to use 
violence in haphazard ways because doing so is counterproductive. They follow 
Machiavelli’s recommendation that punishment “should be used with moderation, 
so as to avoid cause for hatred; for no ruler benefits by making himself odious” 
(Kalyvas, 2000:6-7). However, not all political actors behave this way, as some 
may become excessive in meting out punishment and ignore the potential 
consequences of their actions. There is an intersection between two key 
attributes of violence: its purpose, and its production.  Mass political violence can 
be used to achieve primary compliance or extermination (physical or spatial); and 
it can be produced in a unilateral or a bilateral (in some cases multilateral) 
fashion.   
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Political actors may intend to govern the people against whom they are 
using violence, or they may not.  In the second case, the purpose of violence is 
exhausted by its use, whereas in the first, it lies in the purposive creation of fear: 
violence is a means, not an end; a resource, not the final product.  Violence is, 
then, a tool for shaping individual behaviour by attaching a cost to particular 
actions. This is often called “terror.” (Kalyvas, 2000:3). The second distinction 
focuses on the production of violence: it may be provided unilaterally when only 
one actor uses violence, or it may be provided bilaterally, when two actors rely on 
violence.  The intersection of the two attributes generates four categories of mass 
political violence: state terror, genocide and (ethnic) cleansing, ‘reciprocal 
extermination’, and civil war violence (ibid).  The unilateral use of terror by the 
state to enforce compliance is known as state terror.  Mitchell, et.al (1986:5) 
define it as government by intimidation, which “involves deliberate coercion and 
violence (or the threat thereof) directed at some victim, with the intention of 
inducing extreme fear in some target observers who identify with that victim in 
such a way that they perceive themselves as potential future victims.  In this way, 
they are forced to consider altering their behaviour in some manner desired by 
the actor”.  
 Every conflict has its own history, dynamics, and stakeholders. Yet, those 
seeking to end wars and avoid their recurrence need to ask several questions. 
Who are the key actors that participate in war economies?. I am discussing the 
economy because of the importance it holds for actors and how the resources of 
the economy serves as a motivation and incentive for war and peace. What 
motives do they have for their participation in war economies? What incentives do 
they have to seek peace? Who controls the means of violence? To adequately 
assess the different functions of war economies, Goodhand proposes a 
particularly useful taxonomy of “combat”, “shadow”, and “coping” economies 
(2004:155). While empirically overlapping, each of these economies 
encompasses a distinct set of actors, motivations, and economic activities that 
can have qualitatively different implications for conflict resolution and post-conflict 
peacebuilding. This is further explained in table 2 below. The combat economy is 
based on economic interactions that directly sustain actual combat. It is 
dominated by a variety of actors, including the security apparatus of the state 
(military, para-military groups, police) and rebel groups, as well as domestic and 
47 
 
foreign “conflict entrepreneurs” who supply the necessary weapons and military 
material. Generally, the combat economy serves to fund the war effort of these 
actors as well as to achieve military objectives (Brömmelhörster and Paes 2003). 
The preferred means of resource generation include predatory taxation of licit and 
illicit economic activities, extortion of local businesses, control over the 
exploitation of natural resources, imposition of “customs” in border areas or 
setting up roadblocks, sale of future resource exploitation rights to foreign 
companies, or the capture of foreign aid. 
 
 
 The Combat 
Economy 
The Shadow 
Economy 
The Coping 
Economy 
Who? 
Key Actors 
Commanders, 
“conflict 
entrepreneurs”, 
fighter, suppliers of 
weapons and 
materials. 
Profiteers, transport 
sector, 
businessmen, drug 
traffickers, 
“downstream” 
actors (truck 
drivers, poppy 
farmers) 
Poor families and 
communities 
Why? 
Motivations and 
incentives for War 
and Peace 
To fund the war 
efforts or achieve 
military objectives 
Peace may not be 
in their interest as 
it may lead to 
decreased power, 
status, and wealth 
Fighters may have 
an interest in 
peace if there are 
alternative sources 
of livelihoods 
available 
To make a profit on 
the margins of a 
conflict. Peace 
could be in their 
interest if it 
encourages long-
term investment 
and licit 
entrepreneurial 
activity 
Peace requires 
alternatives to the 
shadow economy; 
otherwise a 
criminalized war 
economy will 
become a 
criminalized peace 
economy 
To cope and 
maintain asset 
bases through low-
risk activities, or to 
survive through 
asset erosion 
Peace could enable 
families to move 
beyond subsistence 
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How? 
Key Activities and 
Commodities 
Taxation of licit 
and illicit economic 
activities; money, 
arms, equipment, 
and mercenaries 
from external state 
and non-state 
supporters: 
economic 
blockages of 
dissenting areas; 
asset stripping and 
looting; aid 
manipulation. 
Smuggling of high-
value commodities; 
mass extraction of 
natural resources; 
Hawalla (currency 
order and exchange 
system); aid 
manipulation. 
Employment of 
diverse livelihood 
strategies to spread 
risk; subsistence 
agriculture; petty 
trade and small 
businesses; on-
farm and off-farm 
wage labour; labour 
migration and 
remittances; 
redistribution 
through family 
networks; 
humanitarian and 
rehabilitation 
assistance. 
Table 2: Economies, Actors, Motives, and Activities during Armed Conflict (adapted from 
Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005:8). 
The shadow economy (sometimes called “black market economy”) 
encompasses the broad range of informal economic relationships that fall outside 
state-regulated frameworks. Key actors are a range of less scrupulous “conflict 
profiteers”, including mafias and criminals, who seek to benefit from the business 
opportunities that open up in highly unregulated and chaotic war situations. Profit 
margins are further widened under sanction regimes, where those with coercive 
power and the right connections can gain significantly from cross-border 
smuggling activities, such as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan, and the 
Balkans (Ballentine and Nitzschke, 2005:8).   
Frequently, the shadow economy is already widespread before the 
outbreak of conflict and is a permissive factor for conflict when it contributes to 
violent state collapse or serves as a source of income to would-be-rebels. Once 
conflict erupts, shadow economies are easily captured by combatants and, thus, 
often become the basis for the combat economy. This was the case with the 
highly corrupted and informalised diamond industry in Sierra Leone, which 
provided easy loot for the rebels of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and 
their sponsor, Liberian warlord-turned-president, Charles Taylor (Goodhand 
2004:9; Pugh, Cooper & Goodhand 2004). In Kosovo, the informal economy 
based on smuggling activities and diaspora remittances had long sustained 
Ibrahim Rugova’s peaceful resistance against the regime in Belgrade. Equipped 
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with arms smuggled from neighbouring Albania, however, the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA) increasingly gained control over these economic activities to finance 
its armed rebellion (Goodhand 2004). 
The coping economy comprises those numerous economic interactions 
during armed conflict that provide benefits to the civilian population, particularly 
the poor and most vulnerable. These functions are even more important to civilian 
livelihoods where the formal economy and traditional livelihoods are destroyed or 
rendered impossible to sustain (Mwanasali 2000; Collinson 2003). This was the 
case in eastern DRC, where swathes of arable land have been ruined by coltan 
exploitation and where a consolidation of large landholdings has occurred under 
cover of conflict. Often, coping economies are centred on lootable resources, 
such as coca and poppy cultivation in Colombia and Afghanistan, and gold and 
coltan in the DRC. The coping economy also includes subsistence agriculture, 
petty trade and cross-border smuggling, or diaspora remittances that help 
civilians and their families to survive. Essentially what I am explaining here is that, 
there are different sorts of actors in the war economy. 
 Finally, post-war contexts provoke vital questions about how to make 
society move on after years of destruction. In countries like Liberia and Sierra 
Leone, there have been discussions in policy and academic circles about how 
these countries should promote reconstruction of broken relations, of local 
communities, of families and individuals after years of suffering. How can former 
enemies learn to live together again? And how should war criminals be dealt 
with?  These are questions that tend to be addressed by Peace Agreements. 
  
Civil War Peace Agreements  
Peace agreements are defined as “arrangements entered into by warring parties 
to explicitly regulate or resolve their basic incompatibility” (Wallensteen & 
Sollenberg, 1997). Bell distinguishes among three types of peace agreements: 
pre-negotiation, framework/substantive and implementation (2000:25). Following 
Galtung’s distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace, where negative 
peace is the “absence of violence (and) war” and positive peace is the 
“integration of human society” (1996:31-32), a peace agreement can be 
considered ‘successful’ if it has been ‘sustainable’ or ‘durable’. Emphasis can, 
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therefore, be placed on negative dimensions of peace, focusing on the conflict 
behaviour of belligerents in an effort to explain conditions under which violence 
can be terminated. It can also be placed on positive dimensions of peace, 
focusing beyond the absence of armed conflict and taking into account aspects 
such as the degree of democratization and the provision of public goods. 
All too often in Africa, peace only represents the time between phases of 
violent conflict (Furley, 2006).
 
Even much of the so-called “peacebuilding” 
activities, coined by the plethora of international aid donors sent in to “help” 
African countries re-establish some semblance of statehood and provide basic 
humanitarian needs, are narrowly defined and often do not attempt to significantly 
alter the economic, political, or social structures that produced the conflict in the 
first place (Talley-Kalokohg, 2008). During peace negotiations, the standing 
government and warring factions often commit similar errors, and sometimes 
violence continues despite the signing of these agreements. 
Various theories have been put forward to explain the adoption of peace 
agreements. These include war fatigue, the search for durable peace, a 
declaration of a no winner and no loser outcome, military versus peace settlement 
victory, and recognition of the effects of war on the social, political and cultural life 
of the community (Pratt, 2009). The advent of peace is also associated with a 
process and culture of democratization. The Democratic Peace Theory – which 
suggests that “democracies do not fight each other” – emphasizes development 
and, specifically, improvements to socio-economic conditions of citizens (Xenias, 
2005). It assumes that if there were more democracies, then there would be less 
conflict. A logical recast of the core argument of the Democratic Peace Theory 
would produce the following syllogism (ACCORD, 2009):  
 
 Democracies do not engage in physical violence,  
 Violence hinders development,  
 Having more democratic states leads to enhanced economic development 
 
The connection between peace and democracy is possible because democracy 
encourages the establishment of effective ‘dialogic mechanisms’ (Bohman, 
1996:34). The notions of negotiation and mediation suggest that peace emanates 
from certain deliberate and deliberative processes (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985:7-16). 
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Managing the peace process, therefore, requires empowering the conflicting 
actors with appropriate skills and establishing deliberative structures that can help 
maintain enduring peace. The role of the mediators and negotiators, and the 
engagement between the mediators and the conflicting parties, require a high 
level of persuasion. However, persuasion occurs in varying degrees of 
competencies – the total lack of which often results in parties seeking other 
symbolic means to enhance their bargaining influence, such as resorting to the 
use of violence to secure re-negotiation. Democratization, therefore, is a process 
that commences with inclusive peace negotiations. 
When adversaries in civil war sign a peace agreement, what can 
international actors do to prevent a recurrence of that war? This is a life or death 
question for millions of people. The two worst outbreaks of massive violence in 
the 1990s – Angola in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994 – followed the failure of peace 
agreements to end those wars. In both cases, the death and destruction were 
staggering: an estimated 350,000 dead in Angola and 800,000 dead in Rwanda 
(Stedman, 2002). War went on for eight years in Liberia and took over 200,000 
lives because multiple peace agreements failed to end the civil war there 
(Sawyer, 2005). In 2000, two more countries found themselves back in war after 
the failure of peace accords – Angola and Sierra Leone. In all of these cases, 
international actors mediated the agreements and were given prominent roles in 
implementation. Why did they fail? What could they have done differently? Was 
implementation in these cases doomed by unworkable peace agreements? Was 
failure a question of unfulfilled mandates or mandates inappropriate to the task at 
hand? Or was failure caused by the lack of an appropriate strategy and/or the 
unwillingness to anticipate violent challenges and craft an effective response? 
How did these cases differ from successes such as in Namibia, El Salvador, or 
Mozambique? Were these successes the result of less challenging environments 
or did international actors do things differently?  
Between late 1997 and early 2000, Stanford University’s Centre for 
International Cooperation (CISAC) and the International Peace Academy (IPA) 
conducted research to better understand the determinants of successful peace 
implementation. The CISAC/IPA project on peace implementation focused on 
three primary issues: 
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1) An evaluation of international actors and their strategies of peace 
implementation; 
 
2) An evaluation of various sub-goals of peace implementation (e.g., 
demobilization, disarmament, refugee repatriation, human rights, reconciliation 
etc.) and their relationship to overall implementation success; 
 
3) A search for low-cost, possible high-payoff opportunities for linking short-term 
implementation success to long-term peacebuilding (Stedman, 2001). 
 
The project studied every peace agreement concluded between 1980 and 1997, 
in which international actors were assigned a prominent role in implementation. 
The cases studied include: 
1. Angola, 1992-93 
2. Angola, 1994-98 
3. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995-2000 
4. Cambodia, 1991-93 
5. El Salvador, 1993-95 
6. Guatemala, 1992-98 
7. Lebanon, 1991-2000 
8. Liberia, 1990-99 
9. Mozambique, 1992-94 
10. Namibia, 1989 
11. Nicaragua, 1989-91 
12. Rwanda, 1993-94 
13. Sierra Leone, 1998 
14. Sri Lanka, 1987-88 
15. Somalia, 1992-93 
16. Zimbabwe, 1980 
 
The study found that cases of peace implementation differ dramatically in terms 
of the difficulty of the implementation environment and of the willingness of 
international actors to provide resources and also that these differences are 
predictable before a peace operation begins. These findings mark a significant 
advance in the understanding of peace implementation in three fundamental 
ways. First, the CISAC-IPA results put to rest simplistic generalizations about 
peace operations based on one or only a few cases. Specifically, the results 
suggest that there is no reason to assume that actions and strategies that work in 
a more benign conflict environment such as Guatemala or Namibia will work in a 
much more demanding environment such as Bosnia, Sierra Leone or Liberia. 
Second, the results imply that implementation strategies must be designed based 
on the level of difficulty of the case. In certain limited situations, strategies that 
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derive from traditional peacekeeping (with its underlying emphasis on confidence 
building) can be effective. In more challenging situations, however, when 
predation co-exists with fear, confidence building will prove impossible, and 
implementers will need to compel and deter to ensure compliance with a peace 
agreement. Third, the results raise the fundamental issue of what economists 
refer to as “incentive compatibility” or what is commonly known as “political 
feasibility”: that it must be in the self-interest of critical actors to implement the 
strategy (Stedman, 2001:4-5). 
Following the peace-making process, durable peace is only guaranteed by 
a successful implementation of the peace agreement. Peace agreements are not 
necessarily rigid documents to which warring factions must legalistically adhere. 
Peace agreements often demonstrate certain values, grievances, negotiation 
capability and commitments of parties to peace. They are arrangements, 
therefore, to which individual parties seek to commit themselves with a view to 
realizing peace – even if, in some cases, their grievances may not have been 
met. Often resurgence of conflict may result, requiring re-negotiation processes. 
Also, a renewed armed conflict risks plunging a democratic state into anarchy, 
resulting in what has been termed ‘the collapsed state’ (Rotberg, 2003). Factors 
that may hinder the implementation of a peace agreement or the ability to re-
negotiate include: the number of warring parties; the presence of a peace 
agreement signed by all parties before implementation; the likelihood of spoilers; 
whether or not the state has collapsed; the numbers of armed soldiers and 
warring factions; disposable natural resources; and the presence of hostile 
neighbouring states (Pratt, 2009).  
There are conditions under which a peace agreement might succeed or 
fail.  Important conditions for the implementation of peace agreements require 
attention on the environment surrounding implementation and to recognize that 
some environments are more conducive to implementation than others. Such a 
perspective also looks at the coalitions that support implementation and their 
willingness to invest resources. Therefore the following factors require 
consideration: 
1. The number of warring parties: The difficulty of implementation increases 
when there are more than two warring parties (Munck and Kumar, 1995; Doyle 
and Sambanis, 2000).   Strategies become less predictable, balances of power 
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become more tenuous, and alliances become more fluid. In Cambodia, for 
example, any action that the United Nations might have taken against the Khmer 
Rouge had to be weighed against the effects such action would have had on 
Funcinpec, which relied on the Khmer Rouge to balance against the State of 
Cambodia (Peou, 2002; Stedman, 1997).  In cases where a proliferation of 
warring parties occurred, as in Somalia and Liberia, implementers constantly 
found it difficult to craft solutions that would address the concerns of all the 
warring factions. Where any factions found themselves excluded, the peace 
agreement faced their violent opposition. 
2. The absence of a peace agreement signed by all major warring parties 
before intervention and with a minimum of coercion: The United Nations has 
usually required a detailed peace agreement among the warring parties as a sign 
of their consent to a peace mission and as a precondition for its involvement. In 
the 1980s and 1990s, however, the United Nations intervened in many ongoing 
wars and, in several instances, either it or a regional organization or a state 
intervened in the hope of using force to compel a peace agreement: the UN in 
Somalia, ECOMOG in Liberia and Sierra Leone, NATO in Bosnia, and Syria in 
Lebanon. Intervention in the absence of a peace agreement likely will trigger 
violent opposition by parties who value the pre-intervention status quo. The 
absence of a peace agreement implies a lack of problem-solving, trust, and 
confidence-building among the warring factions, thus producing a more difficult 
implementation environment (Stedman, 2001). 
3. The likelihood of spoilers. The presence of spoilers in peace agreements 
poses daunting challenges to implementation (Stedman, 1997:74-48). Spoilers 
constitute a major challenge to peace processes. Spoilers come in different 
shapes and sizes – as official as well as unofficial, armed and unarmed, civilians 
and military, and naturally vary in their power and influence. They may be located 
at any of the number of points in the peace process. Additionally, the definition of 
spoilers will always be subjective to some degree, given that one person’s spoiler 
may be another’s hero. And precisely who a spoiler is may well depend on the 
context and the issue area. The key problem is that peace agreements may, and 
often do, end up entrenching inadvertently or otherwise, the power and influence 
of spoilers, all in the interest of fostering agreement and facilitating an end to 
hostilities in the short term.  One critique of the spoiler concept, however, is that 
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spoilers are only recognized after the fact. This criticism can be addressed by 
attempting to gauge whether prospective implementers judged that they were 
likely to face violent challenges during implementation. A more sophisticated 
criticism of the spoiler concept is that potential spoilers are always present and 
whether an actor actually engages in spoiling behaviour depends on the 
existence of a special opportunity structure (Collier and Hoeffler, 2000).  
 
4. Collapsed State: The lack of state institutions and governing capacity places 
great demands on peace implementers. In addition to bringing fighting to a close, 
the implementers must create and build up a modicum of state capacity in order 
for the peace to have a chance to sustain itself. 
5. Number of soldiers: At some level, numbers matter. High numbers of soldiers 
pose greater demands for verification and monitoring and, hence, a greater 
potential for successful cheating. Moreover, greater numbers of soldiers require 
more personnel for monitoring and more resources for demobilization.  
6. Disposable natural resources: If warring parties have access to disposable 
resources such as gems, minerals, or timber, implementation becomes more 
difficult. Such resources not only provide armies with a means for continued 
fighting, they also become the reward against which they weigh the benefits of 
peace (Berdal and Malone, 2000). A key difference between Mozambique and 
Angola is that, in the latter country, UNITA’s access to diamonds emboldened 
their spoiler behaviour, whereas RENAMO’s lack of access to such resources 
effectively limited the benefits of returning to war (Stedman, 1997). 
7. Hostile Neighbouring States or Networks: Civil wars rarely take place in 
otherwise stable regions. As Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1997) 
observed, many civil wars today intersect with regional conflicts and interstate 
competition. From this it would follow that the attitude of the surrounding states 
towards a peace agreement in a neighbour’s civil war plays a key role in 
supporting or undermining the prospects of peace. Spoilers to a peace 
agreement, for example, are likely to be much stronger and more vocal if they are 
confident that they can count on neighbouring states for sanctuary, guns, fuel, 
and capital (Stedman, 1997:51). Likewise, in regions where weak states have 
little control over borders, well-organized private or semi-official networks can 
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allow neighbouring states to take advantage of such state decrepitude to support 
spoilers in the war-torn country. 
The Liberian peace process was protracted, producing 17 peace agreements. 
1. Banjul Communiqué, ECOWAS Plan, August 7, 1990 
2. Bamako Ceasefire, November 28, 1990 
3. Banjul Joint Statement, December 21, 1990 
4. Lome Agreement, February 13, 1991 
5. Yamoussoukro I Accord, June 30, 1991 
6. Yamoussoukro II Accord, July 29, 1991 
7. Yamoussoukro III Accord, September 17 1991 
8. Yamoussoukro IV Accord, October 30, 1991 
9. Geneva Ceasefire, July 17 1993 
10. Cotonou Agreement, July 25 1993 
11. Akosombo Agreement, September 12, 1994 
12. Acceptance and Accession to Akosombo Agreement, December 21, 1994 
13. Accra Clarification of Akosombo Agreement, December 21, 1994 
14. Abuja Agreement (1), August 19, 1995 
15. Supplement to Abuja Agreement (II), August 17, 1996 
16. Ceasefire Agreement, June 17, 2003 
17. Accra Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), August 18, 2003 (TRC, 
2009:126). 
The last one which, signed in Accra, Ghana in 2013, ushered in democratic rule. 
But there have been disagreements by the former factional leaders, most of 
whom are serving in the government, and other members of the regime, over the 
interpretation and implementation of certain provisions in the agreements. This is 
causing deep division and bitter political rivalry among these actors. Ex-
combatants had huge expectations from the peace agreement but this is not 
forthcoming as they continue to feel marginalized, as I shall show. For instance, 
the frequent suggestion by some Liberians in the media that former rebel leaders 
and their fighter should face prosecution in criminal courts has always evoked 
anger and reactions from actors in the civil war. Should this process be pushed 
forward and materialize, there will be resistance from the former fighters, 
potentially leading to widespread violence and a possible reversion to conflict. In 
the next section, I discussed DDRR in Africa and how this is included in peace 
agreement and how it is implemented, with particular reference to the Liberian 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement. This is important because the framing of 
DDRR programme in peace agreement is key to the success of failure of the 
process. A failed process would then create problems of ex-combatants 
vulnerability and risks to the population. 
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Context of Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation, and Reintegration 
in Africa 
 
At the end of the conflicts, DDRR becomes a strategy for executing peacekeeping 
operations, usually employed by the United Nations and the post-conflict 
government, in order to protect against a return to war. This entails the physical 
removal of the means of combat from ex-belligerents (weapons and 
ammunitions), disbanding of armed group militias and rehabilitating and 
reintegration of former fighters into the society, in order to prevent a possibility of 
a resurgence of armed conflict. Gerd Junne and Willemiin Verkoren have this to 
say about war economies: “The ‘seductive tenacity of war economies’ constitutes 
an important barrier to the success of the DDRR and of post-conflict development 
as a whole, and no strategy of DDRR can succeed without taking this aspect into 
account.”(USIP Report 2002). As Richard Williamson, U.S Alternate 
Representative to the United Nations posited, in his statement at the United 
Nations Security Council Workshop on West Africa “On DDRR”, it is critical to 
have a coordinated mechanism through which the host country, international 
community and the UN can address the financial and logistical issues related to 
DDRR activities and ensure follow up by donors on their commitments (Daboh, 
et.al 2010:13). However, the success and failure of DDRR programmes are 
determined by the willingness of the rest of the society to forgive ex-combatants 
for the violent acts they committed during the armed conflict, and support them in 
their transition from a life of war to a life of peace. Given the dynamics of DDRR, 
it is important to note that:  
There is no generic template of DDRR practice that can be 
superimposed on post-conflict scenarios throughout the world. 
DDRR processes must be carefully and sensitively custom 
designed for each scenario, by teams with intimate knowledge of 
the respective theatre, the players, the overall objectives of the 
peace process and the tolls available (UNAMSIL, 2003:4-12). 
The above statement calls for a de-emphasis on the generalization of DDRR 
processes in the light of the fact that societies are dynamic and conflict may have 
occurred under different contexts that require extensive local knowledge and 
expertise in the design of DDRR programmes.  DDRR in Africa has had mixed 
results. In total, since 1992, the UN has engaged in over twenty-four DDRR-
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related processes, twenty-two of which are currently ongoing. Of these, only six 
are outside Africa, with those on the continent accounting for 81 percent of the 
UN involvement (Janzen, 2004). Some have been innovative and remarkably 
successful such as in Ethiopia, Eritrea, Angola and Uganda. Others however, 
have been glaringly ineffective, with the result that many ex-combatants have 
been unable to secure unemployment, or make a successful transition to civilian 
life, such as in the Republic of Sudan, following the signing of the CPA in 2005, 
as well as the unending war in Somalia.  
 The United Nations involvement in DDRR in Africa has been 
complemented by the African Union, regional economic and security groupings, 
support from the EU and Scandinavian states, as well as contributions from the 
Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP). The MDRP 
was established in 2002 by over forty Western governments for the purpose of 
creating an overarching support for DDRR, focusing on the Great Lakes as well 
as West, Central, Southern, and Eastern Africa, managed by the World Bank 
(MDRP 2006). However, the MDRP ceased to exist in June 2009 after seven 
years of operation. In Africa, DDRR processes have typically been established 
within the context of peace processes. The circumstances leading up to the 
peace process and the dynamics during the peace talks often determine the 
scope, range, and sequencing of the DDRR process, as well as the distribution of 
resources. Three different scenarios have been identified below: 
1. DDRR as a result of peace secured by negotiated settlement between the 
conflicting parties, usually following pressure from an external party. This 
scenario normally sees the DDRR decision being postponed until after the 
election of a post-war government, with armed groups being left to reside in 
assembly points. Examples include Zimbabwe (1979), Namibia (1988), and South 
Africa (1990’s). 
2. DDRR as a result of peace settlements established by one party defeating 
others militarily. In this situation, DDRR processes tend to be rapid and coercive 
in nature (particularly for the defeated party), and resources tend to be allocated 
in a biased fashion (usually in favour of the victor). Examples include Angola 
(2003), Rwanda (1994), Uganda (1986) and Ethiopia (1990’s). 
59 
 
3. DDRR as a result of peace agreements due to external intervention, usually in 
the context of a mutually hurting stalemate. The external intervening powers 
(usually the UN), often take a leadership role in the DDRR process once a 
political agreement has been reached. Examples include Mozambique (1990’s), 
Angola (1988), Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire (UN/OSAA, 2007).  
It is important to note that peace processes may facilitate effective DDRR 
programmes in some contexts, but may also undermine the process if the 
reintegration of ex-combatants is not well implemented. Post-war governments 
usually face a competing array of developmental demands, and in such 
circumstances security may be temporarily relegated in priority, with serious 
adverse consequences (Obidegwu, 2004:25-27). It is imperative to understand 
these early challenges and manage them properly.  Reintegration in Sierra Leone 
and Liberia remain far short of what is needed to ensure stability in the future 
(Ginifer, 2003; Africa Confidential; 2008).  The challenges of DDRR in Africa are 
also manifested in Cote d’Ivoire where ex-combatants were paid US$900 for the 
surrender of weapons, causing agitation in Liberia among the ex-combatants 
who, understandably, wanted to withhold their guns and demand more money for 
them (Daboh et.al (2010:10). Therefore, the likelihood of crossing into Cote 
d’Ivoire for a weapon sale became very high. Although the amount was reduced 
to US$830, it was still high relative to the US$300 given in Liberia. As Ryan 
Nicolas stated, “this disparity may not only have significantly undermined Liberia’s 
DDRR process by providing fighters extra incentives to hold to their weapons, but 
also may be contributing to the ongoing instability in Cote d’Ivoire by encouraging 
armed Liberian fighters to cross the border” (Nicols, 2009).  
Peace agreements do not always contain clear DDRR provisions (UN 
Report, 2010:10). In Côte d’Ivoire, there were multiple agreements with conflicting 
provisions for DDRR. Likewise, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has 
multiple agreements providing legal frameworks that make for a complex scenario 
(Lusaka Agreement et.al 1999). In Darfur, while the 2006 Darfur Peace 
Agreement included DDRR provisions, the Agreement was not signed by all the 
protagonists of the conflict (UN Report, 2010). This precondition, which 
recommends that a negotiated peace agreement be signed, assumes that all 
warring parties are signatories to that peace agreement. However, in many peace 
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negotiations not all warring parties are included in the peace process. Moreover, 
the manipulation of gangs by political elites and the proliferation of various types 
of militias and armed groups may complicate even the identification of all parties 
to the conflict (ibid).  Again, in Côte d’Ivoire militias were addressed through 
disarmament and dismantling of militias (DDM) programmes, however, the large 
numbers of people claiming to be members of militias complicated the process 
and highlighted the need to better define this group. In Sudan, the DDRR 
programme was launched only in February 2009, four years after the signing of 
the CPA. In Darfur, a comprehensive DDRR programme is unlikely to start in the 
near future unless a more inclusive peace agreement is signed by all the major 
armed groups operating in the region (ibid). In Liberia, many people that I talked 
to informally criticized the incomplete DDRR which limited the surrender of 
weapons, with allegations of continued circulations of arms and their use for 
violent criminal activities. On the other hand, the reintegration component was 
described by them, including the targeted beneficiaries, as a failure. 
While trust of the parties to the conflict in the overall peace process is 
extremely difficult to evaluate, it is a key prerequisite for successful traditional 
DDRR, as demonstrated by many UN experiences in Africa. As DDRR is often 
one of the first provisions of a peace agreement to be implemented, it may start at 
a time when the parties are still unsure of the process. They may wish to hold on 
to the military means that brought them to the negotiating table, thus delaying the 
start of DDRR. At the same time, DDRR practitioners have understood that 
progress in DDRR can serve to foster trust between the parties. This can 
therefore lead to a vicious cycle where lack of trust delays DDRR and the lack of 
DDRR only increases the parties’ mistrust in the peace process (UN Report, 
2010:11).  
The political will of the warring parties to engage in DDRR is crucial to a 
successful process. Nonetheless, in many cases, political will has been lacking. 
Accordingly, tackling the manipulation of gangs by elite members of society which 
complicates the definition of parties to the conflict, is a key aspect of developing a 
successful DDRR programme. For example, in Sierra Leone, despite the 
signature of the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement, the Revolutionary United Front 
(RUF) refused to fully enter the DDRR programme. Following a major crisis that 
threatened to completely derail the peace process in May 2000, a much 
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revamped international and regional political and military approach was launched. 
This resulted in the removal of the RUF’s recalcitrant leader, Foday Sankoh, and 
the exertion of credible pressure on a key RUF backer, the former President of 
Liberia, Charles Taylor. As a result, the RUF finally entered the DDRR process in 
earnest in the second half of 2000 (UNDPKO, 2010:11-12). Without a minimum 
guarantee of security, armed groups and individuals are likely to continue to 
constitute a threat to peace and stability in post-war societies. Even where 
peacekeeping operations are deployed, as in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia, DDRR 
processes have, at times, been hampered by insecurity.  In Sudan, despite the 
presence of two peacekeeping missions, the security situation in some parts of 
the country remains unstable due to armed conflicts and banditry. In the DRC, 
continued fighting among armed groups, along with the vast size of the country 
and poor infrastructure, has made it difficult to provide a minimum guarantee of 
security, thus severely hampering DDRR efforts. 
At the continental level, the AU considers DDRR to be an integral 
component of the efforts to promote peace, security and stability in Africa. In 
2006, the AU’s Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Policy (PCRD) 
called on the AU Commission to strengthen DDRR capacities on the continent by 
supporting Member States in the planning and implementation of comprehensive 
and well-blended Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration 
(DDRR) programmes. In 2011, the African Peace and Security Architecture 
(APSA) Roadmap also called on the AU Commission to engage and strengthen 
DDRR processes on the continent by integrating it into the entire peace process, 
from the initial peace negotiations through peacekeeping and follow-on peace 
building activities. 
In response, the Peace and Security Department (PSD), in partnership 
with the World Bank Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Programme 
(TDRP) and the United Nations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations-DPKO 
and UN Office to the AU, initiated, in February 2012, the AU DDR Capacity 
Programme (DDRCP). This was done by holding a Consultation Seminar on DDR 
with the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution (RMs). The DDRCP’s main 
purpose is to develop and strengthen African modalities in DDRR by exchanging 
the knowledge that already exists on the African continent and to reinforce DDRR 
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programmes that are being implemented by AU Member States and Missions. As 
such, PSD has developed a project document that sets out a three-year 
programme, to be implemented between 2013 and 2015, which will achieve the 
following objectives: 
     1. Institutionalize DDRR capacities within the AU; 
     2. Establish an AU DDRR Resource and Research Centre; and 
     3. AU engagement and assistance to DDRR activities of Member States. 
Together, these three components will operationalize the ability of the AU to 
identify gaps and challenges in DDRR processes on the continent and respond to 
those needs by providing timely technical, political and/or resource assistance.  
 
Conclusion 
The chapter has provided insights into previous research in this field of study. It 
focused on the nature of civil war and post-war violence, in particular, the actors 
and their motivation to continue to perpetuate violence. It noted that conflict 
theory commonly assumes that when their demands are not met most of the 
actors who took part in conflicts also engage in violence in post-war 
environments, and therefore become active entrepreneurs of violence. This 
perspective will become clearer in the discussion in the next chapter which 
outlines the analytical framework. 
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Chapter Three:  Analytical Framework 
 
Introduction 
This chapter aims to contribute to the literature by developing a four dimensional 
analytical framework which is then applied to the outcome of the reintegration of 
ex-combatants in Liberia. On the basis of the data collected in fieldwork, the 
analytical framework of the study identified four explanatory factors: (a) re-
marginalization (b) re-criminalization (c) exploitation, and (d) economic insecurity. 
It reveals that while some of the factors and dynamics have caused the 
occurrence of violence, others merely facilitated it. I have described this as a 
situation of triggers and enablers. The interview exercise also explored the four 
factors of the analytical framework. A second set of interviews was conducted in 
2016, in the counties outside Monrovia, among 10 ex-combatants. The four 
analytical factors were once again consistently mentioned by the interviewees. 
The entire data from the field was analysed using this four dimensional 
framework, but I focused greater attention on re-marginalization as this featured 
as the dominant factor in the interviews and focus-groups. The chapter also 
provides a broader conceptual debate on violence in post-conflict environments 
and the theoretical explanations of violence. It discusses the political economy 
and neo-patrimonialism in a general and specific context to Liberia and how this 
has shaped the occurrence of violence.  This will be further elaborated in the case 
study chapter.  
 
Explaining the process of marginalization 
The analytical framework explains how political and economic 
marginalization influences the propensity for violence among ex-combatants. A 
marginalized community may be described as a group that is confined to the 
lower or peripheral edge of the society. Such a group is denied involvement in 
mainstream economic and political activities. Liberian ex-combatants are located 
in the periphery of the four research sites. Living in the periphery makes them 
likely to be irrelevant. This variation produces a structure of government power 
that underscores the distribution of public good nationally and locally. The 
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marginalized ex-combatants communities are impacted on the macro-level, 
where its members often lack access to affordable formal education, employment 
and other livelihood opportunities. At this level, they have been denied access to 
political structures and cannot participate in decision-making. No middle or low 
level ex-combatant is in the government. Their leaders and commanders are in 
the government representing their won interest only. Political weaknesses has 
reinforced their marginalization. At the micro-level, their marginalization has 
manifested in low income for those who are working in informal sectors and lack 
of occupational status.  
The framework also explains certain characteristics within the post-conflict 
state. Liberian political landscape can be characterized by whether ex-combatant 
communities are “politically relevant” of “politically irrelevant”. “Political relevance” 
is a function of a given group’s importance in national level politics. On the other 
hand, groups characterized as “political irrelevance” are effectively excluded from 
the national level political agenda (Raleigh, 2010:2). A group’s relevance, in turn 
dictates their political exclusion and discrimination, which are widely believed to 
underlie economic marginalization (ibid). In Liberia, ex-combatants are seem as 
politically irrelevant and may only be politically relevant only during elections 
when their votes are needed by the political class, and again abandoned after 
they emerge successful. This underlie the appetite for resort to violence in protest 
against exploitation and marginalization. Further, there are two main determinants 
of both political economic and political marginalization in this framework. They are 
client networks (ex-combatants) and the state capacity. These represents 
separate axes of vulnerability are difficult to distinguish in practice, as political 
marginalization begets economic marginalization. The actors within this 
framework are ex-combatants communities and the government of Liberia. While 
ex-combatants remain an important social and political unit demanding better 
economic livelihood and political inclusion, the state appears to lack the capacity 
to provide basic social services and to meet their demands, and therefore thriving 
in a patrimonial/neo-patrimonial systems discussed later in this chapter and 5. 
While poverty is widespread and severe in Liberia, particularly among the 
peripheral communities, ex-combatants are disproportionately affected due to the 
dynamics of marginalization and vulnerability. Here, vulnerability is the degree or 
resilience against shock, or the likelihood that a shock will result in a decline in 
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well-being. Vulnerability may arise from an individual’s inherent natural 
characteristics (such as ex-combatant), but it may also be the result of 
marginalization and stigmatization (Gloppen and Kanyongolo, 2007:261). 
Unfortunately, there are no legal basis for challenging political and economic 
marginalization in Liberia and therefore the victims are left to their faith. The pomp 
and pageantry that heralded the introduction of democracy in Liberia has 
diminished. The quality of governance has deteriorated; corruption is rife; and the 
political institutions are generally unresponsive to the concerns of the poor 
population including ex-combatants. Symptomatic of this state of affairs, during 
the Ebola crisis in 2014-2015 fighting over food supplies to the affected 
communities and looting of Ebola equipment’s caused further spread of the virus 
and lead to more deaths.  
Violence may therefore persists in politically irrelevant communities and 
beyond. African conflict literatures presents a compelling case that political 
exclusion alone may lead to increased conflict, but with many caveats (Raleigh 
2010:10). It is becoming increasingly clear that marginalization, inequality and 
exclusion are motivations for conflicts, but do not entirely explain its occurrence 
(ibid). Raleigh further noted, it is a profound and repeated finding that the mere 
facts of poverty and inequality or even increase in these conditions do not lead to 
political and ethnic violence. Although, ex-combatants in Liberia are motivated to 
justify a violent campaign against the government any time they have the 
opportunity to level a significant threat. Therefore, part of a direct response of ex-
combatants to marginalization by the elites seeking to retain monopoly on power 
and resources is the continuation of violence in Liberia. Further discussions on 
the four analytical framework factors have been made in this chapter with relevant 
questions posed for each factor which guided the research. I have also 
highlighted these questions in the methodology on chapter four. 
 
Conceptualizing Violence in Post Conflict Settings 
Violence in itself defies categorization. It can be everything and nothing; 
legitimate or illegitimate; visible or invisible; necessary or useless. Violence is a 
topic that has always been of interest to scholars, although there remain very 
different approaches to defining and understanding it. This chapter discusses the 
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key approaches with a view to identifying those most useful for understanding 
violence in countries like Liberia, and particularly in post-conflict contexts. All 
societies face the problem of violence. No society completely eliminates violence; 
at best it can be contained and managed. Violence manifests itself in many 
dimensions. It can be expressed in physical actions or through coercive threat of 
physical action. Both violent actions and coercion are elements of violence. The 
relationship between violent acts and coercion involves beliefs about the actions 
of others, and we pay considerable attention to whether threats of violence are 
credible and the conditions under which the use of physical violence will result in 
responses from other individuals or from the state.  Violence may be the action of 
a single individual or the action of organized groups ranging from gangs to armies 
(Leander, 2004:1-3).  
The primary concern in this study is with interpersonal violence: the use of 
violence or threats of violence by groups. Theoretically, I explore the roles of 
individuals/groups as social movements that use violence, and the state as an 
entity with the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence (Weber, 1947), as well 
as the nature, character, and motivation of such violence. Violence and coercive 
power are inherent elements of larger social groups (Earle, 1997:106). However, 
since the threat of violence may be used to limit the use of actual physical 
violence; there is no simple way to measure the level of violence in a society 
(ibid). 
Doing research on violence requires an explicit focus on micro-level 
interactions. Behaviours such as killings, may be experienced by individuals, 
groups, and communities. Aggregate patterns tend to obscure these local 
dynamics. From a more local perspective, one can quickly see that observed 
patterns of violence are not necessarily a reflection of group strategies. 
Perpetrators make decisions about assassinations they wish to carry out, or 
government strongholds they would like to destroy. Actual killings and attacks, 
however, may not achieve the objectives. Issues of organization, that is, how 
groups translate strategies into actions, and their interactions – how those actions 
are received and responded by the civilians – must be entered into the equation. 
The common tendency to conflate observed violence with intention leads scholars 
to search only for plausible explanations of the strategic value of amputation, 
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massacre, and rape when such behaviour may or may not have been ordered, or 
even intended, by commanders (Weinstein, 2007:201).  
An approach that captures micro-level interaction also requires an 
understanding of the context in which violence is observed. Thus, measuring 
violence necessitates capturing the dynamics of this interaction at the local level. 
This is a difficult task because perpetrators have strong incentives to misinterpret 
behaviour that leads to violence, and researchers must turn primarily to 
participant accounts, as records of violence are rarely kept.  In studying the 
context of violence, it is useful to consider two different dimensions of violence. 
“Intensity” which refers to the level of violence (e.g. the number of killings, 
attacks, and incidents of coercion), the “character” of violence, (which measures 
the range of violent behaviours that groups exhibit and the identity of their 
targets) .In addition it is useful to investigate the organization of groups in specific 
conurbations, and temporal patterns of violence within the post-conflict state. The 
nature and conditions of violence in human society have been the subjects of 
numerous studies (Riches, 1986).  However, there are a number of new wars 
(Kaldor, 2012) in which it is commonly said that violence took different forms.  
 This study challenges the automatic, simplistic linkages between 
‘increased environmental scarcity”, “decreased economic activity”, and “migration” 
that purportedly “weakens states” and “cause conflicts and violence (Homer-
Dixon 1999:31). Rather, the study of contexts at local levels suggests that 
violence is a site-specific phenomenon rooted in local histories and social 
relations yet connected to larger processes of material transformation and power 
relations (Peluso and Watts, 2001:5). It could also be an instrument of state 
repression of political opponent and groups considered as spoilers. The forms of 
violence, who engages in them and their dynamics, are not obviously predictable, 
or uniform, and they are expanded and deepened analytically by conceptualizing 
violence. As Jean-Paul Dumont noted: 
“Violence is a habitus…….., at once structured and structuring: 
structured because the idea of violence results from historical 
events, stored as the memory of past deeds, of past encounters, of 
past frustrations; and structuring became the idea of violence 
informs human actions, determines the acceptability, even the 
banditry of violence, if not the ability to erase the scandal of its 
occurrence” (Dumont, 1992).  
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Violence against and between civilians is a defining feature of civil war. Levels of 
violence are central to the definition that distinguishes civil war from other forms 
of political instability, but analysts’ attention has rarely been directed at 
understanding variation in the violence that accompanies civil war. King describes 
this variation: “Episodes of social violence”, whether riots or atrocities committed 
during civil wars may be well patterned, but they do not occur uniformly across 
time or space. There are lulls and peaks. (King 2004:431-55). Patterns of killing, 
rape, and pillage are not the same across all armed groups, nor are strategies of 
violence consistent throughout every conflict. Yet this variation is often subsumed 
in the concept of civil war, or ‘new wars’. Violence is better defined broadly to 
include patterns of rebel-civilian, rebel-rebel, and civilian-civilian interaction that 
involve coercion. This type of relationship exists in post-war Liberia. For instance, 
there were 199 cases of sexual and gender-based violence in Montserrado 
County (research site) in 2015 (SG’s Report 2015:11). Also, the death of a 
commercial motorcyclist in Nimba County, alleged to be a ritualistic killing led to 
mass violent protest on 30 September 2015 against a perceived ineffectiveness 
of the police in addressing a series of suspected ritualistic killings. A crowd 
attacked a police station, freed detainees, burned homes and cars, and engaged 
in widespread looting. There were also incidents of vigilantism. For instance, on 
19 August 2015, in Nimba County, mob armed with weapons fired on three 
suspected armed robbers of which two sustained injuries (SG’s Report, 2015:5).  
The World Health Organization defines violence as: 
 The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or 
actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or 
community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of 
resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development 
or deprivation (Krug, et.al 2002:5). 
 
This associates intentionality with the committing of the act itself, irrespective of 
the outcome it produces. Excluded from the definition are unintentional incidents 
– such as most road traffic injuries and burns. The definition covers a broad range 
of outcomes – including psychological harm, deprivation and mal-development, 
and this perhaps reflects the need to include violence that does not necessarily 
result in injury or death, but that nonetheless places a substantial burden on 
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individuals, families, communities and health care systems worldwide. However, 
the above definition lacks rigor in the context of war–to-peace transition. But 
violence is a slippery concept – nonlinear, productive, destructive, and 
reproductive. Violence cannot be understood solely in terms of its physicality that 
is force, assault, or the infliction of pain alone. Violence also includes assault on 
the personhood, dignity, sense of worth or value of the victim (ibid). The social 
and cultural dimensions of violence are what give violence its power of meaning.  
Explaining violence within the context of this study I present discerning 
features and support the views of Cramer (2006) in four ways: first, the 
institutional framework that may have regulated violence in the past or that may 
contain it in the future is no longer viable and has become anachronistic. This is 
in reference to the fact that in post-war situations, institutions have become weak 
and are unable to resolve minor disputes and this ultimately results in violence. 
Second, in transition, the stakes of violence are - precisely because of the open-
ended features of change and institutionalized insecurity - more than usually 
intense. Here transition is characterized by war of position, not in the old military 
strategy of Gramscian political strategic sense, but in the sense of a scramble for 
social position in a social structure whose adhesive has not yet set. Third, the 
social and political conflict during major moments of transition is especially likely 
to be violent where there are histories of violence and ratchet mechanisms that 
introduce the means of violence and draw on what Tilly (1978) calls ‘specialists in 
violence’. Fourth, the crisis of transition is more likely to be violent if – as is also 
normal in such protracted moments – there is no credible central authority that 
can impose a monopoly of the means of and exercise of force, which is common 
where the fiscal source of the monopoly of violence is weak. (Cramer, 2006:215). 
  The prevalence of urban violence, which is widespread in Monrovia, has 
seen the intensification of semblance of gang violence, drug-related violence, 
homicidal violence, criminal violence, assault, gender and sexual violence, rape, 
armed robbery, threats and kidnapping, mob violence, ritualistic violence, political 
and economic violence etc. All these forms of violence can be described under 
three broad categorizations, namely; self-directed violence, collective violence 
and interpersonal violence.  
The World Bank distinguishes between self-directed violence, 
interpersonal violence, and collective violence. Interpersonal violence refers to 
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violence between individuals and is subdivided into family and intimate partner 
violence, and community violence, often carried out by agents of the state against 
civilians. The violence that occurs between family members and intimate 
partners, usually, though not always, takes place inside the home. This category 
includes child abuse and neglect, intimate partner violence and elder abuse. 
Community violence may be defined as: the instrumental use of violence by 
people who identify themselves as members of a group – whether this group is 
transitory or has a more permanent identity – against another group or set of 
individuals, in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives 
(Krug,et.al:2002:215). 
However, the World Bank’s view relates more to the explanation of the 
consequences of violence for public health rather than any in-depth analysis of 
violence within conflict studies. Post-war societies provide an environment for the 
manifestations of violence if peace agreements are not scrupulously 
implemented, particularly if major participants of the conflicts, such as ex-
combatants, are dissatisfied with the outcome of the DDRR process. There is a 
presumption that there is a strong link between ex-combatant satisfaction and 
long-term peace in post-conflict states. This is because in some post-war states 
like Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire and to some extent Sierra Leone, where ex-combatants 
were not properly reintegrated, they constitute a potential threat to peace. 
Therefore, researchers seek to understand as much as possible about how 
DDRR programmes can be implemented to ensure the satisfaction of ex-
combatants. This is not to say that understanding ex-combatant satisfaction with 
DDRR is the only or even the foremost mechanism  deserving of study for those 
interested in post-war stability, as past work on power-sharing  agreements and 
third-party security guarantees can well attest (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Walter  
2002).Even a focus on ex-combatant satisfaction after DDRR only uncovers a 
part of the micro-level process, as successful reintegration of combatants also 
requires effort from households and communities. Focusing on the satisfaction of 
ex-combatants likewise uncovers only part of the process linking DDRR with long-
term peace. Nonetheless, there is the assumption that ex-combatants who are 
satisfied with the DDRR process are apt to contribute to positive peace-building 
vis-à-vis their dissatisfied counterparts. 
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Though, used in its sociological context, social capital may prove useful in 
reintegration studies (Bowd, 2008). Putnam sees social capital as the reciprocity 
and trust that can develop through social interaction, especially in (formal or 
informal) groups and networks (Putnam, 2001). He notes that norms of reciprocity 
have value both for the people who take part in them (private returns), and in 
some instances, for society at large (public returns) through increased 
cooperation. The private returns include a greater likelihood that your friend, 
neighbour or former fellow combatant will come to your assistance in time of need 
(ibid). In this regard, high degrees of trust enable ex-combatants to cooperate 
and engage in commercial exchange without outside interference. To a large 
extent, this also depends on the types of activities of former fighting groups during 
the war, which may then mean that group of combatants enjoys high levels of 
social capital. Although more research is required to know how social capital is 
utilized by fighters after the war, nonetheless, this may constitute a major asset 
for ex-combatants as they are likely to increase their political and economic 
activities through this means.  
 
Contextualizing Political Economy and Neo-Patrimonialism 
I begin this section with a discourse on the broader meaning of political 
economy and then narrowed it to fit into my analysis of the political economy of 
Liberia. I think this is important in order to understand the evolution of the concept 
and how it has been applied in different situations overtime. There is a large body 
of literature that discusses developments in post-conflict settings. Interestingly, 
however, much of this literature takes the international actors in these settings as 
the starting point for analysis. It is striking how few of these assessments can 
help us with a comprehensive ordering of social world that we may find in a post-
conflict situation. One strand in the literature is, however, a fortunate exception. 
Mats Berdal and Dominic Zaum have developed a political economy perspective 
on war and post-war situations. This approach espouses a distinct perspective on 
war: while much analysis on civil war has  emphasized the chaotic and anarchic 
nature of war situations, a political economy perspective stresses that war entails 
the creation of an alternative system of power, protection and profit (Berdal and 
Zaum 2012; Keen 2000). Put differently, war allows for new social orders to be 
forged, where the weaker actors, such as civilian and low level combatants, can 
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be every bit as constrained and subject to formal and informal social control 
measures as they were in peace time. This is a perspective that brings one 
central feature of the war and post-war situation to the forefront, the issue of 
power. 
Political economy explains how and why capitalism and markets are 
structured in ways that reflect various types of social power. There has been 
considerable debate about the difference between neo-classical economics and 
political economy. I make some clarity here with a view to placing each of the 
concepts in proper analytical perspective. The distinction between neo-classical 
economics and political economy is not hard-and-fast; as a rule, they cast light on 
somewhat different aspects of the joint processes of social production and 
reproduction. According to Ronnie Lipschutz, Neo-classical economics is a 
discipline and discourse that purports to explain how and why capitalism and 
“free” markets fulfil individual desires for goods, satisfaction, and freedom, doing 
so more effectively and efficiently than alternatives. As an analytical-ideological 
system, neo-classical economics, Lipschutz argues, rests on the proposition that: 
(1) people naturally “truck and barter” with each other for the things they want but 
cannot make themselves or do not possess, (2) money represents a form of 
stored “value” that makes exchange more efficient than simple barter, (3) 
exchange takes place most efficiently in unregulated markets where it is mediated 
by prices that are a function of the supply of and demand for scarce goods 
(anything without a price is either priceless or worthless), (4), people have 
preferences, and it is rational for them to calculate the lowest cost way to fulfil 
those preferences, and (5) any effort to manage or control production, exchange, 
or markets is “politics” which interferes with the efficient operation of the system 
(Lipschutz (2010:3).   
 Neoclassical economics cannot, however tell us why capitalist markets are 
organized as they are, who might have a hand in that process or organization, 
and how those arrangements benefit some  and not others. Such points and 
questions are generally naturalized. Naturalized is used in this context to mean 
‘nature’ or things we cannot control, but evolve naturally, and to ask about them is 
to enter the realm of politics. This is, then, where critical political economy comes 
in: it recognizes that there are no markets without politics. Indeed, markets are 
thoroughly political institutions that require authoritative intervention in the form of 
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rules and regulations in order to function. That means that they are neither 
neutral nor politically neutral (Polanyi, 2001:147). Viewed from a different angle, 
Robert Cox (1995) opines that critical political economy is concerned with the 
historically constituted framework of structures within which political and 
economic activities take place. It stands back from the apparent fixity of the 
present to ask how the existing structures came into being and how they may be 
changing. Political economy in its Marxian and critical form is concerned not so 
much with exchange, supply, demand, and price as with how markets and the 
general economy are structured and configured, why they have those particular 
forms, and what sources of power shaped them as they are. Thus, the 
organization of political economy is not always the obvious result of the deliberate 
and visible exercise of political and social power by certain parties. The beliefs, 
practices, and rules of society may be structured in ways that are acceptable 
broadly defined as “natural” and inviolable, even while offering preferential 
advantages and benefits to some individuals and groups. These “mentalities” 
constitutes what Antonio Gramsci called “hegemony’, that is, the rhetorical and 
legal dominance in society of certain social elites and the acceptance of these 
mentalities as ‘common sense” by the rest of the society (Gramsci, 1971; Rupert, 
1995). Gramsci’s assertion is germane in the context of Liberia where the minority 
Americo-Liberia elite has maintained dominance through the instrumentalities of 
an archaic constitution that nurtures an imperial presidency. But, on the contrary, 
these mentalities have been challenged at various times by the rest of the 
society, with negative consequences manifesting in violence and wars.  
In an African political economy context, the term neo-patrimonial state has 
been introduced, and it is widely used to describe the real-world dynamics of 
domination. However, despite its extensive use, there is little consensus on its 
key features (Clapham, 1985; Theobald, 1982). The prefix “neo” designates 
divergent aberration from patrimonialism (Erdman and Engel, 2007:95-104) and, 
drawing on Weber’s political sociology, neo-patrimonialism is a hybrid form of 
governance featuring patrimonial and bureaucratic patterns, since the latter are 
specifically modern and thus justify using the prefix (Weber, 1978:105). Neo-
patrimonialism is arguably a feature that has characterized the contemporary 
states in Africa, and it is therefore important to explain this concept in its 
contemporary context. Thus, in neo-patrimonial states, patrimonial patterns are 
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dominant but bureaucratic elements exist. Patrimonial features clash with 
bureaucratic rationality, risking the bending, circumvention and violation of 
bureaucratic norms. Disciplinary action is oriented towards assuring personal 
loyalty and obedience first and foremost, and not administrative rationality 
(Gerdes, 2013:18). Patrimonialism is expressed in patterns of authority rather 
than the way of coming to power, and decentralized patrimonialism may be 
combined with legal-rational features of rules. Patrimonial staff may have 
appropriated wide-ranging powers and the neo-patrimonial president may be of 
rather symbolic importance.  Further, high public sector salaries may indicate 
patrimonial (Therkildsen, 2005) as well as bureaucratic principles.  
Modern theories of states and their formation generally include 
considerations of wars, regimes and democracy, and frequently adopt a political 
economy perspective that is useful for the analysis of both regimes and war 
economies. Applied to a re-emerging state like Liberia, state-building theory may 
provide interesting insights into democracy by focusing on broader societal 
processes underlying the creation and functioning of democratic state institutions. 
I discussed the political economy of Liberia as a means of understanding state 
formation. In particular, I introduced Max Weber’s ideal-types of legitimate 
domination and discussed the term neo-patrimonialism, which is defined as 
governance arrangement characterized by patrimonial patterns clashing with 
relatively weaker but nonetheless enduring legal-rational ones (Weber, 1978). 
Here, the notion of domination is discussed in the context of the hegemonic rule 
and leadership of the Americo-Liberia elites, the economic predation, and 
financial recklessness that has characterized regimes in Liberia. 
Drawing on Charles Tilly (1975) and others, I emphasized the frequently 
violent political competition that is intrinsically associated with competition over 
the economic resources that are needed for state-building. As proposed by Tilly, 
political economy in a wider sense, that is, the authoritative acquisition of values 
and authoritative re-distribution of values is an important concept for investigating 
the evolution of patterns of authority in general and of the state in particular (ibid). 
I then discuss the concept of neo-patrimonialism, an ideal-typical sub-type of 
traditional domination, evolved out of other (typically patriarchal) forms of 
authority when a holder of power succeeds in establishing personally loyal 
administrative staff able to enforce decisions. 
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 Neo-patrimonialism is one of the central concepts in Francis Fukuyama’s 
major study, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French 
Revolution. Fukuyama based his analysis on the classic writings of Max Weber, 
and distinguishes neo-patrimonialism from modern state systems. He state that 
“Impersonal modern states” are difficult institutions to both establish and maintain, 
since neo-patrimonialism – recruitment based on kinship or personal reciprocity – 
is the natural form of social relationship to which human beings will revert in the 
absence of other norms and incentives”. “The most universal form of human 
political form of interaction” “is a patron-client relationship in which a leader 
exchanges favours in return for support from a group of followers” (Fukuyama, 
2011:450-453). 
 Francis (2006) discussed extensively the concept of patrimonialism and 
neo-patrimonialism in the context of African domestic politics, and how the 
patron-client system has defined the functioning of political regimes, and their 
consequences on the state and population. He argues that the nature of domestic 
politics or prebendal politics based on patron-clientelistic systems in much of 
Africa has been driven by informal networks through which state resources were 
appropriated to support and consolidate regimes in power and their followers. 
Political clientelism, as a system of governance, was a ‘mechanism of exchange: 
by recognizing private interests and using the machinery of state to purvey private 
benefits to groups and individuals, in the process giving them vested – and purely 
instrumental – interest in the maintenance of the state itself (Francis, 2006:80). 
He then linked the politics of clientelism to patrimonialism and neo-
patrimonialism, which are extensions of the patron-clientelistic nature of domestic 
politics in Africa. First, Francis contend that patrimonialism, as a basis for 
governance and exercise of political power, entailed the lack of distinction 
between public and private relationships and the general privatization and 
informalisation of political life. Patrimonialism involves a high degree of 
personalized rule, in which the ‘strongmen’, including the ruling and governing 
elites, are able to extract and redistribute patrimonial resources along regional, 
ethnic, religious and familial lines in order to consolidate political power and 
ensure regime survival (ibid, 81). 
Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, in their seminal study, 
Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transition in Contemporary 
76 
 
Perspective also placed neo-patrimonialism in contemporary context at the centre 
of their analysis:  
“In neo-patrimonial political systems, an individual rules by dint 
of personal prestige and power; ordinary folk are treated as 
extension of the ‘big man’s household, with no rights or 
privileges other than those bestowed by the ruler. Authority is 
entirely personalized, shaped by the ruler’s preferences rather 
than those bestowed by the laws. The ruler ensures the political 
stability of the regime and personal political survival by providing 
a zone of security in an uncertain environment and by selectively 
distributing favours and material benefits to loyal followers who 
are not citizens of the polity so much as the ruler’s clients” 
(Bratton and Walle, 1997:61). 
 
Indeed, neo-patrimonialism is a term that has been used for patrons using state 
resources in order to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population, and it 
is indicative of informal patron-client relationships that can reach from the very 
high up in state structures down to the individuals, including at small village 
levels. Neo-patrimonialism may underlay or supplant the bureaucratic structures 
of the state in that only those with connections have the real power. Further, it 
undermines political institutions and the rule of law, and it is a corrupt practice.  
Contrasting patrimonialism and bureaucracies as modes of administration 
of power, the former is characterized by the absence of distinction between public 
and private, as well as the all-dominant importance of personal relations between 
ruler and staff (Weber, 1978:231-241). Reciprocal exchange of unequal goods 
creating personal ties is a principle universally found in rural dominated cultures. 
As intermediary staff are institutionalized, exchange takes place in the form of 
granting privileges in return for political loyalty (Gerdes, 2013). Exchange of 
values, regularly taking on the symbolically enriched material form of gifts, may 
appear as a totally voluntary act, yet traditional rules of reciprocity bind both 
parties (Mauss, 1954-10-12). Morally, the ruler is not free to reciprocate or not, 
leading to regularization of domination (Gerdes, 2013). 
This is due to the gift having more than an economic quality, it remains linked to 
the giver, and exchange creates a “spiritual bond” with the receiver (Mauss, 
1954:11). Reciprocal exchange has been considered the very foundation of the 
political pattern in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chabal, 2009; Bayart, 1993). These 
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discussions are useful for clarifying the notion of patrimonialism. The core 
characteristic of patrimonialism is the creation of legitimacy by establishing 
complex personal bonds of loyalty, making use of the traditional principles of 
reciprocal exchange of unequal values. This implies that there is no distinction 
between public and private, that the “authoritative allocation of values’ (Easton, 
1953) takes place through personal relations patterning the administration of 
power, and that clientelism is an integral feature of patrimonialism. Here, the 
patrimonial ruler seeks to integrate the whole populace into clientelistic networks 
expressing reciprocal relations (Reno, 1998). In explaining this further, William 
Reno noted that clientelism is a pyramidal system of exchange of unequal values. 
He noted that its basic units are personal dyadic relations. The values allocated 
by the higher ranking party are termed patronage. Patrimonialism further implies 
that there are no universal rights. Justice means treating persons differently 
according to social status rather than respecting their equal rights as citizens 
(Mungui-Pippidi, 2006). Here, I also explore the variants of patrimonialism in 
order to place the chapter is its proper analytical context. In pure patrimonialism, 
there is complete separation of functionary from the means of carrying out his 
functions (Weber, 1978:234). 
 According to Weber, the paramount ruler personally controls all economic 
opportunities, and private prerogatives are controlled and discretionarily allocated 
by him. Providing the means of administration both increases the need for the 
ruler to personally acquire patrimonial revenues and his ability to control 
patrimonial staff. This correlates with staff subsistence being assured by “living 
from the Lord’s Table” or receiving discretionary “allowances, usually in kind from 
the lord’s magazine treasury” (ibid, 235). In the “estate-type of patrimonialism”, 
Weber asserts that the “administrative staff appropriate particular power and the 
corresponding economic assets”, and have personal control of the means of 
administration. Individuals making up the patrimonial staff live by the 
appropriation of property income, fees or taxes” or from exploiting fiefs (ibid).  
Thus, whenever lower ranking holders of authority privately appropriate authority, 
patrimonial authority tends to disintegrate. Legitimacy is created through the 
exchange of rights to appropriation against loyalty, but it is compromised and 
opportunities of the ruler to impose his will are severely limited. Further, “feudal 
patrimonialism” and prebendal patrimonialism” are borderline cases but 
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nevertheless fall under the patrimonial paradigm (ibid, 255-262). Such 
decentralized patrimonialism and the associated weak legitimacy of the central 
ruler imply deficits in control. It is often, though not necessarily, spatially 
manifested and more pronounced in the peripheral politics (Gerder, 2013).  
In the 1970s and 1980s, African countries experienced new civil wars and 
insurgencies. The outbreak of war in Sudan; the civil wars and liberation conflicts 
in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau; the wars of Liberation in Namibia 
and Zimbabwe; the guerrilla war in Uganda and the conflict between pro-and anti-
apartheid groups in South Africa. During the 1990s, some of these wars 
continued and new ones appeared, many of them with significant religious 
dimensions. In a study of African insurgencies, Christopher Clapham 
distinguished between four   main types of wars: (1) Liberation insurgencies 
aimed at achieving independence from colonial or minority rule; (2) Separatist 
insurgencies which represent the interest of ethnic groups or regions within an 
existing state and aim at achieving secession from or autonomy within the state, 
this will include the case of southern Sudan; (3) Reform insurgencies seeking 
radical reform of the state, the case of Rwanda may be seen as an example of 
this type; (4) Warlord insurgencies aim at changing the leadership of the state 
without necessarily wishing to create a new state radically different from the 
existing one. The latter is rather being directed towards creating a personal 
political fiefdom within the state, and cases of this would be Liberia, Sierra Leone 
and Congo (Clapham, 1998:6-7). 
 
Re-marginalization, Re-criminalization, Exploitation and Economic 
Insecurity of Ex-combatants 
 
In this section, I discuss the factors that can predispose ex-combatants to re-
engaging in violence. Here, I will pose and test the research hypothesis: “The 
more ex-combatants are re-marginalized, the more they are likely to engage in 
violence”. I begin by presenting the primary nexus and the context-specific 
processes for analysis:  
1. The Primary Nexus is envisioned as the point where there is a significant 
alignment of common processes, and the point at which the potential for violence 
is extremely high. 
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2. Context Specific Processes highlight the unique manner in which underlying 
risks factors interact to produce violence. These categories are not mutually 
exclusive, as an understanding of the first stage is essential for the second stage 
to be meaningful.  
The primary nexus framework posits that ex-combatant violence can best 
be understood by analysing the interaction among four explanatory factors 
namely: Re-marginalization, Re-criminalization, Exploitation, and Economic 
Insecurity (RREEI). The context specific processes embody critical risk factors 
which are viewed as existing conditions that could potentially culminate in 
violence. These include, but are not limited to: economic decline, dilapidated 
health and education infrastructure, lack of legitimate and adept state apparatus, 
clientalism, nepotism, corruption, lack of a legitimate political system, lack of a 
functioning judicial system, disintegration of the social fabric of society,  social 
exclusion, geo-political and regional instability, and class conflict (Sawyer, 
2015:15-18;  LPRS Report 2008). By using this analytical framework, the study 
strives to develop a better understanding of the types of re-marginalization, re-
criminalization, exploitation and economic insecurity which makes ex-combatants 
likely to engage in violence. While the four explanatory factors are discussed 
here, I will limit my analysis and give greater focus to the discussion on re-
marginalization which was a dominant expression among the research 
participants. 
 
Re-marginalization: The process of re-marginalization is significant in 
understanding why ex-combatants have the motivation to resort to violence in 
post-war era. Recent research has shown that, while disarmament and 
demobilization appear to have solved some problems, at least temporarily, they 
also generate new ones (Call and Stanley 2003, Gamba 2003; Mehlum et.al, 
2002). After ex-combatants have been disarmed and demobilized, they are 
released into societies that are often ill-equipped to receive them (Themmer, 
2011:11). Not only do ex-combatants tend to lack employment and necessary 
skills (given the short period of their encampment) to compete on the labour 
market, more often they suffer from trauma and social stigmatization. Sukanya 
Podder’s work highlights a pre-war agrarian crisis in some West African countries, 
where youth in rural areas were marginalized in a stifling social order. This meant 
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that ‘in reintegrating successfully, returning youth ex-combatants needed 
alternatives to their erstwhile rural dependency and the exploitation due to stalled 
land reform measure of their labour by older land-owning patrons’(Podder, 
2012:197). In turn, an anonymous urban life was deemed more attractive for 
many ex-combatants. Indeed, the promotion of a home community return could 
entail an unfortunate return to a pre-war status quo for them, which in turn might 
mean re-marginalization and a renewal of the seeds of unrest (Podder, 
2012:199). If people are excluded from the political process of decision-making, 
they may, in the long run, seek to address the situation through violent means 
(Ohlson, 2008:136; Wallenstein, 2002).  
Further, groups may seek empowerment through the use of arms if they 
have fears for their safety. Protection against physical abuse is a powerful 
incentive for ordinary civilians to join rebel movements (Themmer, 2011:15). 
Although repression in the form of state abuses decreases the probability of non-
violent protest, it significantly increases the likelihood of rebellion and civil war 
(Regan and Norton (2005). A similar argument has been made by Sambanis 
(2002:229), who stated that an increase in a government’s repression of 
nonviolent opposition will reduce nonviolent activities of an opposition group but 
increase its violent activities. Thus, any political re-marginalization of ex-
combatants in a post-conflict society can be seen as based on patrimonialism that 
is rule founded on personal relations rather than rational bureaucratic principles 
(Themmer, 2011). When this happens, state resources are usually allocated to 
the political supporters of the ruling party, friends and family members, rather 
than on the basis of universal principles of need. I will return to re-marginalization 
of ex-combatants in communities later in this chapter.  
 
Re-criminalization: The following questions were addressed to the participants 
and I have provided answers to them in the analysis. 
1. How are ex-combatants re-criminalized and by whom? 
2. Are ex-combatants the only group re-criminalized in their communities and why 
is this so? 
3. Who re-recriminalizes ex-combatants? 
4. How would you avoid being re-criminalized, specifically, what steps will you 
take to prevent this?  
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First deceit, that is, false promises and cheating by the leaders, forceful 
recruitment, plunders and pillage, maiming and killings characterized the first 
phase of ex-combatants criminalization. Second, re-criminalization occurs 
through rejection and stigmatization by communities. The insecurity of 
reintegration, both physical and socio-economic, combined with the perception of 
broken promises on the government side, a sense of being stigmatized by society 
and constant offers to return to criminal activities make for an extremely difficult 
and turbulent process (Derks, et.al 2011:48). The loss of identity by many ex-
combatants after they quit a life of war adds to the problems, and this sense of 
rejection fosters a re-engagement in violence. Third, ex-combatants continue to 
face the excessive use of force by agents of the state.  
Ex-combatants are re-criminalized through the availability of drugs and 
weak regulations to prosecute offenders. The use of drugs is identified as a major 
source of violence (LDEA 2015). Consuming drugs emboldens the users to 
engage in unplanned violent activities. Production, consumption, and trafficking in 
drugs are illegal in Liberia.  Local information suggests that foreign nationals 
dominate the trade, including supplying cocaine to workers (predominantly ex-
combatants) in the mining fields (Agoha, 2013-2016). According to the Director of 
Liberia’s Drugs Enforcement Agency, Anthony Sour, the main challenges in 
fighting drugs problems are the lack of legal framework to address the issue and 
that “traffickers, users and other people take advantage of that weakness”. 
Further, the government has not been in a position to finance all of its projects 
properly because of the war, and Liberia can only become drug-free if there are 
harsher penalties against drug offenders. Currently, a drug user can get bail for 
as little as US472 (ISS, 2012). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
pinpoints some of the worst affected areas in and around Monrovia, the capital 
city. The communities in Liberia with the highest drug use include, Congo Town, 
New Kru Town, West Point, Paynesville, Montserrado Central (all sites of this 
research), Clara Town, and Chocolate City (UNODC 2012). Addiction is said to 
be linked to crime and violence.  During the civil war, variations of drugs were 
consumed by militias and combatants, and were thought to be a type of “psychic 
and physical protection” against enemy bullets, and to make fighters brave and 
fearless” (ISS, 2012). This perception still prevails in post-conflict Liberia, possibly 
being the driving force for engaging in violent activities. However, it is difficult to 
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assess what role drugs play in increasing violence, as cultural, historical, political 
and economic factors are intertwined in a country still emerging from conflict. 
Poverty plays a role as the youth turn to illicit drugs and violent crimes for simple 
lack of economic opportunity. 
 Fourth, the regional context has brought a re-criminalizing effect on 
Liberia’s ex-combatants (UNMIL 2014). Common security threats encountered by 
ex-combatants are the emerging criminal structures that regularly put them in 
contact with “job offers.” As former combatants know how to use a weapon, they 
are seen as a useful asset for these groups. In the conflict in Cote d’ Ivoire, 
Liberian ex-combatants were recruited by different actors. Thus, re-criminalization 
has taken two forms. First, many of the recruited ex-combatants received 
monetary rewards to fight following the electoral crisis in 2010/2011. When 
President Laurent Gbagbo was ousted, many of those who were fighting on his 
side fled back to Liberia with significant numbers of weapons. As their funding 
dried up, the acquired weapons became instruments for the perpetration of 
violence to sustain their high-profile life-style. Second, following renewed violence 
in Cote d’Ivoire after the ascendancy of President Alhassan Ouattara into office, 
again, Liberian ex-combatants became ready targets for recruitment for 
mercenary activities against the Ouattara government and international 
peacekeepers. In this connection, 18 Liberian fighters (ex-combatants) who 
engaged in several attacks in Cote d’Ivoire were arrested and tried in Liberian 
court for their involvement in killing of seven United Nations peacekeepers in 
Cote d’Ivoire in 2012. Of this number, 13 were convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment, while 5 were acquitted. There are concerns within Liberia that the 
process of re-criminalization of ex-combatants portends great dangers for the 
peace and stability of the country. The implication is that, although the DDRR had 
disarmed and demobilized ex-combatants, their engagement in insurgency and 
mercenarism at the regional level has effectively re-armed them, and it is highly 
unlikely that the Liberian government will embark on DDRR in its territory again. 
There is apprehension within Liberian society of the ongoing drawdown and 
eventual departure of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), fearing that 
the departure of the UN may lead to a resurgence of conflict in the light of the 
presence of active ex-combatants. 
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 Finally, as written in its report of November 2013, the United Nations Panel 
of Experts for Liberia during its investigation found that hundreds of former 
combatants, some of them armed, were active in the Gola forest bordering Liberia 
and Sierra Leone where they are illegally mining gold and engaging in other illicit 
activities, including drugs and weapons smuggling (UN Panel of Experts Report, 
2013:18). The report further stated that these groups of ex-combatants operating 
outside of any State authority have also initiated cross-border armed skirmishes. 
For instance, the Panel received information from Sierra Leone that on 11 
October 2013, men armed with artisanal hunting shotguns and operating on the 
Sierra Leone-Liberia border ambushed Sierra Leonean forest rangers in the Gola 
Forest, seriously injuring one of the rangers. The Panel also documented 
evidence of former Liberian fighters who were recruited to fight for the 
Government in Mali in 2013. One of them, a former fighter for Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) rebel group, provided information on how he, 
along with others from the Liberia United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
(LURD), and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel groups, had 
travelled to Sierra Leone, onwards to Guinea and then to Bamako, where they 
were paid and equipped before fighting on behalf of the government. Finally, it 
seemed that ex-combatants feel that they have been singled out within the 
communities for re-criminalization by the state, their leaders who seek to advance 
their own political and economic interests, and by external actors who use them 
to fight in civil wars at the sub-regional level.  
 
Exploitation: The following questions were addressed to the participants and I 
have provided answers to them in the analysis. 
1. Who are those exploiting ex-combatants? 
2. Why are ex-combatants exploited and how? 
3. Are ex-combatants happy about being exploited and what can you do to avoid 
being exploited? 
Ex-combatant exploitation occurred during the DDRR and after. But of much 
concern is the nature of their exploitation in post-war Liberia. The exploitation is 
linked to the actions of individuals, agencies, multinational corporations, 
international organizations, and political groups, etc. Foreign concessions whose 
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operations are mainly in the area of palm oil and rubber plantations, mining, 
construction and oil exploration, have employed large numbers of ex-combatants 
as unskilled and contract workers. They are paid low wages; far below the 
minimum wage recommended by the International labour Organization (ILO). The 
agreements which the government signed with concessions granting them 
operating rights, largely excluded the participation of host local communities 
(inclusive of ex-combatants). As a result, they are denied benefits accruing from 
corporate social responsibility, and workers remain marginalized and exploited.  
National labour laws are ineffective to compel concessions to apply appropriate 
wage remunerations and working conditions. Sometimes, officials of government 
receive bribes from concessions to the detriment of the predominant ex-
combatant workers. 
This has led to massive exploitation of community members and ex-
combatants. This state of affairs has always led to violence, spearheaded by ex-
combatants in an attempt to get their demands addressed by the concessionaire 
and the government. This type of violence has often led to the destruction of 
properties, injuries, and the disruption of operations of the company concerned. 
For instance, in 2007, a Belgian Manager of the Liberia Agricultural Company 
(LAC) was killed by workers who were protesting low wages and lack of social 
benefits (UN Report 2007). In July 2014, there was exchange of gun fire between 
the national police and workers who were protesting against a foreign mining 
company – Arcelor Mittal - over poor working conditions and lack of social 
development in communities within the concession area.  Six police officers 
sustained gunshot wounds. Only those with skills in the use of weapons could 
carry out this shooting and this was widely attributed to ex-combatants among the 
workers. Also there have been concerns of forced labour within concessions 
which is frowned on by the ILO. Workers are exploited in construction, agriculture, 
and sometimes the use of child labour occurs. But because of the weaknesses of 
national justice institutions, these activities remain unchecked (Agoha, 2014/ 
2015). 
 After the civil war in Liberia, there was a burgeoning of private security 
companies. Since the end of the civil war in 2003, the Liberian security industry 
has considerably expanded in size. Its total revenues reportedly doubled between 
2004 and 2011. This would make it one of the fastest growing segments in the 
85 
 
Liberian economy. Today, an estimated 87 private security companies are active 
in the country, employing about 7,000 individuals, all of whom are Liberians, 
mostly male. The number of private guards outstrips that of soldiers (2,000) and 
police officers (4,000). The services of security companies predominantly consist 
in unarmed and static perimeter protection, mostly in urban environments and 
particularly the capital city of Monrovia (Von Boemcken, 2012:2)  
Most are owned by top and mid-level rebel commanders and they have 
employed former combatants who provide security to government institutions, 
international organizations and agencies, business entities, multinational 
corporation/concession, and residential houses. This is the minimum the society 
can afford them after their participation in civil conflict and after what many 
Liberians described as failed reintegration process. These groups who harbour 
anti-government sentiments see themselves as being exploited given the low 
level of salaries they receive which range from US$100. 00 to US$150.00 per 
month, and sometimes they are owed arrears for several months (Agoha 2012-
2014). They are highly vulnerable and often, they have used violence to express 
resentment of exploitation. For instance, in 2010, personnel of a private security – 
INTERCOM – deployed at various installations of the United Nations Mission in 
Liberia (UNMIL), embarked on a violent protest against the organization for what 
they perceived as the inability of the UN leadership to intervene on their behalf 
and address the low wages paid to them by the management of INTERCOM. This 
incident happened upon the realization that UN pays to the company 
(INTERCOM) a high amount estimated at between US$500.00 to US$1,000.00 
per worker. While in turn, INTERCOM pay them the range stated above. The 
violence led to the destruction of UN properties and also significant injuries to its 
staff members (UNMIL Report, 2010). 
In Liberia, most ex-combatants have transformed into commercial 
motorcyclists and they operate under an umbrella union (President LMTU, 2013). 
This probably cuts across countries of the Mano River Union as former fighters 
use this means to generate income for their livelihood in the absence of 
sustainable reintegration. These groups are also known to be very vulnerable 
because of their poor economic status and exposure to harassment by the police 
due to their frequent engagement in civil disobedience, such as riots, protests, 
and blockade of roads to express their anger and frustration towards the 
86 
 
government. In addition, they provide other services such as being “rented” or 
“recruited” for political activities, as spoilers, and are also known to engage in 
drug trafficking and armed robbery amongst others. In the light of all these, 
including the risk they pose to road users due to high rate of accidents, the 
government has issued operational guidelines for the motorcyclists, which 
includes; complying within designated areas, wearing reflective vests and 
helmets, registration and license of motorcycles, and night-time curfew from 
10pm to 6am etc. In addition, the government has imposed various fines and 
taxes on them to ensure that operational standards are met. But this has always 
been resisted by the motorcyclists who see themselves as being exploited and 
this has led to frequent violent clashes with the police who try to enforce the 
regulations (UNMIL 2015). They also extend their frustration and anger to 
members of the public through mob justice, particularly when any of their 
members is attacked (Agoha, 2014). 
Key (civil) war actors are likely to have controlled, participated or enjoyed 
the benefits stemming from the war economy (Spear, 2006; Ballentine and 
Nitzschke 2005). They are also likely to transform and continue dominating a 
range of economic sectors, especially those with high profit margins, in the years 
after conflict (Torjesen, 2013a). The evolving patterns of domination, 
monopolization or open competition in the economy will matter for low-level ex-
combatants as they seek to enter into mainstream economic activity (Torjesen 
2013b). These considerations, in addition to formal economic assessments of 
growth, employment prospects and livelihood options, need to be factored in 
when planning economic reintegration. 
Finally, it is clear that ex-combatants have remained victims of exploitation 
in the communities and in the wider society, and this is manifested in different 
forms in the activities they are engaged in. Although ex-combatants may lack the 
power to effect any change that can have positive impact on their lives, they have 
the capacity to pursue a course of action (violent orientation) to demonstrate 
disapproval of their continued exploitation, as shown above. 
 
Economic Insecurity: The following questions were addressed to the 
participants and I have provided answers to them in my analysis. 
1. Why are ex-combatants economically insecure? 
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2. Who created these conditions of insecurity? 
3. How can ex-combatants avoid being economically insecure? What will you do?  
One of the main benefits of participating in war is the opportunity for economic 
gain. Some scholars argue that the central aim of rebellion is economic profit, 
especially through the illegal taxation of natural resources for export (Collier, 
2000:839, 852). Even though other factors may explain the outbreak of violence, 
economic considerations may become more important with time. In some civil 
wars, an economic interest in continuing the war at a profitable level may replace 
defeating the enemy as the main objective (Berdal and Malone, 2000:2, 6). 
Taking part in war can also be profitable for the individual combatants. Being a 
combatant ensures a certain income either in the form of a salary or from looting. 
The use of violence may also be a way to gain access to land, water and mineral 
resources by forcing original owner’s way (Berdal, 1996; 16-17; Kees, 2000:23-
25, 29-31. 
There is a lack of economic security which is linked increasingly to the 
issue of the sustainability of DDRR and wider stabilization efforts. There appear 
to be deep-rooted assumptions that in post-conflict settings, economic recovery 
will occur, providing absorption capacity for former combatants and other war 
affected people. Yet, evidence for this is severely limited. Ex-combatants have 
alleged economic insecurity due to their poor living conditions and that of their 
families, without any prospects that these conditions will improve in the medium 
to long term. They have attributed their impoverishment to the actions of the 
state, either as a deliberate neglect of their communities or as a specific action 
targeted on ex-combatants for their roles in the civil wars.  
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Figure 3: A circle of analytical framework with key driving agencies / institutions - 
by the author, 2014. 
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In fig 3 above, the analytical framework circle explains the key actors that induce 
or facilitate the quadripartite of re-criminalization, re-marginalization, exploitation, 
and economic insecurity. Former rebel leaders and commanders’ decisions to 
sponsor ex-combatant violence may, in fact, be the function of their relative 
position in the larger political and economic network. The willingness of rebel 
leaders and commanders to remobilize and re-criminalize ex-combatants through 
their involvement in violence can be viewed through the lens of brokerage. 
According to this perspective, rebel leaders and commanders are most disposed 
to violence when they establish themselves as brokers – who distribute economic 
resources between governing elites and ex-combatant communities – in post-civil 
war societies. Post-war societies are often characterized by weak bureaucracies, 
judiciary, police, armed forces and the legislature. Such institutional shortcomings 
Conflict 
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Figure 4: A pyramid of analytical framework - by the author, 2014 
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compel the governing elite to outsource different state functions to influential 
private persons, or brokers, e.g. former rebel leaders and commanders. By 
offering these services to former fighters, political elites are now subject to the 
whims and caprices of the influential brokers, who re-criminalize ex-combatants 
by using them to create and sustain violence as well as by their exploitation due 
to their weak position. For the governing elites there are clear benefits for such 
outsourcing. Brokers controlling informal networks can, for instance, be used to 
engage in dubious activities that governing elites wish to remain undetected, such 
as intimidation of political rivals or illegal economic activities (Utas 2012).  
 In the post-conflict state such as Liberia, key actors are known as being 
culpable for the re-marginalization, re-criminalization, exploitation, and economic 
insecurity of ex-combatants. Their actions drive ex-combatants to engage in 
violence which then has greater negative ramifications for the society, and 
threaten the nascent democracy. In fig 4 above, a threshold is attained when the 
risk factors at the base (content-specific process), interact with the primary factors 
to produce violence and conflict at the apex. The risk factors are usually the 
underlying causes of wars which remain unaddressed by the political and ruling 
elites in peace time. They may remain latent for a longer period of time until there 
is a trigger. Therefore, in a highly elitist and neo-patrimonial society like Liberia, 
the continued display of the primary factors may inevitably lead to violence, and a 
worst case scenario will be a relapse to conflict.  
 
Re-marginalization of Ex-combatant Communities 
 
In most post-conflict societies like Liberia, former combatants demand attention 
on issues that specifically affect them especially when they feel that they have not 
benefitted from the peace agreement that ended the war or from the reintegration 
processes. Liberia ex-combatants feel re-marginalized from local and national 
development benefits and particularly vulnerable to economic difficulties. Re-
marginalization of ex-combatants has negative effects on them and the cohesion 
and stability of the society in which they live (Columbia University, 2014). The 
phrase “marginalization” was frequently mentioned during face-to-face interviews 
and focus group discussions with ex-combatants, and often accentuated by 
stories of how they suffered from the first phase of marginalization that led to the 
civil war. Yet, they have not been recognized as “liberators and “agents of peace” 
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in ending the war. There are gaps in research and policy identifying and 
understanding ex-combatants re-marginalization in Liberia. In seeking to address 
these gaps, the study asked the following questions on ex-combatants re-
marginalization: 
 Why are ex-combatants re-marginalized and by who? 
 Did ex-combatants receive reintegration benefits? 
 Are ex-combatants’ communities represented at all levels of government? 
 To what extent can re-marginalization lead them to engage in violence? 
 What are the community’s perceptions about ex-combatants re-
marginalization? 
 What policy/framework exists to support ex-combatants’ livelihood and 
prevent their re-marginalization and resort to violent? 
 Can political and economic empowerment prevent the re-marginalization of 
ex-combatants? 
  Which other groups apart from ex-combatants feel that they are re-
marginalized (e.g. members of the ex-Armed Forces of Liberia, widows of 
ex-security personnel, unemployed youth, commercial motorcyclists, etc.)? 
 How do ex-combatants respond to their re-marginalization? 
 What are the implications of ex-combatants re-marginalization? 
Looking at the fieldwork data, the respondents feel that they are re-marginalized 
because they belong to a particular group, referred to as “fighters”, and 
consequently are excluded from society and the benefits accruing to that society. 
Their views probably reflect Catherine Bolten’s (2012) assertion that in the 
aftermath of the war, ex-combatants embraced their status as “war affected” 
victims and “beneficiaries of reintegration, further alienating themselves from 
civilians as they navigated foreign, rather than local models of peacebuilding. 
(Re)-marginalization can be understood as persistent inequality and adversity 
resulting from discrimination, social stigma and stereotypes. Understanding the 
nature and depth of re-marginalization is the first step toward combatting it (NDI 
undated). The notion of “nothing about us without us,” a view held by many ex-
combatants, remains prevalent in Liberia. Opportunities exist in Liberia for 
engaging ex-combatants into productive activities, particularly with huge 
international support to the country in post-war reconstruction and peace 
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consolidation. Unfortunately, it appears that DDRR implementing agencies were 
not able to identify appropriate interventions in which ex-combatants can enrol, 
and participate for their economic livelihood. There was a clear indication during 
the fieldwork that ex-combatants are likely to react violently depending on the 
extent of their re-marginalization. Also there are no clear policies/framework that 
target ex-combatants. Therefore, increase in research on the visibility of the 
issues involved in their re-marginalization is necessary for a better understanding 
of issues for institutional action. Ultimately, efforts to recognize and include them 
in the political process and address the economic inequities associated with re-
marginalization may discourage their resort to violence. The occasional protests 
associated with other groups such as members of the ex-Armed Forces of 
Liberia, widows of ex-security personnel, unemployed youth, commercial 
motorcyclists, etc.) also give an indication that they feel a sense of 
marginalization. In the figure below, I have identified types of re-marginalized ex-
combatants. This typology was derived from my extensive interactions with these 
groups during the course of my field work (formal and informal) across the 
country. 
Figure 5: Types of Re-marginalized Ex-combatants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Source: The typology is based on the author’s research across the country 
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Each group of ex-combatants experiences re-marginalization differently, and aims 
to ensure how they can overcome this. Disabled ex-combatants feel re-
marginalized due to their incapacitation and not receiving any support from the 
state, with many relying on street begging. Rural and Urban ex-combatants 
struggle to contend with officials of the government in seeking for inclusion in the 
political process and befitting from state resources. Skilled and unskilled ex-
combatants engage in frequent labour disputes with concessions, sometimes 
leading to violence as the government is unable to provide employment for this 
category. Motorcyclist ex-combatants have gained notoriety for violently 
challenging state security when their interests are infringed upon by the latter. 
Migrant or migratory ex-combatants have fought in the civil wars in Cote d’Ivoire 
and probably in other places where war is still ongoing in Africa, such as in Mali. 
Many who fought in Cote d’Ivoire returned home feeling re-marginalized because 
financial promises made by the protagonists in the war were not fully met. A 
known Liberia fighter, Joseph Marzah, (aka Zigzag) of the Independent Patriotic 
Front (NPFL) of Charles Taylor, and a recruiter of ex-combatants for the Cote 
d’Ivoire war, informed me in 2012 that most of the attacks in the west of Cote 
d’Ivoire were carried out by dissatisfied ex-combatants who did not receive the 
financial promise made to them.  Their frustration has been exacerbated by their 
re-marginalization in Liberia for participating in the Ivoirian civil war. Members of 
the re-marginalized ex-combatants experience re-marginalization in different 
ways, but share common hurdles, that is, to be recognized, participate in political 
processes, and their economic empowerment. They, however, pursue these 
agenda in different ways – from subtle persuasion to violent inclination.  Also 
some of these groups have different ways of coping, and may have different 
financial, social and cultural capital that is likely not to make them engage in acts 
of confrontation with state security or in violence. In addition to limitation of the 
explanatory factors to re-marginalization, the study also limited focus on 
categories of violence to the discussion of political and economic violence. This is 
discussed in the Liberia case study in chapter five. 
 In addition to examining the research hypothesis, I have also asked the 
following question: If ex-combatants are no longer re-marginalized, re-
criminalized, exploited, and made economically insecure would that stop them 
from re-engaging in violence? 
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It will be difficult to provide evidence to show that violence will stop in Liberia if 
these explanatory factors are met. For instance, previous research on ex-
combatants re-engaging in violence in a post-democratic dispensation is lacking 
as this is the first time that Liberia has elected a President through constitutional 
means and it is attempting to hand over to another democratically elected 
President in 2018. There are other reasons why it is difficult to determine whether 
violence by ex-combatants will stop or not.  
Liberian society is inherently violent as demonstrated by the deadly 
conflicts that have characterized the country since 1822 to 1847, when it was 
declared a Republic, and beyond. In other words, violence runs deep in the social 
fabric of the society. In his seminal work entitled “The Evolution of Deadly Conflict 
in Liberia: From ‘Paternaltariansm’ to State Collapse”, Jeremy Levitt discussed 
the nature and dimensions of violent conflicts, including settler vs. indigenous 
conflict; tribal conflicts, and the “Great Wars” 1989-2003. In his conclusion, he 
noted that the Great Wars brought about an era of state disintegration, brutality 
and egregious and wanton destruction of life and properties that few states and 
peoples have experienced (Levitt, 2005:245). Many of the causes of the wars 
remain largely unaddressed today, and this remains a potential source of 
violence. 
  Ex-combatants have become a category of spoilers in Liberia because of 
their exclusion from the political processes as many continue to rely on violence 
to push for recognition and political inclusion in the government and the decision-
making processes, not necessarily as active participants, but for their voices to be 
heard. Violence appears to be a profitable venture for ex-combatants, and its 
perpetuation could create opportunities for looting. In addition, within the 
communities, ex-combatants arguably have access to weapons (I can confirm the 
availability of locally made short guns), and also they have the advantage of 
knowing how to use the weapons more than any other category because of their 
war experiences.  
Violence may not stop because the huge expectation of ex-combatants 
from the reintegration process was not delivered to them (though this should be a 
continuous process) as the government has inevitably terminated the 
reintegration process. It is not likely that the government will meet the 
expectations of ex-combatants given the prevailing economic conditions in the 
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country, exacerbated by the global economic meltdown. The reconstruction of the 
post-Ebola economy has been a daunting challenge to the regime, and corruption 
remains at its peak, impeding the mobilization of resources for genuine national 
development. Ex-combatants do not feel that the government has the capacity to 
meet all their demands given the political rivalry and divisions that exist among 
the political actors. Less or no attention is given to the ex-combatants among the 
larger members of the society. Entrenched acts of nepotism and mismanagement 
of the country’s resources remain impediments to the improvement of human 
conditions. 
Divergent views exist in Liberia on what should be done for ex-combatants. 
There is a strong perception in some communities that ex-combatants do not 
deserve to be given special treatment because of the atrocities they committed 
during the war. 8. Rebel leaders and commanders who serve as brokers between 
ex-combatants and the government may want to maintain the status quo for the 
ex-combatants so that their profiteering channels are sustained.  
 
 
Figure 6: Description of the linkages between the variables and how they interact to 
generate violence involving ex-combatants. By author 2016. 
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From figure 6 above, the independent variables converge at the combustible box 
which is followed by the expression of frustration and aggression by ex-
combatants leading to the pursuit of political and economic violence. Although, all 
ex-combatants appear to suffer from the four dimensional factors, however, 
depending on their type as indicated in figure 5 above, they may pursue different 
interests. But the key factor uniting all Liberian ex-combatants, irrespective of 
their type and the factional groups they belong to, is that they feel re-
marginalized. In the same manner, they have formed a united front to overturn 
their re-marginalization, ostensibly through the pursuit of political and economic 
violence. Figure 6 also notes that the end state of the violence that has been 
generated may in the medium to long term lead to conflict if not well managed. I 
have discussed in detail the nature of political and economic violence in chapter 
five – the case study. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I discussed the four dimensional analytical framework factors and 
how they have impacted on ex-combatants livelihood, and subsequently became 
triggers for the engagement in violent activities. The discussion focused more 
broadly on the re-marginalization component which was the dominant feature 
throughout the research. I also discussed the conceptual parameters of violence 
in a post-conflict setting with a contextual linkage to the nature of the political 
economy, and in the case of Liberia, its neo-patrimonial appendages.  
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I outlined the processes undertaken to identify, approach, recruit 
and collect information from the participants in the research. It also includes the 
strategies adopted in the collection of data that enabled the organization of the 
work into a cohesive and conceptual product. In addition, the research 
methodology explains how the research question/or hypothesis have been 
addressed and the rationale behind this particular method and the materials 
used. It highlighted the four analytical framework factors and the questions asked 
under each factor. Finally, the choice of this approach/method provides enough 
information for the study to be replicated in a similar way and in another situation. 
 
 Methodological approach 
The methodological approach adopted in the study is qualitative research. 
This determined the methodological design, the research strategy, and 
implementation of the field study. Methodological awareness involves a 
commitment to revealing as much as possible of the procedure and evidence that 
have led to a particular conclusion; always open to the possibility that the 
conclusion may need to be revised in the light of new evidence (Silverman, 
2005:209). The strategy adopted involved the triangulation of data, defined in 
social science as the mixing of data or methods in qualitative research to increase 
the credibility and validity of the results (Olsen, 2004:1). It is not aimed merely at 
validation but at deepening and widening the researcher’s understanding of the 
subject being studied. Triangulation has been criticized on several grounds, 
especially from writers aligned with constructionism who noted a tendency of 
triangulation subscribing to a naïve realism that implies that there can be a single 
definitive account of the social world (Bryman, 2001). But other writers working 
within the constructionist framework do not deny the potential of triangulation; 
instead they depict its utility in terms of adding a sense of richness and 
complexity to an inquiry (Bryman). Data collection techniques included the use of 
semi-structured interviews, focus group study, participant observation, and a 
cross-sectional telephone survey where appropriate.  
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The use of in-depth face-to-face interview method in study of this nature is 
that it will allow a deeper, more unique understanding of the conceptual 
processes examined in the research: ex-combatants, violence, DDRR, 
peacebuilding and transformation, as well as the key actors being studied. 
Through in-depth interview, qualitative researchers try to understand the meaning 
people make of their lives from their own perspectives. The method also takes 
seriously the notion that people are experts on their own experience and so are 
best able to report how they experienced a particular event or phenomenon. 
 As Brenner, Brown and Canter (1985:3) argued: 
“Probably the central value of the interview as a research 
procedure is that it allows both parties to explore the meaning of 
the questions and answers involved. There is an implicit, or explicit 
sharing and/or negotiation of understanding in the interview 
situation which is not so central, and often not present in other 
research procedures. Any misunderstandings on the part of the 
interviewer or the interviewee can be checked immediately in a 
way that is just not possible when questionnaires are being 
completed, or tests are being performed”. 
The study recognizes the advantage of focus groups in relation to the benefits of 
group interaction, such as the extent to which the cross-flow of communication 
sparks ideas that would emerge as easily in one-to-one interview. It is based on 
the premise that hearing others talk about their experiences in a supportive 
environment may enable participants to respond by sharing their own 
experiences. This is particularly important in trying to elicit a broader dimension of 
a group view on violence, and the DDRR of ex-combatants in post-conflict 
Liberia. Johnson (1996) argues from a realist perspective that focus groups have 
considerable potential to raise consciousness and empower participants. Focus 
group discussions are good at revealing, not only what the participants think, but 
why they have the political attitude or preferences that they have (Kitzinger and 
Barbour, 1999:5; Tursunovic, 2002:14). 
Observational studies formed part of the data collection techniques used 
in this study. The study considered participant observation as a very effective 
way of finding out what people do in particular contexts, the routines and 
interactional patterns of their everyday lives. The choice of participant 
observation was therefore necessary for this study in order to enable me 
document my experiences. Residing and working in Liberia since 2004, I 
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understand the nuance of what is occurring. I first established rapport with the 
respondent’s overtime, and this provided a good level of trust in me which I 
thought led them to open up and describe their true feelings, thoughts, and 
intentions. Throughout the observation, I took notes on what I have seen, what 
the observed events mean and this helped in answering the research questions 
during subsequent data analysis. 
In this study, telephone interviews proved to be very useful. They share 
many of the advantages of face-to-face interviewing with good response rate, 
correction of obvious misunderstandings, and the effective use of probes, etc. 
Though rapport was initially difficult to achieve, it was compensated by evidence 
of smaller interviewer effects and a lower tendency towards socially desirable 
responses (Robson, 2002:282). The lack of visual cues tend to cause disconnect 
and some problems of interpretation. The major advantage however, particularly 
if the sample is geographically dispersed, is the lower cost in terms of time, effort 
and money. Telephone interviewing can be safer as well; you won’t get 
physically attacked over the phone by angry respondent. Telephone interviews 
afforded greater anonymity and privacy than in a face to face interview. It 
encouraged those interviewed to be more forthcoming about sensitive matters 
such as being exposed to violence or being victims of crime (Acierno, et.al 2003; 
Shannon, et.al 2007). Many interviews occurred over the span of days, weeks 
and months. The interviews elicited information from respondents to illustrate the 
nature of violence and their perpetrators in post-conflict Liberia. While some 
respondents were willing to be mentioned in the research, others were either 
indifferent or refused to be named. 
I used four explanatory factors namely: Re-marginalization, Re-
criminalization, Exploitation, and Economic Insecurity (RREEI), for the analytical 
framework. For each of the four factors, I asked questions and responses have 
been provided in chapter three. The questions for each are listed below:  
 
Re-marginalization 
  Why are ex-combatants re-marginalized and by who? 
 Did ex-combatants receive reintegration benefits? 
 Are ex-combatants’ communities represented at all levels of government? 
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 To what extent can re-marginalization lead them to engage in violence? 
 What are the community’s perceptions about ex-combatants re-
marginalization? 
 What policy/framework exists to support ex-combatants’ livelihood and 
prevent their re-marginalization and resort to violent? 
 Can political and economic empowerment prevent the re-marginalization of 
ex-combatants? 
  Which other groups apart from ex-combatants feel that they are re-
marginalized (e.g. members of the ex-Armed Forces of Liberia, widows of 
ex-security personnel, unemployed youth, commercial motorcyclists, etc.)? 
 How do ex-combatants respond to their re-marginalization?  
 What are the implications of ex-combatants re-marginalization? 
Re-criminalization 
 How are ex-combatants re-criminalized and by whom? 
 Are ex-combatants the only group re-criminalized in their communities and 
why is this so? 
  Who re-recriminalizes ex-combatants? 
  How would you avoid being re-criminalized, specifically, what steps will 
you take to prevent this?  
Exploitation 
 Who are those exploiting ex-combatants? 
 Why are ex-combatants exploited and how? 
 Are ex-combatants happy about being exploited and what can you do to 
avoid being exploited? 
 
Economic Insecurity 
 Why are ex-combatants economically insecure?  
 Who created these conditions of insecurity?  
 How can ex-combatants avoid being economically insecure? What will 
you do? 
In exploring these analytical factors, I drew three main scenarios from post-war 
experiences which are sketched as follows: 
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1. If the political economy is negative as demonstrated in chapter five (and 
affects the ex-combatants), then the state is not likely to have the resources to 
initiate policies that will improve their conditions. 
2. If the state is recording a positive political economy (medium to long term), 
there is a likelihood of minimal improvement in the conditions of ex-combatants. 
The problem here is that, as the state provides some support, there is likely 
going to be higher expectations from the ex-combatants given the perception of 
huge corruption in the government and their non-inclusion in the decisions that 
affects their lives. 
3. If the escalation of violence inflicts higher costs (in terms of fatalities, 
resources, loss of political assets and infrastructures etc), this might lead to a 
further negative political economy, which may then create conditions of mass 
violent protests, and if not well managed could degenerate into conflict. These 
three scenarios or phases could be seen as a continuum and in a dynamic 
mode. Thus, my assessment of the political economy of Liberia is important is 
evaluating the response of then state to the perceived marginalization of ex-
combatants. 
I reviewed literatures, documents and records relevant to the study. I also 
gained knowledge in my personal and official interactions and discussions with 
officials of aid agencies, women groups, local and traditional leader’s, officials of 
the government, academics, ex-combatants leaders, and youth groups. Some 
national staff members of the United Nations (male and female) who spoke to me 
informally on conditions of anonymity gave account of their experiences as 
combatants/ex-combatants and their transformation into civilian life. These 
individuals are few of the lucky ones that gained employment into the United 
Nations as private security guards or drivers, and later rose to higher positions as 
Administrative Assistants and National Professional Officers after they obtained 
diplomas or University degrees. Quantitative measures of issues such as age, 
gender, graphs, and measurements formed part of the context for testimonies. 
In September 2004, I arrived at the Roberts International Airport, Liberia 
just a year after the civil war ended in 2003, and with others, driven in a United 
Nations vehicle to the Transit Camp residence in the capital Monrovia to assume 
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my position as a Political Affairs Officer in the Organization. During the long 
distance drive of about 150km from the airport, the driver was intermittently 
stopped on the dilapidated road by a group of youth carrying weapons (AK-47s), 
painted their faces with assortment of colors, and wearing women’s wig and 
dresses. Disarmament has not been done in Liberia and seeing these seeing 
people with weapons in bizarre costumes was terrifying. They collected money 
and asked questions in the Liberian colloquial English demanding to know the 
names and countries of origin of the occupants in the vehicle.  I was frightened 
and hearing that I am a Nigerian, they shook my hands, praising my country for 
helping to bring peace to Liberia. Then, my fears temporarily disappeared and as 
we left the scene, I inquired from the driver who these individuals are. He 
informed me that they are combatants from different rebel groups that fought in 
the war, noting that we will be meeting them as we drive along and this was true 
as we met over 50 check points controlled by combatants.  
I thought that these encounter could be a source of information for my 
personal and official undertakings. In this regard, I put up the courage to pass on 
some comments and questions to the combatants who were rather not 
aggressive, such as, “well done for providing security along the road”. “My friend 
what is your name”?, “how old are you”, “I like your uniform and hair” and I will 
end by saying “I am your friend from Nigeria”. This was the beginning of my 
interaction with individuals who later came to be known as ex-combatants. While 
living in the Transit Camp for a year, with the help of a house-keeper I only know 
as JOHN, I invited some ex-combatants living in the neighborhood to know more 
about them. I offered some drinks as it is the practice in Liberia when you invite 
someone for discussion. They were happy and asked questions such as: “how 
long will you be in Liberia”, “what exactly will you be doing”, “ so who are we 
going to hand over our weapons over to, the United Nations or the Government of 
Liberia”, and “what will be given to us in return”. Complicated aspects of the 
Liberian English were explained to me by the house-keeper.  I met these ex-
combatants occasionally when I have the time.  
Assuming duties as a Political Affairs Officer, my first task was to join 
colleagues from the DDRR and Human Rights sections to monitor and report on 
the process of disarmament at the various cantonments located across Liberia. 
Beginning from the disarmament and demobilization and culminating in the longer 
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process of reintegration provided me an opportunity to think about the nature of 
the Liberian civil war and the “world view” of ex-combatants and their 
reintegration into civilian life. I document each moment of my encounter and 
interaction with ex-combatants either in form of a UN report or for my personal 
use. The information documented also served as references for the many 
presentations that I make at conferences and workshops I attended, some of 
which were published. In 2006 when I took up a volunteer teaching appointment 
at the Graduate School of International Affairs, University of Liberia, I became 
deeply involved in the understanding of ex-combatants, their roles and the 
challenges that they face in post-war Liberia. Many of them were my students 
who were privileged to get sponsorships and pursue a degree programme. The 
stories of these student ex-combatants and about their colleagues who remain 
idle, were quite revealing to me and it was at this point that decided to undertake 
a doctoral degree study in order to conduct further research on them.  
Prior to the commencement of the fieldwork, I engaged two undergraduate 
research assistants (male and female), who are also national staff at United 
Nations. I organized two days’ training for the on basic research ethics; key 
principles and concepts underpinning the study; and the application of research 
tools. Issues of confidentiality, anonymity and providing containment were also 
discussed. As all the research assistants had prior experience in survey 
administration and focus group discussions, less time was devoted to testing the 
tools for local relevance, language usage, and cultural sensitivity.  
The primary participants (ex-combatants) in the research were identified, 
approached, and recruited through: 
  
Identification: (1) Documented reports and data on ex-combatants from the 
Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation (DDRR) process 
were reviewed to obtain their social profiling, that is, their names, age, location, 
the vocational training they underwent, if any. This record was accessible at the 
office of the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration (NCDDRR); (2) an informal association of ex-combatants who were 
easily identified as members of the motorcycle taxi union; (3) traditional leaders 
and members of local communities where ex-combatants are resettled or 
“reintegrated”;  and (4) through their former leaders. 
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Approached: (1) through community structures; (2) the leaders of their 
association; (3) former rebel leaders who have formed political parties, either out 
of or currently in government; (4) through my personal contacts and work as a 
staff member of the United Nations Mission in Liberia. I also approached known 
and influential ex-combatants individually and in a friendly manner. The process 
proved successful in view of my previous interactions with them on different 
subjects.  
Recruitment: I wrote a letter explaining the intent of the research and channelled 
it through the community structures and the leadership of the association of ex-
combatants requesting their members to participate in the research. They were 
also recruited through community leaders and elders, as well as through their 
former factional leaders. Modest incentives, such as the offer of soft drinks were 
made to facilitate group discussions, as is the usual custom in Liberia. Those who 
needed privacy were offered a token amount to cover the cost of transportation to 
a designated location for interview with me. 
Ex-combatants as Special Category in the Research  
Different assumptions have been held about ex-combatants. The category 
‘ex-combatants’ is a social construct, with a meaning distinct from the individual 
former fighters encapsulated within it. In this regard, analysis regarding the 
category necessarily entails ‘sorting out the structures of signification’ that 
produce the category, particularly because those structures tend to be presented 
not as construction but as fixed and natural, as ‘background information before 
the thing itself is directly examined (Geertz, 1993). Through DDRR, modern 
perceptions about ‘African conflict’ that is, what it is, why it occurs, and what can 
be done about it, and ‘African fighters’ are produced and reproduced in ways that 
reinforce the idea  of Africa as ‘the exotic other’(Utas, 2011). 
Such ideas are not just to be found in journalism and films about African 
fighters, but are also embedded in DDRR programme frameworks and 
evaluations, and in policy and academic literature on DDRR. During conflict, 
combatants are portrayed as acting out tribal, ethnic, and irrational animosity and 
barbarity; conflicts are apolitical, formless, and a regression from civilized order 
(Allen, 1999). After conflict, ex-combatants are said to threaten the state due to 
primordial, underlying behaviour patterns such that it is natural, normal, and 
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expected for them to turn to crime or violence. Crime and violence are even said 
to ‘give new justification’ to their post-conflict lives (Mashike, 2004). The IDDRS 
claim that ‘idle former combatants are a real security threat’ and argue that the 
ex-combatant threat results ‘ because of their lack of skills or assets, their 
tendency to rely on violence to get what they want, and their ignorance of or 
disrespect for local cultures, leaders and social habits’ (IDDRS, 2006). 
 Further, various literatures converge to present ideas about ex-combatants 
after conflict. Greed-based narrative hypothesis, as discussed in chapter two, that 
natural resource predation will drive ex-combatants’ behaviour after war, just as it 
is argued to have done during war, will lead them to engage in banditry, 
criminality or violence if their economic aspirations are unmet (Collier, 1999). 
Literature on ‘new wars’ suggests that ex-combatants of today are fundamentally 
distinct from the veterans of ‘old wars’ (Kaldor 2012). In addition, studies on 
regional dimensions of conflict suggest that ex-combatants are mercenary by 
nature and will migrate across state borders in search of new opportunities to 
make war. Discourse of ‘New Barbarism’, as discussed earlier, in academic and 
policy accounts of conflict, constructs contemporary civil wars as apolitical and 
combatants as angry and irrationally violent.  
  Again, in Robert Kaplan’s (1994) article, ‘The Coming Anarchy’, he asserts 
that unemployed youth in African states are ‘loose molecules in a very unstable 
social fluid’.  In fact, literatures of New Barbarism suggest that unemployed youth 
are a ‘triple threat’: they threaten the state before conflict breaks out (the number 
of young men in a state is one of Collier’s original proxies for determining the 
likelihood of war occurrence), during conflict (their anger is said to explain why 
the conflict is so violent), and after conflict (their dissatisfaction is said to increase 
the likelihood of war occurrence) (McMullin, 2013). Africa’s youth culture is 
portrayed not as a source of human capital, where young people are building 
blocks of peace and reconstruction after war, but as a security threat. These 
divergent views about African youth and ex-combatants have elicited debate and 
criticisms, some of which have sought to recapture the political motivation and 
ideology of violent armed movements, and to challenge the idea that conflict 
actors in the global South are significantly different from those in other states. The 
debate is relevant to reintegration since it is often suggested that ex-combatants 
have been socialized into violent networks that are difficult for them to transcend 
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in the post-conflict period. But the debate’s tendency to naturalize violent 
penchant among ex-combatants problematically implies that transcending such 
networks is impossible. It also means that little attention has been paid to the way 
in which such debates have shaped assumptions about ex-combatants after war 
and during the reintegration process. 
Disarming ex-combatants and then reintegrating them into a society 
flooded with weapons, particularly after they have formally severed their existing 
military and social networks through DDRR, will likely make the DDRR 
participants unsatisfied with DDRR overall.  This is because disarmed ex-
combatants may still worry about the security of themselves, their families and 
their property. Sometimes, the security situation becomes so dire that disarmed 
individuals become willing to expend their resources (if any) on re-armament.  
Such situations occurred in Liberia after the first civil war, the second and the 
third, in which many combatants failed to disarm fearing the outbreak of a fourth 
war.    
Scholars recognize the importance of security concerns facing ex-
combatants, and have sought ways to explain how individuals can be disarmed 
while still feeling secure in order to establish long-term peace. One of the 
foremost solutions to this dilemma is the introduction of external security 
guarantors. As Walter (1999) explains, warring factions have a difficult time 
credibly committing to DDRR unless a third-party can guarantee the security of 
those who disarm. Civil war settlements hold stronger when agreements are 
enforced by third parties (Walter and Snyder 2007; Brancati and Snyder 2012). 
This is because third parties can “guarantee that groups will be protected, terms 
will be fulfilled, and promises will be kept” (Walter 1999). DDRR participants 
should be more satisfied if external security guarantors are present in their area 
of reintegration. However, respondents in the study stated that the presence of 
external security guarantors in Liberia did not have substantive impact on the 
DDRR, and therefore, neither did it ensure their reintegration nor provide them 
security. Third parties were criticized by participants in this research for entrusting 
DDRR implementation to national stakeholders who mismanaged the process to 
their own benefits, although third parties were also criticized for implementing a 
short-term reintegration process. 
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Ex-combatants, especially when they are young, may have become a ‘lost 
generation’(Dzinesa 2008), having been deprived of education, employment and 
training during conflict periods, suffering from war trauma, becoming addicted to 
alcohol and drugs (highly typical of Liberian ex-combatants), and dependent on 
weapons and violence as the only means to make their way in the world. When 
they lose their military livelihood, they are likely to experience difficulties in 
adapting to civilian life. Male ex-combatants may engage in anti-social behaviour 
within their families and communities, contributing to an increase in economic and 
social - especially sexual – violence, an issue that is widespread in Liberia. 
 Ex-combatants are also vulnerable to war-related mental trauma. Their 
mental health problems are exacerbated by the social and psychological 
stressors associated with reintegration in post-war contexts (Bandeira, 2008). In 
addition, a hyper-masculine culture often prevails in time of war. Combatants 
subscribe to a mode of masculinity that is imbued with a sense of manly physical 
strength, personal invulnerability, and high levels of conquest desensitized to 
violence (Dzinesa, 2008). These battlefield dispositions, along with psychological 
distress, can lead to ex-combatants engaging in various forms of violence during 
war to peace transition. 
 Liberian ex-combatants are faced with inevitable psychological challenges 
as they grapple with the violence of the past. These challenges include anger, 
coping with the symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), such as 
nightmares and flashbacks, relationship difficulties, mistrust, difficulties with 
adjusting to family life, stress and depression. Against this backdrop, war 
traumatized and highly militarized ex-combatants can be a threat to their 
receiving communities. In Liberia’s case, the impact has included violent attitudes 
and crime. Most ex-combatants lacked official psychological rehabilitation 
programmes and given the high cost of professional and clinical psychological 
support, most ex-fighters resorted to either traditional help or peer support, often 
with adverse results. Others took refuge in alcohol, which often compounds the 
situation and disposes them to violence. In addition, the reintegration 
programmes did not include proper counselling mechanisms to transform violent 
wartime masculine identities. In this context, political violence and disturbances 
were recorded in Monrovia, during the presidential elections 2005 and 2011 
respectively, in which ex-combatants participated with hyper-masculine vigilance. 
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Women were also victims of violent act including rape. It is against this backdrop 
that male war veterans can be perceived to play the role of perpetrators of 
violence. Conversely, unsuccessfully reintegrated male ex-combatants who felt 
frustrated by their failure to fulfil the masculine role of provider for their families 
were prone to committing violence and abusing alcohol.  
 
Sample Groups 
This study is based on the interviews with ex-combatants conducted in 
Monrovia (Monserrado County), in which a total of 60 ex-combatants at five 
research sites were interviewed using a semi-structured format. Focus group 
discussions were carried out in the five locations and 175 people participated, 
about 90 percent of who are ex-combatants. The remaining 10 percent may have 
been ex-combatants who could not provide much detail about their identity. In 
order to compare what ex-combatants say about themselves and their conditions 
in the post-conflict era, I also took time to interview some members of 
communities where these ex-combatants reside, as well as individuals who have 
links to them, such as their former commanders, rebel leaders etc. Their 
perceptions about ex-combatants and the roles they play also provided useful 
information to the research. All the participants were identified through purposive 
sampling. Such sampling is essentially strategic and entails an attempt to 
establish a good correspondence between research questions and sampling. In 
other words, the researcher samples on the basis of wanting to interview people 
who are relevant to the research questions (Bryman, 2008:458). Sampling is an 
important aspect of life in general and enquiry in particular. As much as you might 
want to, you cannot study everyone everywhere doing everything. Your choices –
whom to look at or talk with, where, when, about what, and why – all place limits 
on the conclusions you can draw and on how confident you and others feel about 
them.  Sampling may look easy. Much qualitative research examines a single 
“case”, some phenomenon embedded in a single social setting. But settings have 
sub-settings, e.g. (schools have classrooms, classrooms have cliques, cliques 
have individuals), so deciding where to look is not easy. In addition, within any 
case, social phenomena proliferate (science lessons, teacher questioning 
techniques, student unruliness, use of innovations); they too, must be sampled 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994:27). We make judgments about people, places and 
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things on the basis of fragmentary evidence. In this study, purposive sampling 
was adopted because it illustrates some features or processes that are of interest 
to me and would help to achieve the needs of the study. I thought critically about 
the parameters of the population being studied before choosing the sample case. 
Other things that I took into consideration include: setting the boundaries of the 
research, adopting the case that would be studied within the limits of time and 
means, ensuring that there was a direct connection to the research questions. As 
Denzin and Lincoln (2000:370) put it: “many qualitative researchers 
employ……purposive, and not random sampling methods. They seek out groups, 
settings, and individuals where……the processes being studied are most likely to 
occur. In other words, qualitative samples tend to be purposive, rather than 
random (Kuzel, 1992; Morse, 1989). That tendency is partly because the initial 
definition of the universe is more limited (e.g., arrest-making in an urban precinct), 
and partly because social processes have a logic and a coherence that random 
sampling can reduce to interpretable sawdust (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The 
ex-combatant sample group comprised people from various factional rebel groups 
in Liberia, namely; LURD, MODEL, NPFL, INPFL, ULIMO-J, ULIMO-K, LPC, Lofa 
Defense Forces, GOL etc. The full meanings of these have been explained in the 
list of acronyms in the study. 
 
Research Sites 
Beall et al. (2010) focus on the changing locations of violence, introducing 
the term ‘civic conflict’ for urbanized forms of collective violence. This spatial shift 
of violence is highly relevant for post-war Liberia because its wars (1989-2013) 
led to rapid urbanization and or concentration as people sought refuge where 
arguably there is minimal security guarantee. But while cities like Monrovia may 
be a safe haven during war, this seems to change after the end of the war due to 
the activities of the various actors who harbour grievances related to the poor 
implementation of the peace agreement and this frequently results in violent 
protests. Other reasons that could trigger violence relate to the absence in the 
urban slums of state institutions responsible for providing social services and 
security of the population. This provides opportunities for violence and organized 
crime to thrive. There is high risk of firearms circulation that does not necessarily 
increase violence but constitutes a problem, given the lack of functioning state 
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and non-state mechanisms of violence control and sanctioning Panel of Experts 
(2013). Violence is an important push factor for rapid urbanization, creating the 
risk of changing patterns of violence and continuous high levels of violence after 
the end of war and armed conflict (Kurtenbach and Wulf 2012:21). 
Since an overwhelming majority of ex-combatants including those who 
graduated from reintegration training programmes have been living in urban and 
semi-urban areas, particularly within Montserrado County (Monrovia), the 
economic rehabilitation of ex-combatants appeared to be ‘urban centric’.  Two 
dimensions of urban centric in this study are related to political and economic 
motivations. Economically, Montserrado County is the major economic hub in the 
country. Major industrial corridors such as Cemenco, Coca Cola, National Port, 
Club Beer Bottling Company, etc. are located in this area. Since economic 
opportunities are more available in Montserrado, this is a lucrative destination 
from the employment and business point of view. Therefore, the urban and semi-
urban areas are seen as places of opportunity. Politically, the focus group study 
found that most of the ex-combatants did not wish to return to the village for a 
host of political reasons, but perhaps most importantly because of the gains of 
participation in political activities. Politically, in urban Montserrado, ex-combatants 
are easily available for political recruitments and mobilization during elections to 
lead campaigns, as tools used in intimidating political opponents for fees, serving 
as security/bodyguards to big politicians, and getting the overall benefits accruing 
from political participation. The city spaces could also help them to conceal their 
past identity and create a new civilian identity. Rural–urban migration is growing 
at an unprecedented rate in Liberia. This new trajectory of internal migration has 
caused the agricultural sector which use to be the backbone of Liberia’s economy 
to suffer deeply from shortages of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled labour. 
Liberia use to be described as the “grain coast” of West Africa, and one of its 
regional hubs, Lofa County, was known as the “food basket of Liberia; it still holds 
that title but with limited engagement in grain (mainly rice) production.  
My official travels have also taken me outside of Monrovia covering the 15 
counties of Liberia. I have visited hotspots in these areas where I interacted and 
held discussions with ex-combatants seeking to know why they prefer the local 
environment and what they are doing for a living. During these visits and 
interaction with them, I played the role of a peace builder/peace makers, seeking 
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to know more about their post-war economic conditions and make 
recommendations to the United Nations. Their perceptions about my roles were 
positive as they indicated that they will provide frank and honest perspectives of 
their activities in their responses to my questions. However, there are some 
discernible differences between local and urban/semi-urban ex-combatants. 
While local ex-combatants are somehow contented with their engagement in 
illegal rubber tapping and diamond/gold mining, including serving as unskilled 
workers in Iron Ore mining companies, urban/semi-urban respondents mostly feel 
marginalized and make various demands of the political regime. They also seek 
to engage in self-employment when they have the funding, such as commercial 
motorcyclists, brick making, mechanics etc. Whenever the government brings out 
policies they deem as repressive to the conduct of their private businesses, they 
often react violently. Local ex-combatants enjoy relative freedom and have less 
interference in their activities due to the absence of decentralized power at the 
local level. As one police officer disclosed to me during a field assessment to Lofa 
County in 2013, “ex-combatants who engage in drug trade (reference to 
marijuana) are armed and we don’t have weapons to confront and arrest them. 
We fear for our lives and allow them to go away”. But Monrovia being the seat of 
government there is minimum security coverage supported by the presence of the 
United Nations troops which often intervenes to control violent activities by ex-
combatants and other disgruntled groups. 
Therefore, the limitation of my research sites to Monrovia does not indicate 
a lack of knowledge of hotspots in other parts of the country and the activities of 
ex-combatants in these areas. Rather, through my field assessment activities, I 
have good knowledge of hotspots around the country harbouring ex-combatants, 
and I have demonstrated in chapter five how ex-combatants working in 
concessions engage in violence when their demands are not met.  In fact, there is 
stiff competition among ex-combatants to survive in hotspots in the counties, and 
only the very strong ex-combatants can withstand such tough conditions, while 
overly ambitious ex-combatants now constitute political and economic migrants 
into the city to join others elevating the risks in the research sites. Consequently, 
the limitations in this study necessitate a focus on Monrovia, but this does not 
preclude making references to the situation of ex-combatants in other hotspots. 
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Specifically, the focus on Monrovia City for the research is derived from the 
following factors: 
i. Monrovia is a macrocosm of the entire Liberia. It hosts members of all the 15 
ethnic groups and members of all different rebel/factional groups that participated 
in the civil conflict. In fact, according to the 2008 population census, Monrovia 
(Monserrado) is the largest County with 1.4 million people. 
ii. Monrovia is both the political and economic nerve-centre of Liberia, with the 
presence of officials of government, aid agencies, members of the international 
community, multi-national corporations, as well as an assortment of civil society 
groups, which provided a broad spectrum of participants interviewed in the 
research. 
iii. Monrovia hosts the largest number of ex-combatants in Liberia, estimated at 
over 15,000. This figure was provided by a former rebel leader who is also an 
official of government, and not happy with the conditions of ex-combatants in 
Liberia. Two factors account for the large concentration in Monrovia. First, at the 
end of the civil war, combatants of the two rebel groups (MODEL and LURD) that 
captured Monrovia remained in the city to loot the spoils of war and to retain 
power at the centre. Second, many of them migrated from rural Liberian counties 
to Monrovia City in search of livelihood opportunities. 
iv. Monrovia was the last theatre of war in 2003. For this reason, ex-combatants 
of different rebel/factional groups remained in Monrovia seeking to advance their 
wellbeing. In addition, they prefer to remain close to their leaders who are serving 
in the government, and expect financial support from them. 
v. There is a collection of identity found within ex-combatant communities. This is 
not only a product of the previous war; it is just as much, a result of social 
interaction in post-war setting. Former fighters fraternize with each other, as well 
as with other war-affected groups, and factional identities are often reinforced in 
these locations. 
vi. I have made extensive field visits to Liberia’s rural counties where I interacted 
and interviewed ex-combatants at different times. Many of them have linked their 
activities to the support they receive from their former leaders and commanders 
who are based in Monrovia. Ex-combatants who remain in other parts of the 
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country, particularly in the rural areas, are engaged in illegal mining, rubber 
tapping, drugs trade and other activities. A few are employed by foreign 
construction companies on a temporary basis. Given the foregoing, I consider 
Monrovia City appropriate for the research. Accordingly, five locations/settlements 
in Monrovia that host large numbers of people, particularly ex-combatants, were 
identified. They include: Montserrado Central; New Kru Town; West Point 
Community; Paynesville Town; and Congo Town. It was also necessary to 
conduct research in Monrovia due to the fact that officials of the National 
Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR), 
officials of government and other organizations that fall into the category of 
samples are located here.  
vii. Finally, the incidence of violence appears to be high in the selected locations. 
This will be explained in more detail in the Liberia case chapter. Below is the map 
of Monrovia showing the five research sites. 
 
Figure 7: Map of Monrovia indicating the five sites 2014 (author) 
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Data Collection 
The research data were collected from interviews conducted with ex-combatants 
and from the focus group discussions. Data collection was carried out in three 
phases. The first phase involved the preliminary fieldwork accomplished in three 
months (August to October 2012). During the first phase, through the help of my 
research assistants, important contacts were established with those who could 
provide access to the research participants, such as community and community 
and opinion leaders, commanders, factional group leaders, youth and or ex-
combatant leaders. During this process, I identified ex-combatants settlement 
patterns and potential sites that contained enough ex-combatant population. 
From this, I observed that there was a mix of ex-combatant population from 
various factional groups residing in a particular location. The Liberian civil war 
was so complex, occurring at different times with different factional groups, for 
different motivation, to the extent that fighters easily switched allegiance 
depending on interests. The first phase also served to locate the national archive 
in Liberia (though destroyed by the war), university libraries, relevant agencies 
and government institutions.  
The second phase of fieldwork/data collection which lasted from 
(November to December 2012) focused on the consolidation and initial 
registration and classification of data. The knowledge previously gained about 
data locations facilitated effective collection of demographic and social 
background data between and within the key areas identified.  During this phase, 
a total of forty ex-combatants were interviewed. No female ex-combatant was 
interviewed, apparently due to social stigma. Each interview lasted for between 
10-15 minutes. Ex-combatants’ leaders selected those who were interviewed. 
However, in some instances, self-selection was made through volunteering. An 
average of thirty five people participated in focus group discussions in each of the 
five sites (total 175) and only ten females were in attendance. Other identified 
participants were interviewed in the research with a representative number of 
men and women. A total of 10 people were interviewed by means of telephone 
due to unavailability or logistical difficulties for face-to face interview. Notes were 
taken during all the interviews with the permission of the interviewee in conformity 
with the researcher’s ethics commitment. Women, particularly the illiterate groups 
were not forthcoming and this can largely be attributed to the long-time 
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marginalization of women in Liberian society. Before the interview, I introduced 
myself and stated the aims of the research to the participants, thus gaining a 
significant degree of trust that facilitated the interview process. In addition, the 
topic of my research appeared to be very attractive as it received wide 
acceptance from the respondents.  
In the third phase (April 2014), I interviewed an additional 10 ex-
combatants at the University of Liberia. During the period of my (volunteer) 
teaching at the graduate school of the University of Liberia (2006-2012), under a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Mission and the 
University, I established contacts among the students, both at individual and 
group levels, as well as with the faculty. This long-time acquaintance facilitated 
my interview process, as many students who participated in the war volunteered 
to share their war-time and post-war experiences with me. Another 10 ex-
combatants were interviewed among members of the commercial motorcyclists 
union. Overall, a total of 60 ex-combatants (21.43%) were interviewed face-to-
face while a total of 10 non-ex-combatants (3.6%) were interviewed by telephone. 
The latter were not available for face-to-face interview and they include: senior 
officials of government, some of whom I taught at the University of Liberia 
graduate school, and high-level commanders/leaders of rebel groups. The 
responses of these informants were very useful to the study. An average of 35 
people (14.3%) participated in focus group discussions in each of the five sites 
(total 175 – 71.4%) and only ten (5.7%) females were in attendance. A total of 
235 (95.9%) were male respondents. Some of the interviewees also took part in 
the focus group.  
There were few women involved in the study. This was evident in the 
number (10 females) out of 175 persons who participated in the focus group. 
Although I interviewed a few female ex-combatants who are working in 
international organizations, their perceptions were quite different, perhaps 
because they are employed and earning a living. The low participation of females 
in the study is not surprising. In Liberia, social roles are designated for women 
and performing other roles aside from these is seen as inappropriate, and 
sometimes could lead to community sanctions spearheaded by their male 
counterparts. Indeed, fundamental challenge can be seen in the tri-system of 
customary, Islamic, and statutory laws that define the rights and duties of women, 
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which carries discriminatory provisions, particularly in the area of family law 
where, under customary and Islamic laws, rights of inheritance are biased against 
women and, in certain circumstances, women themselves are considered to be 
inheritable property or disposable with abandon through perfunctory divorce 
proceedings (Sawyer, 2005:152). In Liberia, gender-based inequality forms a 
continuum that begins with denying girls their rights and advantaging boys, thus 
setting the social path to gender-based violence and institutionalized oppression 
(ibid). 
 
Ethical Considerations 
Groups were diversified based on gender, age, and ethnicity. I promised 
confidentiality and anonymity of respondents, and also reiterated this at the 
beginning of each interview session, but as is the common practice in Liberia, 
people were quick at mentioning their names with pride, and explain what they do 
for a living, although as expected, no one said in the public domain that he or she 
engages in violence as an occupation. All focus group members have no problem 
if their names are made public; for them it is “recognition” that they have 
expressed their views and concerns over their plight and for the wider readers of 
this study to appreciate their problems. But, I also recognize that there is still an 
ethical responsibility on me to protect their identity. 
Prior to engaging in the interview process, I discussed the ethical issues of 
this study with both the community representatives and with the participants 
themselves. The study was endorsed by the community leaders with the condition 
that the community receive a written summary so that the knowledge and 
understanding gained could be shared with the communities. Ethical concerns 
assume a more urgent and stark form in social research. Foremost are the ethical 
issues which consider the effects of research on a vulnerable population after a 
civil war. The sensitive task of conducting research in a violently divided society 
requires responsibility (Smyth and Robinson, 2001:5). The principle that research 
in violent societies must at least do no harm to participants (Anderson, 1999) and 
at the most have a beneficial effect for those participating is an aspiration that is 
challenging to realize.  
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There is a distinction between moral concerns in research, defined as 
“acting in accordance with accepted notions of rights and wrongs, and ethical 
concerns, which generally concern conformity to a code or set of principles 
established by professional organizations” (Fontes, 1998:53-61). Therefore, as a 
researcher, I am morally obligated to think deeply about ethical issues. I 
discussed these with senior researchers and my supervisor in order to keep my 
moral thinking towards those I am researching, and the environment in which they 
live. More importantly, I was sensitive about how I appeared to them.  
Researchers have ethical responsibilities to anticipate the impact of the 
study on those studied and to ensure that at the very least the benefits of 
investigations outweigh any possible negative effects that they might have. 
Research can do harm, and researchers must recognize this and avoid or 
minimize that harm. Furthermore, researchers have the responsibility to take 
steps to secure resources to deal with any negative impact of their research on 
those researched, so that they are not left to deal with the impact of the research 
without support and resources (Smyth and Robinson, 2001:208). During the 
study, I did not withhold any information likely to affect the respondent’s 
willingness to participate, since doing so would remove from the subject an 
important means of protecting their interests.  
I followed the University of Bradford Code of Ethics as it pertains to 
academic research. I adhered to the principles of informed consent, in which the 
participants agreed to take part in the research on the basis of their knowledge of 
what the study is about. The ‘non-negotiable’ values of ‘honesty, fairness, 
respects for persons and beneficence’ were observed (Solties, 1989:129). In 
practical terms, this means for example, not harming the institution or the persons 
one is researching, if possible leaving them in a better rather that a worse 
condition, protecting their identities in disseminating the research, obtaining 
permission to view and film activities, record interviews, and to use documents 
owned by others. Specifically, I adhered to the following in my research: 
1. Kept all names and information confidential, and did not use any identifying 
names in written and recorded material. All the information was securely stored, 
locked in filing cabinet/safe in a strong fireproof box not accessible to anyone 
other than myself and will remain there between five to ten years before it can be 
destroyed. Additional s was adopted in the use of computer files, anonymised, 
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protected with password and kept as a backup copy. Since web technology is 
constantly evolving, and in conducting research online, I was very cautious when 
exchanging confidential information electronically to prevent others from tapping 
into the data that I thought was properly protected; 
2.  Gave priority to protecting the safety, security, and privacy of the interviewee 
at all times, by ensuring that information about them is kept confidential and 
protected; 
3. Remained sensitive to the interviewee and stopped the interview when it 
appeared necessary and when it was requested by the interviewee, and refrained 
from pushing the interviewee to talk about what they will not; 
4.  Did not raise the expectations of the interviewees or make promises that I may 
not fulfil;  
5.  Reported the data with as much accuracy as possible and honour the voice, 
i.e. the story as given by the interviewee, subject only to changes to preserve 
confidentiality;  
6. Maintained contact with my supervisors as the research progressed. In 
addition, my supervisor asked questions about difficulties, problems, and my 
personal safety. 
I avoided undue intrusion into the participants’ private and personal 
domain. As Cassell (1982:7-31) argued, people can feel wronged without being 
harmed by research, they may feel that they have been treated as objects of 
measurement without respect for their individual values and sense of privacy. I 
strived to conform to the ethical standards of the society in which I was 
conducting the research. In particular, I ensured that I understood, and was well 
informed about appropriate legislation of the country and how the legislation 
might affect the conduct of the research. In this instance, I have the advantage of 
having resided in the country of research for over ten years, and, as a Political 
Affairs Officer at the United Nations, I had covered proceedings in the parliament 
for over three years and have continued to follow events in the lower and upper 
houses of the parliament. 
As would be expected, researchers employed in the public sector tend to 
have less autonomy over what they do or how their data are utilized. Rules of 
Secrecy may apply, and pressure may be exerted to withhold or delay the 
publications of certain findings (SRA, 2003:16).  As this is academic research, the 
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Rules of Secrecy will not apply and findings will be disseminated to the wider 
academic community and other interested audiences. I made sure that I left the 
research field in a state which permits further access by researchers in the future. 
In the course of my research, I ensured that I did not withhold information which 
may be of potential service to the advancement of knowledge. Sometimes, cross-
culture problems can be an obstacle in terms of the way a researcher is expected 
to appear in the society and among participants. I did not have any problem with 
this because, apart from learning much about the culture of Liberia over time, I 
come from the same sub-region which has abundant cultural similarities. 
 During the field research, I avoided asking sensitive questions. 
Respondents sometimes misreport on sensitive topics such as drug use, sexual 
violence, criminal violence etc., in order to avoid painful feelings of 
embarrassment in the interview situation or repercussions from third parties 
(Hoglinger, 2008). As a consequence of under reporting socially undesirable 
activities and attitude, survey estimates are often erroneous, more specifically 
distorted by bias.  Sometimes when researchers ask sensitive questions, 
respondents may ignore the question, provide either untrue or incomplete 
responses, or even terminate the survey. I was aware of all these issues, and at 
the beginning, I tried to build rapport with respondents.  
In addition, the Code of Ethics requires me to consider my own safety. 
While it has to be acknowledged that risk is a part of everyday life, it is also 
certainly the case that some research activities may place the researcher in the 
field in some degree of extra risk of physical and or mental harm (SRA, 2003:25). 
Research that entails direct contact with the public such as qualitative study, 
presents a potential risk. Therefore, I ensured my safety at all times, by 
maintaining awareness of this type of risk and striving to eliminate the dangers 
arising from the research, by using local knowledge to avoid places and people 
which present any threat to my safety. I had very good support structures and 
networks in the country related to my work. 
  
Limitations of the Study 
When I thought of researching on Liberia for a Doctoral degree, I was 
aware of the complex nature of the Liberian society and sought from the outset to 
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integrate myself in order to gain more information for the study. Notwithstanding 
this approach, I recognize that there may be some limitations to the study as 
some important information that could have enriched the research may be 
missed. The research faced some challenges which are linked to the problems 
encountered by researchers when faced with frustrated and dissatisfied people 
who are being recruited as research informants. A number of participants or 
people who lived through the Liberian civil war are still dealing with an unpleasant 
past that they wish would disappear and never be discussed. Many of the war-
affected persons have not come to terms with their marginalization and neglect. 
There are those who refused to discuss their experiences even with the promise 
of confidentially and anonymity. Perpetrators might still be in shock at their abrupt 
role and status reversal, disgusted even at the researcher wanting to evoke 
memories of their past acts of decadence or leadership failures (Dolo, 2003). In 
this connection, they prefer to insulate themselves from the consequences of 
revealing information that would make them culpable. Liberia has very weak 
national surveillance systems to track and record various types of violence 
indicators, and there are extremely poor reporting rates and a lack of human and 
technological capacity to centralize and analyse data. Reliable time-series data 
on violent crime and victimization are especially scarce, particularly in urban 
slums, and shanty towns. Criminal justice statistics are especially weak owing to 
uneven reporting rates and uneven investment in record-keeping and related 
practices (Muggah, 2007:5). As a result, information on the extent of violence and 
the surrounding circumstances is scarce. 
Conclusion  
In the foregoing chapter, the research design described entails a qualitative 
approach. The quantitative process was also applied in the study to put some 
incidents in context. The chapter describes the rationale behind the 
methodological approach, identifies the sample group in the research, including 
the research sites and outlines the structure of the study. This then provides the 
basis for the discussion in chapter in chapter five beginning with an attempt to 
first understand the political and economic history of Liberia and how this has 
produced violence. Two considerations have been taken into account for 
selection of the case study. First, that violence pre-dates the foundation of Liberia 
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as a Republican State, and second, the new forms of violence in the post-war 
democratic era are manifestly huge and the risk of conflict recurrence remains 
high. The is particularly of concern in the light of the often cited statistic which 
indicates that countries emerging from war have a fifty percent risk of sliding back 
within the next five years (Collier, et.al 2003). Although, this view is seen as too 
pessimistic and has attracted debate among researchers, the risk nevertheless, is 
still likely to be in the order of 20-25 percent (Small Arm Survey, 2008:58).  
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Chapter Five:  
Ex-combatants and Violence in Post-War Society: The Liberian Case 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis to the Liberian case.  This 
begins with a historical overview of the political and economic history of Liberia 
and how this has produced series of violent conflicts. The chapter is not focused 
on the Liberian conflict as such, as most of this has been discussed in the 
introduction on chapter one and in chapter two on the causes of civil wars, their 
interpretations, and the processes of termination of civil wars. In this chapter, I 
provided an analysis of the DDRR and the outcome of the programme for the 
participants, which then underpins the justification for the research question. I 
also discussed the DDRR model theoretically and then applied it to the Liberian 
situations. Further, to develop and advance theory, I discussed how the current 
situation of ex-combatants have led them to engaging in political and economic 
violence, as the dominant violent category, thus providing answers to the 
research question posed in chapter one. I then explained how national and 
international actors are managing these violence, including through the 
peacebuilding initiatives. The chapter is also analyzed in the light of the four 
overarching framework factors. I found that ex-combatants in the research sites 
and all over the country display the same characteristics and respond 
aggressively to issues that affects their livelihood. 
 
Political history of Liberia and how this produced violence 
 
The republic of Liberia lies from 40 20’ N to 80 30’ N of the Equator. It is 
situated at the south-western corner of the great western bulge of West Africa, 
bordered on the northwest by Sierra Leone and the southeast by Cote d’Ivoire; 
the Republic of Guinea lies to its north. With a maximum breath of 280 kilometres 
between Buchanan and Nimba, and boasting a 595km (370 miles) coastline 
along the Atlantic Ocean, the country covers an area of about 111, 370 square 
kilometres about (43,000 square miles). The low coastal marshy plains are 
backed by a rolling plateau broken by mineral-bearing hills and a rocky array of 
mountain ranges within the Guinea highlands. Much of the hinterland is rugged 
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and densely forested with at least nine river basins draining northeast-southwest 
into the Atlantic Ocean.  
The capital, Monrovia, is the seat of the central Government, and the 
country is further divided into 15 administrative divisions known as Counties. 
Liberia’s topography features coastal lagoons and mangrove marshlands, 
rainforest, and mountainous plateaus. The rainforests occupy 27 percent of the 
land and are cultivated for agriculture, and the mountains (including Mount Nimba 
and Putu Mountain) are home to mineral resources – especially iron ore, gold and 
diamonds. Liberia also has significant hydro resources, including the Cavalla 
River, the St. John River, and the St. Paul River, which offer the potential for 
hydroelectricity. Liberia remains one of the poorest nations in the world as it 
recovers from decades of civil war. Both a challenge and an opportunity, more 
than 50 percent of its population comprises young adults between 15 and 34 
years of age. While this population is highly urbanized, high population growth 
and urbanization exert pressure on available resources (basic services, 
infrastructure, and jobs). 
 
Figure 8: Map of the Republic of Liberia 
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The national census, conducted in 2008, put the population of Liberia at 3.5 
million. While overall population density is still relatively low, population growth 
rates are high. The population grew at an average rate of 3.3 percent annually 
between 1962 and 1974, and 3.4 percent during 1974 and 1984. Between 1984 
and 2008, average growth was 2.1 percent, reflecting the population exodus and 
losses during the civil war (AfL, 2013:16).  Some of the indigenous tribes are 
believed to have migrated from ancient Mali, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Burkina 
Faso between the 13th and 15th centuries. However, before the arrival of these 
tribes, oral history indicates that some other tribes lived in parts of the land such 
as the Baabo and Blewe in Maryland County who were so called by the Grebo; 
the Khran also speak of another tribe whose language they learned and spoke on 
arrival (Guannu, 1982:12). The majority of the tribes are the Kpelle, Kissi, Gola, 
Grebo, Kru, Khran, Mandingo, Bassa, Belle, Lorma, Mano, Gio etc. There are 16 
officially recognized tribes in addition to the emancipated slaves, or Americo-
Liberians, who had settled in Liberia in 1822.  
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 Figure 9: Map showing the distribution of major Liberia ethnic and 
language groups. 
 
125 
 
The Americo-Liberians became the ruling elite and monopolized the national 
economy from 1847-1980. They labelled the indigenous majority as being 
unready to assimilate into their slave inherited culture. This recurring practice was 
designed to develop an anti-indigenous sentiment. The Americo-Liberians built 
the requisite social, cultural, and economic structures to support their oppression 
of the indigenous population. They evoked their cultural superiority with great 
pride and disdain, although they failed to recognize the contradictions of their 
sentiments. That is to say, the culture that they hold as a badge of honour was a 
product of slavery and repression, and it could not possibly be used to achieve 
the freedoms that they purportedly sought in Liberia. Indeed, overtime, it was 
proved that their chauvinism did not have any validity. Against this background, 
the public policy of the regime designed to support its prejudices may be 
problematic and open to a series of predictions. If the ruling elite developed a 
public policy that produced maximum hostility, but worse, if they use a large 
group of dependent people to prove their theory of superiority, by denying them 
citizenship, equal opportunity for education, good quality healthcare, roads to get 
their produce to the markets, and enlisting the population in the military and using 
them as drivers and servants, this treatment would lead to retaliatory acts of 
vengeance (Dolo, 2007:6).  The majority (indigenous), estimated at 95 percent of 
the population was subjugated by the minority (Americo-Liberian) estimated at 
less than 5 percent of the population, which turned out to be a recipe for disaster. 
The indigenous people were set up in permanent opposition against the Americo-
Liberians. It is important to state that not all Americo-Liberians were privileged to 
enjoy the fruits of their monopoly of power. Discrimination also existed among 
them on the basis of skin colour and other factors.  
 Government failures and violent conflict have their most destructive impact 
on society when they erode the sense of shared community (Sawyer, 2005:50). 
Townships or villages are the most basic form of human association, such that 
“local institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to science” (Tocqueville, 
1969:61). 
 On the other hand, the indigenous population was not cohesive in their 
relations amongst themselves. Animosity existed between and among them. The 
existence of “shared understanding” is fundamental to any group of people that 
can be called a community (Sawyer, 2005). This relates to the existence of a 
126 
 
common sense of justice (fairness) and values of trust and reciprocity among 
them.  Dolo (2007) argued that the cultural composition of the indigenous people, 
coming from a single cultural source, ethnically, although not linguistically and 
religiously, but being relegated to second class citizens or lower in their own 
country was just enough to bring them to a tipping point – wanting to assert 
themselves politically, although they lacked the basic framework to accomplish 
this goal. Positioning its culture and language as superior to that of the 
indigenous majority spurred ill feelings and resentment. Consequently, the 
massively disruptive political and social convulsions that occurred in 1980 were 
predictable. The desperate desire for the population to improve the quality of their 
life impelled a disruptive force. With a landscape dominated by authoritarian 
rulers, Liberians were enmeshed in powerful political, social and economic 
systems that were impervious to change. Leaders held no regard for the welfare 
of citizens or their participation in the nation’s politics. Citizens bore their suffering 
and discrimination and nervously waited for change. At that time, it was a rarity to 
see Liberians coming together to challenge the oppressive system in which they 
were situated, since indeed, many of them were beneficiaries of the Americo-
Liberia regime, and have accepted their names to gain entry into the University of 
Liberia, a premier institution, exclusively for the Americo-Liberians. Then came a 
change, the advent of social movements. The social movements reflect, in 
complex and conflicting ways, the collective national effort to articulate the goals 
of resistance and oppression. The term social movement is used here to describe 
individuals acting collectively with some degree of organization and continuity and 
at least partially outside the normal governmental processes and institutions to 
effect societal change (Goodwin and Jasper, 2003). In the general context of the 
country, the study of social movements in Liberia is illustrative of some of the 
underlying issues, problems, and debates that constitute the backdrop of 
contemporary social and political activism in the post-war era (Dolo, 2007:59). 
Analysis of social movements in Liberia presupposes some shared context and 
concerns among institutions pursuing democratic changes in the governance of 
the state. However, contrary to popular opinion, social movements in Liberia are 
not uniform and homogenous in their characteristics and approaches to activism. 
But social movements are similar in that they share many of the same political 
and historical factors that overwhelmed the state and added to the core factors 
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that plunged it into civil war. These include, the opposition to the True Whig Party 
(TWP), hegemony of the Americo-Liberians; the quest for freedom of the 
indigenous majority from tyranny; the use of the University of Liberia and its 
students as the centre of political mobilization and member recruitment; their 
flawed embrace of the despotic regimes of Samuel Doe and Charles Taylor; and 
their inability to engage the nation on how to address ethnic bigotry (ibid, 60). 
 
Political Economy of Liberia  
 In chapter three, I discussed the general context of political economy, 
patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism. In this section, I will focus on the political 
economy of Liberia, again highlighting the role of its elite leadership in applying 
patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism in governance, and how this has 
generated discontentment among the population, particularly the youth. Liberia’s 
political history and political economy also fits appropriately in Reno’s concept of 
warlord politics, attempting to establish an ideal-type of illegitimate domination. 
According to Reno, the warlord seeks to reduce the number of those benefitting 
from rule to an absolute minimum. Exclusion from patronage networks is 
classically associated with a loss of legitimacy. In warlord politics, exclusion is 
intended to increase the relative value of the spoils of power by causing greater 
scarcity, optimizing the cost-benefit ration of patronage. Consequently, he 
argued, decreasing levels of patronage can be reconciled with maintenance of a 
ruling network: 
“To make patronage work as a means of political control, the ruler 
must prevent all individuals from gaining unregulated access to 
markets. A [warlord] ruler thus logically seeks to make life less 
secure and more impoverished for subjects. That is a [warlord] ruler 
will minimize his provision of public goods to a population. 
Removing public goods like security or economic stability, that are 
otherwise enjoyed by all, irrespective of their economic or political 
stations, is done to encourage individuals to seek the ruler’s 
personal favour to secure exception from these conditions” (Reno, 
2000:46-47). 
Thus, by withdrawing security and economic opportunities, social and material 
capacities for resistance are weakened. As internal sources of economic 
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accumulation and opportunities for social organization are destroyed, insurgents 
face tremendous difficulties unless they can find external backers. Other warlord 
techniques include fuelling of conflict between domestic groups and thus reducing 
security, deliberate destruction of sources of income, and filling security forces 
with vulnerable strangers without ties to the populace in terms of culture, ethnicity 
and religion (Weber, 1978). In order to prevent military staff from overthrowing the 
ruler, the security apparatus is fragmented and its different segments compete for 
the ruler’s favours. Ideally, staff are tied to the ruler purely by economic incentives 
and motivation. Warlord techniques may stabilize rule for a considerable time. 
However, destruction of economic opportunities implies that there is little potential 
for revenue generation and growth, and that warlord rule will encounter financial 
problems. 
 How and why did the political history and political economy of Liberia 
create the conditions for perennial violence, its reproduction and war? It is 
extremely difficult to discuss the Liberian state by adopting a single analytical 
approach. Therefore, in my analysis, I have explored different perspectives aimed 
at understanding the political and economic trajectory of Liberia and how this has 
shaped post-war development. Patrimonialism and neo-patrimonialism have been 
dominant features in the governance of Liberia since the Republic was founded in 
1847, and ruled by the hegemonic Americo-Liberian elites. This system of rule 
has been sustained through the co-optation of the weaker and less educated 
indigenous population as its followers. In fact, the system of patrimonial 
governance had, over the years, moulded and incorporated indigenous 
governance institutions that were a mixture of lineage-based institutions and 
other clientele arrangements organized around specific principles and dominated 
by the oligarchy (Liebenow, 1987; Sawyer, 1992).The end state is the 
institutionalization of patrimonialism, which when challenged attract heavy 
punishment from governing elites. The consequences are, as David Francis 
(2006) noted, patrimonialism and the rentier mentality in much of Africa has 
created widespread impoverishment, dilapidated social services and 
infrastructure, poor educational systems and badly managed economies, and the 
marginalization and exclusion of the majority of the populace from the political 
and economic processes in the country. Settler patrimonial order in Liberia was of 
a distinct character. In a sense, the ideology of patrimony that underpinned the 
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oligarchy was based on a conception of patrimony rooted in settler history, a 
history that perceives Liberia as the patrimony of black African settlers. 
Transforming that sense of heritage to cover a more inclusive policy was its 
historic challenge. As a patrimonial order, the protection of the patrimony, no 
matter how narrowly or broadly defined by its leaders over the years was the 
motive force of its history. 
 Patrimonial regimes in Liberia have survived through the support of 
Western governments and the Bretton Woods institutions, with the later giving out 
financial packages with conditionalities to support the functioning of the system. 
In Liberia, when the governing elite falls out of favour and goes against the whims 
and caprices of the West, internal crisis sets in and the regime is threatened and 
finally shown the way out of office in a rather violent means. In other words, even 
if one accepts the view that the roots of the Liberian tragedy lie wholly in the 
sustained crises of leadership and embraces the “bad man” theory of history, one 
must still see such crisis through the prism of history and, at least, as a project of 
many accomplices, internal and foreign, wittingly and unwittingly (Sawyer, 
2005:2). For instance, it is not possible to speak of the 1980-85 bloodletting in 
Liberia without mentioning the post-coup military and economic support given by 
the United States that bolstered the confidence and capacity of the Liberian 
leadership to rampage against real and perceived enemies during the years 
immediately before the ending of the Cold War – or the abrupt withdrawal of that 
support on the eve of the fall of the Berlin Wall. One could not explain Charles 
Taylor’s plunder without the subplot of his escape from a U.S prison and his 
relationship with influential African leaders, European business interest and 
numerous others (ibid). 
Neo-patrimonial politics, to some extent, explain the ethnicisation and 
militarisation of politics in Africa. Mass politics are reconstructed along clientelistic 
and ethnic relationships, with the increasing propensity to use state-sponsored 
violence and repression as a means to extract legitimacy from the governed. The 
militarization of political and socio-economic relations amongst competing elites 
creates the impetus for the social mobilization of ethnic identities (Francis, 2006: 
82). Neo-patrimonial economy has therefore become the driving force in politics 
and political life. A decade of intermittent violence characterized the period of 
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Samuel Doe’s rule. The military regime came under siege immediately by 
successive violent purge within its ranks and evolved into an ethnic-based 
dictatorship of monstrous proportion (Sawyer, 1987, Dunn and Tarr 1988; 
Liebenow 1987). After settling in as a military leader and purging the military of 
his opponents, Samuel Doe began to lay the foundations for a new patrimonial 
order, with a predominantly indigenous constituency resting on his Khran ethnic 
foundations, and in a way try to replicate settler patrimonial order. He built a multi-
ethnic political support base, drawing largely from the ranks of professionals and 
political operatives who had felt under-appreciated by the deposed William 
Tolbert government, and he allowed his closest associates to draw from the 
public treasure and accumulate wealth as best they could. For himself, he 
appropriated the timber industry of the country and took charge of the accounts of 
the forest resource establishment. He promulgated decrees stifling freedom of the 
press and association, and he issued orders banning individuals from 
participation in public affairs. One such order declared Conmany Wesseh, then a 
student leader, now a Senator, a dangerous person, a confusionist, and a threat 
to public peace, and directed the public to stay clear of him (Doe 1980). However, 
the plunder, pillage and carnage that characterized Doe’s rule seemed legendary 
at that time, but later paled when compared to the excesses of Charles Taylor’s 
regime. Doe’s mode of control of Liberia came close to classical warlordism as 
seen in imperial China (Sheridan 1966; Pye 1971).  The violence applied to 
remove the dictatorship of Samuel Doe, which went beyond excising its essential 
core, was driven mainly by greed for power and wealth (Sawyer, 2005). It is not 
possible to understand the nature of armed groups that perpetrated such violence 
without understanding the transformation of the Liberian military and its role as 
the core instrument of violent conflict. The Liberian military was constituted as a 
part of the patron-client network that was an important instrument of state 
consolidation. Its rank and file was drawn from indigenous lineage and was linked 
to the Monrovia oligarchy through indigenous governance arrangements.  Most 
soldiers had grown up in the traditions of their indigenous communities, 
experienced the rites of passage required in these communities, and remained 
active members of their local communities while in the military. For all practical 
purposes, the Liberian military was itself a patrimonial organization linked to the 
Monrovia-based ruling oligarchy as well as to the indigenous social order (ibid).  
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Charles Taylor was the sole and undisputed leader of the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL). He made decisions alone, and his strategy of imposing 
terror, as observed by those who broke away from his organization as well as his 
loyal functionaries, reflected remarkable entrepreneurship. Young fighters were 
encouraged to rival each other with more gruesome killings to demonstrate battle 
prowess and loyalty to him. Charles Taylor used armed bandits extensively as 
state security to carry out both legal and illicit economic transactions, thereby 
using the Liberian state as an instrument for both criminal and legal purposes. 
The plunder of the natural resources of Liberia and Sierra Leone by Liberian 
armed gangs and their leaders became legendary and is well documented. It is 
estimated that between 1990 and 1994, more than $500 million was accrued 
annually by leaders of armed groups and their associates from exports of timber, 
rubber, diamonds, and other natural resources. Charles Taylor is reported to have 
gained $75 million annually (Caine 1999; Reno 2000). It is estimated that if the 
pace of indiscriminate logging allowed by Taylor had continued, just half of 
Liberia’s rainforest would have disappeared in five years (Global Witness 2001). 
In 1999, deals agreed between Charles Taylor and the Oriental Timber Company, 
an Indonesian establishment with a notorious environmental record, brokered by 
a shadowy Dutch businessman granted that company logging concession rights 
close to half of Liberia’s rain forest (ibid). In 2000 and 2001, investigations by the 
Committee on Sanctions of the United Nations Security Council revealed that the 
President of Liberia was engaged in illicit economic activities.  
The report uncovered links between the President of Liberia and an 
assortment of underworld figures of Ukrainian, Dutch,  Lebanese, and Italian 
origins, among others, in gun-running and smuggling of Sierra Leone diamonds 
(UN Security Council 2001). Those who did business with the Taylor regime 
included such diverse groups and individuals as DeBeers, Al-Qaida, and 
Christian fundamentalist evangelist Pat Robertson. All these operated in the 
same market and under the same rules (Washington Post, 2002). Monopolies 
dominated the economic strategies of the Liberian government and Taylor, and 
the personal stakes of the President and his circle of friends, families, and 
advisers were indistinguishable from those of the state. All these developments 
seems to suggest that a combination of the quest for power, greed through the 
acquisition of wealth, international economic conspiracy to loot and Liberia’s 
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enormous resources, as well as grievances (ethnic or religious hatred, political 
repression, political exclusion, and economic inequality) were the causes of the 
Liberian civil war. The above explanation contrasts with Paul Collier’s explanation 
of the cause of civil war that relied more on his econometric model, an approach 
which I thought seems unilinear, as it may have missed out other factors that 
cause war.  
Liberia also continues to suffer from the politics of dependency. Liberia has 
got a lifelong paradox yet to be unbroken. The paradox is this: providence is so 
kind to the country – adorning this oldest African republic with vast natural 
resources – yet it continues to be stuck at the bottom of the world’s human 
development index ranking 177 out of 188 countries (UNDP, 2015). The outbreak 
of the Ebola Virus Diseases (EVD) has certainly foregrounded not only the reality 
of Liberia’s non-existent health system, but the failure of Ellen Johnson Sirleaf’s 
government to contain Ebola is emblematic of much larger problems of 
governance, leadership and mistrust. Indeed, Ebola has emerged from the nexus 
of the overlapping problems. The Ebola crisis has also shone a spotlight on the 
faults of the international development system that has propped up Sirleaf’s 
political leadership. In many ways, one could argue that Ebola serves as a 
cautionary tale about the dangers of ignoring nepotism and cronyism in countries 
where a government that is friendly to Western government is in place. Further in 
this chapter, I discussed how the Ebola virus prompted violence in one of the 
research sites. Liberia is one of the most dependent countries in the world: 73 
percent of its gross national income comes from aid agencies and Monrovia, its 
capital city, is crawling with aid agencies. There are literally hundreds of 
international NGOs with offices in the city, and in addition to the $800 million the 
country receives in foreign assistance each year, the United Nations spends an 
additional $500 million annually on maintaining a peacekeeping force (The 
Analyst, 2014).  
Consequently, the aid community has created a mentality that Liberia 
cannot act on its own. As a result of this mentality, Liberian leaders have chosen 
to wait for the slow moving bureaucracies that have occupied it for decades to 
wake from the inertia of the well-fed aid system. All these have negative 
manifestations: severe infrastructure blockages, drug use and trafficking, rampant 
corruption, and economic malfeasance, a demographically-skewed population 
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with tens of thousands of “futureless youth” accentuate the level of insecurity and 
the attendant high profile violence that accompanies it. The crippling 
consequences of dysfunctional governance are experienced in all areas of life in 
Liberia. The deepening patron-client system in Liberia reflects increasing anguish 
over the misuse of public resources, widening poverty, despite renewed 
economic growth, and unremitting physical insecurity. Therefore, the 
personalization of office and the commandeering of state resources in Liberia by 
the privileged elite have ensured the effective establishment of the neo-
patrimonial state. The entrenched and pervasive nature of elite leadership in the 
country, and how patron-client attitudes are exhibited, are woven into what Ken 
Post and Michael Vickers described as a “conglomerate society”, that is, a nation 
composed of cultural sections defined by ethnicity, language, region and cultural 
practices (Post and Vickers, 1973).  Liberia’s post-war development has 
been characterized by anti-development indicators: a burgeoning corruption 
cartel principally through the award of dubious contracts; patronage and 
entrenched nepotism (e.g Global Witness Report, 2016). Individual and group 
continue to illegally exploit the country’s rich natural resources for their private 
use. This inevitably creates fertile grounds for the occurrence of violence, its re-
production, and the potential for re-lapse into war. Below is a graphic illustration 
of Liberia’s political landscape: 
Fig 10: Circles of Liberia’s Political Setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 2015 
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Fig. 10 above is my perspective on the current political landscape in Liberia. The 
various debilitating factors are superimposed on the map of Liberia, signifying a 
nation that is susceptible to collapse. The weight imposed on it by these 
interlocking problems could potentially lead to a crisis situation. At the centre of it 
is widespread and endemic corruption which has permeated the fabric of the 
society. According to an official of government whom I spoke to on condition of 
anonymity, corruption is now a way of life for Liberians as little or nothing can be 
done about it. The other major challenge has to do with the position of ex-
combatants who see themselves as a group competing/fighting against the rest of 
the society. The Peace is given a little space in the diagram indicating the 
continued fragility of the state.  
            Further, the deep culture of politics of personal advantage is anchored in 
the exclusive patronage network. President Sirleaf has in the past traced Liberia’s 
particularly pervasive form of patronage to former President William Tubman’s 
(Americo-Liberia) rule. The reality is little different today, deep into President 
Sirleaf’s second term. The political culture effectively stifles the meaningful 
development of party politics. It also leaves all political actors suspicious of each 
other, as alliances are not reliably based on substantive platforms, and neo-
patrimonialism and clientelism become the order of the day. The underlying 
causes of war have not been sufficiently addressed as the TRC 
recommendations for prosecution remain in limbo. Violence has continued in new 
forms and dimensions. The relative balance of power of various protagonists in 
peace/democracy, the nature of elites who organize and wield power, the nature 
and capabilities of former rebel groups and ex-combatants remain incoherent and 
disagreement has always been a source of tension. 
 
DDRR and the Outcome for the Ex-combatants 
The disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR) 
programme has become an integral element of national and international 
programming in countries transitioning from conflict. Despite attracting a high 
level of attention and resources, the extent to which DDRR has been an effective 
tool to achieve security and development goals in Liberia remain a challenge. The 
impact of DDRR on a micro-level – that is, on the lives of individual ex-
combatants – is extremely poor. One problem is that it is difficult to measure the 
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‘successes of DDRR, especially the reintegration component, which resists 
precision in both definition and evaluation. It is similarly problematic to establish 
causality between particular outcomes and DDRR in the context of a complex, 
multi-dimensional peacekeeping operation in Liberia. The evaluative focus of 
DDRR has been on the achievement of programmatic targets, that is, the number 
of DDRR participants, the number of guns collected or the actions of elite 
spoilers, and elections. There was no concerted effort to examine how DDRR 
plays out on the ground, which will support future programming to be formulated 
and implemented more effectively, thus improving outcomes and mitigating 
unintended and harmful consequences. Ironically, as of November 2006, two 
years after the DD components formally ended in Liberia, and the year of the 
inauguration of the democratically elected president, over 40,000 registered 
(about the same figure are unregistered) ex-combatants still have no access to 
reintegration programmes (Jennings, 2008).  
The basic ingredients for the success of a DDRR programme are (1) 
political will, (2) careful preparation based on rapid assessment of the opportunity 
structure and a profiling of ex-combatants and their families, including classifying 
ex-combatants according to their characteristics, needs, and desired way of 
earning a livelihood (mode of subsistence), (3) transparent and effective 
institutional arrangements, minimizing transaction costs and corruption while 
maximizing benefits to ex-combatants, with a simple monitoring feedback system 
to ensure flexible but accountable implementation (to both donors and the 
community), and (4) timely and adequate funding (Colleta, et.al 1996). 
Unfortunately, all these were lacking in the Liberian DDRR. When a country is 
moving from war to peace, demobilization and reintegration issues should be 
addressed at the earliest stage of the peace negotiation process. Strong political 
will and leadership, expressed in terms of commitment, realism and pragmatism, 
are critical. In conflict environments, DDRR programmes are highly political, as 
they directly affect a party’s ability to pursue its interest through coercive means 
and its ability to defend itself. For instance, at the Sierra Leone peace 
negotiations in mid-1999, disarmament and demobilization issues were neglected 
until very late in the negotiation process, and then they were treated in a cursory 
manner. This failure contributed to the establishment of technically unreasonable 
deadlines in the peace accord implementation schedule, ultimately undermining 
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confidence in the process. The ensuing unwillingness of the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) and other national and regional parties to trust the peace process 
eventually undermined it (Colletta, et al 2004). 
The Liberian DDRR process was established in 2003 under the auspices 
of the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration (NCDDRR). A total of 101,495 ex-combatants and individuals 
associated with the fighting forces were disarmed and demobilized. Rehabilitation 
and reintegration programmes were initiated in June 2004, which included 
computer and vocational skills training (such as carpentry, masonry, auto 
mechanics and farming). By November 2006, 22,000 participants were enrolled in 
formal education courses, with an additional 8,000 registered for courses starting 
before the end of the year. By the end of November 2006, the UN estimated that 
a total of 60,000 beneficiaries had completed the reintegration programme. 
Although many participants contend that this figure is exaggerated.  
One of the major problems identified by respondents in this study was the 
level of corruption in the programme, which took several forms, but primarily 
revolves around payment of monthly stipends to ex-combatants. The most 
common complaint concerned consistent and multi-monthly delays in dispensing 
the cash by schools, for those initially enrolled in vocational training. School 
principals and administrators were key suspects in the corruption scheme. This is 
important not just as another example of corruption in post-conflict Liberia, but 
because such actions replicate and reiterate power relationships from pre-war, 
war-time, and post-war Liberia. Programme recipients were at the mercy of ‘big 
men’ (the elite).  
Thus, the DDRR programme was compromised by an inability to live up to 
its promises, resulting in lamentably little change in ex-combatants’ social and 
economic situation and potentially feeding their dissatisfaction. Insofar as ex-
combatants are considered to be a major problem in post-conflict Liberia, then 
expanding their ranks seems to be counterproductive. Moreover, privileging them 
above their equally impoverished countrymen and women through DDRR benefits 
arguably helped harden the division between former fighters and civilian society, 
reinforcing ex-combatants’ ‘separateness’ (IRIN, 2005). This in turn undermines 
reintegration’s rationale.  
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In post-war settings like Liberia, there is a lack of diversification in the 
economy and a heavy dependence on a particular resource.  During 
disarmament, a large number of former fighters were released into civilian life 
with promises of reintegration and sometimes inclusion in the political process, 
enshrined in peace agreements. These promises and expectations are however 
seldom met, creating a sense of anger and frustration among the ex-combatants. 
These grievances sometimes lead ex-combatants to challenge the new post-war 
peace order by engaging in spontaneous violent activities to draw the attention of 
the government and members of the international community. The different forms 
of violence that ex-combatants engage in range from taking part in new 
rebellions, becoming mercenaries, fighting wars in neighbouring countries, as 
explained earlier, to engagement in petty and organized crime, communal 
violence or riots (Call and Stanley, 2003:216). However, these scenarios can only 
be mitigated or avoided if peace agreements and the political leadership address 
the fundamental factors that led to the war and this has been a realization that 
more academics hope could be achieved. But, the most immediate threat that ex-
combatants pose is when the existence of such violence constitutes a major 
threat to post-war order and has the potential to result in the resurgence of 
conflict.  
Long after demobilization, many ex-combatants continue to spend time 
with each other, relishing their experiences of war, and showing strong bonds of 
loyalty and friendship within the group and in their communities. The majority of 
them who could not benefit from the reintegration process remain economically 
marginalized and excluded from decision making processes. Equally, many of 
them lack skills and are unable to attend vocational training and formal education, 
making it difficult for them to fend for themselves and their families. In the light of 
all these, ex-combatants become a unique and potentially dangerous group.                                                                                  
The perception among ex-combatants is that they were fighting a ‘just war’ 
that would result in the overthrow of the patrimonial Americo-Liberian regime, and 
ensure the ascendancy of the marginalized indigenous population. In their 
thinking, this aspiration came to fruition following the ousting from power of the 
Charles Taylor led National Patriotic Front of Liberia rebel group in 2003, and the 
signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in Accra, in August 2003. 
After securing a victory in the first round of the presidential election in 2005, the 
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undisputed choice of the ex-combatants, an indigenous homeboy, George Weah, 
suffered a defeat in the second run-off presidential election to incumbent 
president Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. This was never their choice, and the rejection of 
President Sirleaf appears to have underpinned ex-combatants orientation 
towards violence. Politically, and economically, ex-combatants are re-
marginalized in post-war Liberia, thus increasing their vulnerability to engaging in 
violence. 
First, ex-combatants are recruited for political violence with promises of 
reward and this is becoming increasingly “legitimized” due to the weaknesses of 
the justice system to deal with the perpetrators and their sponsors. Some 
literature on political violence takes a “diagnostic’ view (Apter, 1997:7). Applied to 
autocracies, political violence becomes self-legitimizing, an expression of the 
natural desires for freedom and liberty. In democratic societies, political violence 
suggests institutional weaknesses and blockages, or normative insufficiencies, 
injustices, or inequities, i.e. wrongs to be righted (ibid). The diagnostic view 
suggests that political violence results when offended interests seek their outlets 
by means outside the rules of the game. Another strand in literature deals with 
political violence as individual pathology. Those engaging in violence are likely to 
be in some sense “pathological.” For instance, in any movement, those most 
prone to the use of violence have some kind of personality problems. Again, 
pathological conditions may arise out of asymmetries of power and access, of 
classes, of systems of political economy like capitalism and socialism (Apter 
1997). 
In attempts to curb the violence that is allegedly perpetrated by ex-
combatants, the Liberia National Police, (LNP) has in the last five years launched 
several Security Operations to deal with violence. These include, “Operation 
Pyramid”; “Operation Safe Haven”; “Operation Re-load”; “Operation Dragnet”, and 
“Operation Restore Hope”. The last was a military deployment of the Armed 
Forces of Liberia to Liberia’s borders in 2013, in order to mitigate mercenary acts 
and insurgency into Cote d’Ivoire by armed elements from Liberia.  Paradoxically, 
because of the corruption within security institutions like the LNP, many of the 
arrested ex-combatants offer bribes to security personnel and get released into 
the society, and the circle of re-criminalization and violence continues. The 
predicaments of ex-combatants are reinforced by the neglect of the state many of 
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whose officials attained political power through the manipulation and use of ex-
combatants. Currently, the presence of the United Nations Mission in Liberia has 
a deterrent factor. At different times, the UN has successfully mitigated and 
managed high profile violent incidents that would have degenerated into low 
scale conflict among the various groups competing for political power. However, it 
remains to be seen how the national security institutions will manage the 
incidents of violence when the United Nations pulls out of Liberia. 
In 2005, 103,019 combatants, including child soldiers, were disarmed and 
demobilized in Liberia. Of this figure, about 13,872 were reported to have 
engaged in reintegration and rehabilitation programmes (HRW, 2005:45; 
NCDDRR, 2005). The remaining 89,147 were expected to be reintegrated 
through bilateral funding assistance, while the Liberian Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (PRS) would provide additional measures towards the reintegration of 
former child soldiers (GoL, 2008).  There is no available record to show whether 
the 89,147 ex-combatants were reintegrated or not. This has left ex-combatants 
highly vulnerable. It was thought that a democratic regime would bring succour to 
the plights of ex-combatants. But the case of Liberia (and perhaps elsewhere) 
clearly shows that the holding of elections does not necessarily bring an end to 
violence. Although such broad disarmament and demobilization exercises may 
not deter criminality, they may reduce the prospects of the resurgence of such 
groups as readily available instruments of political violence domination, and 
control (Sawyer, 2005:140). DDRR programmes are normally considered a 
security imperative undertaking. The alleged reduction of armed violence that 
followed the demobilization of ex-combatants has not fundamentally changed 
some people’s perception of their own security. The DDRR programme was 
unable to substantially reintegrate the overwhelming majority of the ex-
combatants into civilian life with social and economic support. Many of them, who 
felt that their political goals could be pursed through the democratic process, were 
disappointed. In the new democratic dispensation, ex-combatants face threats 
and intimidation from the state security, as well as recruitment into criminal 
groups. The new criminal group appears to be at the heart of organized violence, 
and one of the most salient of their characteristics is their extreme cohesion and 
spread. They have woven a huge variety of local alliances including militias 
across Liberia’s borders. Sometimes, there is collusion with disgruntled elements 
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within the police. Tactical diversity is also apparent in the groups, with some 
preferring to maintain low profile while others are highly conspicuous. But all are 
very dedicated in the pursuit of their cause, most of which are directed through 
violent means, and the primary victims are community members who live under 
constant threats and intimidation. There is no evidence to show that there will be 
a reduction in the occurrence of violence in the short to medium term unless ex-
combatants are provided with sustainable livelihood opportunities. The presence 
of the United Nations Mission in Liberia continues to provide security cover, and 
deter any large scale internal insurrection against the regime. 
The dangers posed by ex-combatants have manifested in different forms. 
They have challenged the clientelistic approach to the award of concessions in 
the production and extractive sectors of the economy, many of which lack 
transparency and Corporate Social benefits to local communities where they 
operate. The result is anger and frustration, exhibited by ex-combatants by violent 
means to seek redress. For instance, on 3 July 2015, over 500 youths protested 
against Arcelor Mittal Steel Company operations' (an Iron Ore mining company) 
in Nimba County. The protesters, who comprise mainly of armed ex-combatants, 
used single barrel guns and fired at members of the Liberian National Police 
(LNP) deployed to maintain the peace. Six LNP officers sustained serious 
injuries, while the protesters destroyed and looted the company’s properties worth 
millions of dollars. It is important to underline that the DDRR has long ended, 
which makes it illegal for unauthorized persons to be in possession of arms, a fact 
that is strengthened by the existing Security Council arms embargo on Liberia. 
Although it is alleged that single barrel weapons were used during the protest, 
which are only permissible for hunting purposes and when officially registered 
(which they are not), their use demonstrates the fragility of the country and the 
“battle readiness” of ex-combatants to confront armed state security personnel.   
The Ebola crisis in Liberia highlighted in a dramatic manner the lack of 
capacity of the Liberian government and threatened the gains achieved in the last 
eleven years in peace consolidation and the rebuilding of state institutions. In 
addition, the Ebola outbreak exacerbated the overall state fragility; pervasive 
institutional weaknesses; governance challenges; and deep mistrust by the 
citizens of the government commitment. The Ebola crisis led to military brutality 
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against unarmed civilians in the West Point Community who were staging a 
peaceful protest in response to the Ebola quarantine of their community. 
 The West Point Community was one of the locations predominantly 
inhabited by ex-combatants and I conducted face-to-face interview and focus 
group study there. This location was hit by the Ebola outbreak and subsequently 
quarantined. In response to the Ebola situation in this area, the UN Panel of 
Experts (UNPE 2014) indicated that the Liberian government has shown a trend 
towards the militarization of the Liberian State response to what was essentially a 
health emergency, as demonstrated by the 20 August 2014 incident which led to 
the shooting to death of a 25 year old student by the military forces deployed in 
West Point to enforce the quarantine measures after they were resisted by the 
population. The action of the government was not surprising because, during this 
period, all other government institutions, including the system of public health, 
had quickly collapsed after the surge of Ebola, and the government seemed to 
have been left with the only functioning tool, the army, as there was no alternative 
means to show action. This incident has further strained the relationship between 
ex-combatants and the government as the former sees the governmental action 
as a deliberate means of targeting them since West Point Community was not the 
only Ebola affected location in Liberia. 
In 2006, the Liberian Ministries of Gender and Justice launched the 
National Gender-Based Violence Plan of Action, which is constructed on four 
pillars: protection of women and children from sexualized and gender-based 
violence; prevention of sexualized and gender-based violence; promotion of 
women’s human rights; and participation of women in peace processes. Liberia 
has enacted two major laws aimed at enhancing protection against sexualized 
violence. The first is a penal law that was amended in 2005 to expand the 
definition of rape to include gang rape, rape of minors, and rape by weapons. 
Additionally, the provisions of the amendment are couched in gender-neutral 
terms, thereby negating the notion that rape is an offense only committed by men 
against women. The second reform occurred in 2008, when Liberia amended its 
judicial law to establish a separate court with exclusive jurisdiction over sexual 
offenses. Moreover, a domestic violence law is currently under consideration by 
the Legislature. The Liberian National Police (LNP) has established the Women 
and Children Protection Sections in more than 21 locations in Liberia to improve 
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the protection of women and children, particularly against sexualized violence. 
Liberia has developed an all-female civil police unit with special commitment to 
cases of sexualized violence. 
In spite of all these efforts, there are still challenges in addressing the 
widespread issue of sexualized violence. Many Liberians have limited access to 
the formal legal system, and reforms still need to be made to the customary legal 
system, in which financial compensation tends to be given to the family of the 
survivor rather than the survivor him or herself. According to Scully et.al (2013) 
40% of survivors accessed the LNP, but only 23% accessed the courts. This 
suggests a fairly significant gap between a woman’s initial reporting of an incident 
of sexualized violence and that case being carried to the courts. There are 
several obstacles that prevent access, such as the costs and the authority of 
traditional leaders to mediate disputes. An Amnesty International report in 2011 
found that other barriers exist for prosecution, including low rate of prosecution of 
rape cases; excessive pre-trial prison time for accused perpetrators; shortage of 
social workers in health facilities to support survivors of gender-based violence; 
fast turnover of staff trained in clinical management of rape; high number of rape 
cases being dismissed; magistrates trying rape cases not under their jurisdiction; 
poor selection of jurors; delays in evidence collection and investigation; poor 
linkages in the justice delivery system; and lack of transportation to convey 
prisoners to prison (Amnesty, 2011:207).  
The number of incidents of sexual and gender-based violence remains 
high, with the majority of reported cases involving minors. The Ministry of Gender, 
Children and Social Protection noted 1,392 reported cases of sexual and gender-
based violence in 2014, of which 720 were rape cases, including gang rape. Five 
children involved in those cases have died, while only one alleged perpetrator 
has been arrested (GoL, 2014; UNMIL, 2015). The Government, the United 
Nations and partners continued to emphasize the importance of addressing 
sexual and gender-based violence at the grass-roots level by engaging 
communities in changing social norms and holding perpetrators accountable. 
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Table 5: Criminal violent incidents in Liberia 
Source: UN Police daily situation reports on criminal violence incidents recorded in Liberia in 2014 
Criminal  
       Violent incidents 
JAN-
2014 
FEB-
2014 
MAR-
2014 
APR-
2014 
MAY-
2014 
JUN-
2014 
JULY-
2014 
AUG-
2014 
SEPT- 
2014 
OCT- 
2014 
NOV-
2014 
DEC-
2014 
1. Armed Robbery ( *) 
Committed with firearms 
23     
(14) 
18 
(11) 
9 
(5) 
22 
(13) 
23 
(12) 
19 
(13) 
39 
(24) 
24 
(17) 
21 
(15) 
18 
(13) 
6 
(3) 
8 
(5) 
2. Arson 4 5 2 3 5 2 2 0 0 0 0 1 
3. Aggravated Assault 82 71 84 64 79 45 1 0 0 0 1 0 
4. Simple Assault 234 206 229 141 194 155 3 0 0 0 0 0 
5. Illegal Poss. Of Drugs 16 11 9 8 13 7 7 0 1 4 4 0 
6. Homicide 8 6 14 10 6 7 13 6 4 9 7 10 
7. Kidnapping 2 2 5 2 5 3 2 0 0 0 1 0 
8. Mob Violence 7 2 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 
9. Poss. of firearm/am. 22 17 6 18 16 12 29 22 22 15 12 5 
10. Rape/Corruption of 
minors 
61 44 53 42 40 38 35 14 19 30 36 20 
11. Riot 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
12. Robbery 13 17 15 9 10 8 0 0 0 0 0 1 
13. Sexual  Crimes except 
Rape 
0 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
TOTAL 472 403 202 320 392 296 132 66 67 76 69 46 
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Table 5 above shows a statistical report based on criminal violent incidents 
reported daily by the United Nations Police (UNPOL). Although these are incidents 
that are reported and investigated, many others occur throughout the country, and 
are not being noticed, reported, or investigated by security personnel. Significant 
among these violent activities with high numbers are armed robbery which frequently 
involves the use of firearms, with perpetrators harming their victims; aggravated and 
simple assaults; illegal possession of firearm and weapons; rape and corruption of 
minors; and mob violence, although the last appears to have reduced substantially 
following sustained campaigning and sensitization of the public mounted by the 
United Nations to support the government efforts. Armed robberies are most 
commonly reported in Monrovia and its environs. County assessment reveals that 
communities are concerned about armed robbery and the violence that it unleashes, 
and do not feel that the Police are fully equipped to protect them. Armed robberies in 
Liberia do not tend to involve military-grade weapons (but cutlasses, local single 
barrel shotguns), or involve organized gangs of former militia.  However, armed 
robberies are often perpetrated by two to four persons, indicating some level of 
organization. During my Bong County assessment in 2013 as part of my official 
duties, women that I interviewed in the City of Gbarnga cited the lack of functioning 
Police hotline phones and insufficient Police night patrols as factors that undermine 
their security and that of their communities. Specifically, the women claimed that 
when they call the Police hotlines they ring indefinitely without any response.  
Rape is one of the most serious crimes plaguing Liberia, with an average of 
eight known cases reported per week and many more never reported to the 
authorities (UN Report 2013 -2014). Asked if isn’t ironic that sexual abuse continues 
unabated in post-war Liberia—the first African country with a female head of state, 
Ernest Gaie, ActionAid country director, said: “The election of President Ellen Sirleaf-
Johnson in 2005 has given women’s rights an unprecedented profile and momentum 
in Liberia and the president is personally committed to tackling rape and violence 
against women.” (ibid).  
In her book, entitled “The Child Will Be Great”, President Sirleaf gave an 
account how she was imprisoned, humiliated, threatened with rape, and the ordeal 
she suffered in the hands of soldiers loyal to the late President Samuel Doe, for her 
alleged involvement in the coup to overthrown Doe in 1985 (Sirleaf, 2009:142-149). 
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In her other writings and public speeches, she has continued to explain the 
sufferings that Liberian women endured during the war. Writing on “Liberia: When 
Darkness Falls”, Stemn narrated, through pictorial presentation, women and their 
babies who were killed during the civil war (Stemn, 2011:45-52), while Dolo argued 
that institutional patriarchy has rendered many Liberian women dependent on their 
male counterparts, and that the violence against women during the war has 
implications for nation building in the post-war era (Dolo, 2007:116).  
From the beginning of her presidency, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf has 
demonstrated a personal interest in addressing sexualized violence. The 
government has placed emphasis on improving protection, prevention, and 
rehabilitation mechanisms for survivors. In many speeches, including her acceptance 
of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, Johnson Sirleaf highlighted the need to confront 
the issue of sexualized violence in Liberia and all over the world (Sirleaf 2011). The 
Liberian government has developed one of the first National Action Plans to End 
Gender-Based Violence under the terms of UN Security Council Resolution 1325. 
Introduced in 2000, the resolution formally acknowledges the impact of war on 
women and girls and encourages the involvement of women in peace-building 
processes.  
In spite of all these, the high rate of reported rape cases, particularly of 
minors, remains a serious security concern in post-war Liberia. From the table 
above, between January to December 2014, 423 rape cases were reported. In the 
majority of the cases, minors are alleged victims as indicated below. The high 
statistics are more alarming when one considers that rape likely goes unreported or 
under-reported in many cases due to the stigma attached to the violent crime as well 
as the tendency in some communities to settle rape cases through communal 
means. The violent nature of this crime, the considerable bodily and psychological 
harm it can cause to the victims and its prevalence relative to other violent crimes 
are major concerns, and despite laws against rape and a number of initiatives aimed 
at curbing the crime, it remains pervasive problem in Liberia. The result is an 
environment wherein women and girls are not guaranteed protection. In my personal 
findings through interviews and reporting, Police officers often ask victims of rape 
and other crimes for money to purchase fuel for their vehicles to travel to scenes of 
incidents for investigation. This can discourage reporting due to the victim’s 
anticipation of a financial burden. 
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 Rape is a crime under international law. It is also recognized by the United 
Nations Security Council as a threat to international peace and security in Resolution 
1325, adopted in 2000 (UNSC 2000). A central component of the UN’s strategy for 
preventing conflict-related sexual violence is addressing impunity and identifying 
perpetrators. In UN Security Council Resolution 1960 of 2010, the Secretary General 
is asked to provide ‘detailed information on parties to armed conflict that are credibly 
suspected of committing or being responsible for acts of rape or other forms of 
sexual violence, and to list the parties that are credibly suspected of committing or 
being responsible for patterns of rape and other forms of sexual violence in 
situations of armed conflict on the Security Council agenda (HPN 2014; UNSC 
2010). Under UNSC resolution 1820 of 2008, NGO’s, human rights organizations, 
UN agencies, civil society groups and healthcare providers are specifically requested 
to “enhance data collection and analysis of incidents, trends and patterns of rape”. 
No research that I know of or have read has credibly explained the motivation for 
rape in Liberia, except for the often local beliefs and unsubstantiated claims that rape 
of minors is a potent source of prosperity, and in particular, enhances the success of 
perpetrators in political contests and participation. Rather there has been a simplistic 
way of explaining the objectives for rape, that is, the sole fulfilment of sexual desire 
by force – a motivation that does not fit with the ‘strategic rape theory’, the dominant 
leading explanation for war rape since the conflict in Yugoslavia (Gottschal, 2004) – 
are being pursued through rape: destruction, humiliation, punishment or revenge 
against the enemy. 
 Research in this area usually reaches the same conclusion, namely that more 
research is required to respond to the same unanswered question: to ‘ understand 
the motives that drive perpetrators to commit such brutal acts of violence in a 
systematic manner by comparing the experiences and attitudes of multiple militias in 
order to better understand how behaviour around sexual violence varies amongst 
groups’, or to ‘elucidate the links between soldiers’ perpetration of, command 
structure attitude towards, and motivation for sexual violence’ (HPN 2015). The 
dearth of data on the motivation for rape in Liberia, except for local perceptions, 
stated above, means that this is potential area of further research. 
 In table 5 above, I have provided some statistics on rape in Liberia for 2014. 
Below are some of the rape cases of minors/under-age investigated and reported 
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weekly by the United Nations Police (UNPOL) in 2015. This report is categorized 
under UN title on Safety and Security (UNMIL 2015). 
Safety and security 
 From 2 June to 8 June, there were four reported rape cases, three of the 
victims were below 18 years of age. 
 From 16 – 22 June, there were eight reported rape cases, all eight victims 
were below 18 years of age. 
 From 23 -29 June, there were four reported rape cases, all the victims were 
below 18 years of age. 
 From 30 June to 6 July there were five reported rape cases, four victims were 
below 18 years of age. 
 From 21 – 27 July, there were three reported rape cases, all the victims were 
below 18 years of age. 
 From 28 July to 3 August, there were six reported rape cases, all victims were 
below 18 years of age.  
 From 4-10 August, there were seven reported rape cases; all victims were 
below 18 years of age. 
 From 12 17 August, there were three reported rape cases, all the victims 
were below 18 years of age. 
 From 18- 24 August, there were three reported rape cases, all victims were 
below 18 years of age. 
The above statistics, underscores how prevalent violence that are linked to rape are 
in Liberia. The ages of the victims are as low as between five to ten years. It is also 
important to note that in all the cases mentioned above, the perpetrators escaped 
and were not arrested.  
  
There is external dimension to the violence perpetrated by Liberia ex-
combatants and this is particularly located with the Mano River Union.  An 
estimated 3,000 foreign combatants, mostly from Liberia, fought in Côte 
d’Ivoire during the country’s post-election crisis, the majority on former 
President Laurent Gbagbo’s side. A significant number also fought on the side 
of the current President, Alhassan Ouattara (UN Report, 2012). About 1,000 
Liberian ex-combatants and mercenaries were estimated to fight on both 
sides during the 2010/2011 crisis (UN Panel of Expert (2012; UNMIL/JMAC 
Report, 2011:3). These mercenaries were allegedly recruited and financed by 
the last regime’s inner circle, fought side-by-side with local ethnic militias in 
western Côte d’Ivoire where they targeted and killed perceived Ouattara 
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supporters. The ability of recruiters in Cote d’Ivoire to contact and activate  ex-
combatants and mercenary leaders in Liberia, and for the leaders to in turn 
recruit hundreds of fighters to join during the 2010/211 crisis, presents 
potential domestic and regional threats to security in the medium to long term 
(ibid).  
 Following Gbagbo’s arrest, many of the mercenaries and local militia 
crossed into Liberia, with huge caches of weapons, and stayed with 
communities of the same ethnic group in the border area, keeping many of 
their command structures intact. Others are reportedly still hiding in refugee 
camps on either side of the border. The Liberian authorities were unable to 
effectively screen arriving refugees for the presence of combatants. As they 
have not been disarmed, remnants of these pro-Gbagbo militia and 
mercenaries in the border area continue to pose security threats to those 
ethnic groups perceived to be pro-Ouattara. The situation is further 
complicated by the presence of criminal gangs and the fact that the area 
hosts key businesses, both legitimate and illegitimate (e.g. cocoa trade, gold 
mining, drugs and weapons trafficking). The border crossing points between 
Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire are very porous and heavily forested. There are few 
security personnel in official border crossing points. This makes it easy for 
criminal and illegal activities to thrive on a large scale. 
 
Political and Economic Violence 
This section is discussed in the context of four analytical framework praxis 
that shows how ex-combatants are re-marginalized, re-criminalized, exploited 
and their economic insecurity, creating the avenue for their engagement in 
political and economic violence. As indicated earlier, I have focused the 
discussion on political and economic violence as the dominant and most 
challenging areas of ex-combatant engagement. In addition to the narrative, I 
have also provided graphic and statistical explanations on the nature of 
political and economic violence. Importantly, I discussed the current economic 
situation in Liberia, in relation to its resource mobilization capacity and how 
this has affected the general living conditions in the country. These conditions 
have had an immense impact on the ex-combatant communities who have 
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reacted to this development in many ways.  Politically, there are feelings of 
marginalization, rampant corruption and the lack of transparency in the public 
sector. Observers within and outside the country will argue that Liberia is 
stable and at peace because it has not gone back to war after over 10 years 
of democracy, but beneath that superficial stability and peace there is glaring 
hostility, distrust and anger in the country, all because of the massive 
corruption that exist at all levels in the country. Recently, the government has 
used the “blame game” to justify its lack of progress, citing the Ebola crisis, 
falling prices of Iron Ore and Rubber in the international market, and, in 
retrospect, the prolonged civil war as combined constraints to growth and 
development. Six years ago, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
released its final report, which contained important recommendations for 
advancing reconciliation and addressing fundamental aspects of 
accountability, which are essential for lasting peace. Many of those 
recommendations have yet to be implemented. There is an upsurge in violent 
public disturbances, which underscores deficiencies in the response capacity 
of the police. The undercurrent of public discontent and alienation expressed 
through violent disturbances threatens the peace in Liberia. Political 
cleavages have left many Liberians with a feeling of exclusion from the 
political process and the lack of opportunities.  
 A ‘transition from war to peace’ is unlikely to see a clean break from 
violence to consent, from theft to production, from repression to democracy, 
or from impunity to accountability (Keen, 2001)  While political-institutional 
violence is related to collective action over participation and power, economic 
violence relates to survival strategies that lead to common crimes (ibid). 
These actors have challenged routine state violence seen as selective and 
which may contain a strong political message to the population, for instance 
warning actors against political organization or participation in elections. In 
Liberia, political violence has shifted into the society and amongst the main 
actors are ex-combatants who secure their daily survival by providing varied 
services to politicians, and lack other viable options and capabilities. There is 
also the likelihood that others who may not have benefitted from the post-war 
dividend have formed criminal groups. The increase in domestic violence in 
Liberia, for example, is likely to be rooted in these developments. 
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 Notwithstanding the focus of this research site on Montserrado County, 
I made a comparative analysis of political and economic violence across the 
country between April 2014 and April 2015 in order to further demonstrate 
why Monserrado (Monrovia) was chosen as a preferred site for this research. 
During this period, 57 violent protests were carried out. Let me state that 
although there is no hard evidence to show that the perpetrators of this 
violence were ex-combatants given the mixture of the protesters, there are 
indicators to show that they are predominantly ex-combatants. First, many of 
the protests, majority of those involved have always carried placards showing 
their dissatisfaction with the reintegration programmes, indicating that these 
are ex-combatants. Second, if ex-combatants cannot find new livelihoods, 
they will protest violently or turn to committing crime to support themselves. 
Although Jeremy Mullins (2013) has debunked this assertion, noting that the 
claim rests on a dubious causal chain. Third, the locations where violent 
protests have taken place are either in communities inhabited by ex-
combatants, their locations, concessions or within organizations where they 
operate/work as unskilled labourers. Fourth, in those violent protests that 
involved the use of weapons and dangerous objects, the perpetrators were 
identified as ex-combatants. Finally, ex-combatants have been known to 
provide leadership in political campaigns and support to politicians, lead 
protests against government policies and actions, protests to confront and 
resist police brutality against unarmed civilians, protests against bad labour 
practices etc. 
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   Figure 11: Map showing the distribution of violent protests in the 15 Counties   
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Analysis 
During the period under review, there was a total of 29 politically motivated 
protests with the highest in Montserrado which recorded 17 violent protests. 
There were 28 economically motivated protests with the highest of 5 in 
Montserrado and Grand Bassa Counties respectively. Montserrado is the 
political and economic capital while one of the World’s giant Iron Ore 
Companies, Arcellor Mittal Steel and the Liberia Agriculture Company are 
located in Grand Bassa County. The predominant work force in these 
concessions is ex-combatants who occasionally engage in protests to 
demand for better wages and benefits.  In addition, Montserrado accounts for 
58.62% of political and 17.24% economic protests follow by Grand Bassa and 
Nimba counties with 6.90% each of political and 17.86% and 10.71% of 
economic respectively. Bomi, Grand Cape Mount, Grand Gedeh, Grand Kru, 
Gbarpolu, Lofa, and Sinoe counties all had 3.45% each of political protests. 
Bong, Grand Cape Mount, and Nimba counties had 10.71% each of 
economic, while Grand Gedeh and Grand Kru counties had 3.57% each of 
economic. The overall averages between political and economic protests are 
96.57% and 95.79% with political protests being prevalent at 0.78% higher 
than economic. There were more political and economic protests in 
Montserrado and Grand Bassa as shown in the charts, graph and percentage 
representation below, while three counties out of the 15 counties did not 
experience any forms of protests and four counties had one of each of the 
protests (political/economic). 
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Graphic analysis of protests April 2014 – April 2015 
 
 
 
 
Percentage analysis of protests April 2014 – April 201 
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The general economic conditions in Liberia have impacted negatively on the 
population. The consequence is that those who are most affected, and have 
no alternative means of livelihood, take advantage of a peaceful protest 
against the government to express their anger, and engage in violence with a 
view to destruction, stealing and looting. Again the most affected areas are 
locations where concessions operate, with a significant number of the 
unskilled workers as ex-combatants. Here, the study identified and discussed 
how Liberia’s major exports of Iron Ore, Rubber, and Palm Oil have 
contributed to Liberia’s current economic hardships, and the reactions by 
segments of the population, particularly, unemployed ex-combatants. The 
prices of these products have fallen drastically in the international market 
resulting in the lay-off of a significant number of workers. The problem was 
exacerbated following the outbreak of the Ebola epidemic which forced 
concessions to scale down and or shut down their operations. In the graphs 
below, I show that this situation has affected the Liberian economy and 
served as a push for the occurrence of violence. I have analysed the global 
market price for iron ore, rubber, and palm oil for the period of November 
2014 to December 2015 to identify trends between the commodities that 
caused the market’s continued price drop. 
Iron ore- The price drop is being driven by two factors: evidence that supply is 
continuing to increase out of the World’s biggest producers, Australia and 
Brazil; and concerns that Chinese demand is tanking as the economy slows 
(UK. business insider.com 2015).  
Rubber- Thailand is the world’s largest supplier of natural rubber. In recent 
years, the country has faced falling demand, particularly in China, a major 
rubber consumer, and oversupply at the global level. This has made the Thai 
government resort to subsidy and buying programmes to support rubber 
growers against a weak economic backdrop in 2014 and 2015. The natural 
rubber price has been on a downward trend since 2013 because of high 
inventories and production against a backdrop of slower demand 
(security.com/emis/insights/ 2015). 
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Palm Oil- Palm oil production is vital for the economy of Malaysia, which is the 
World's second- largest producer of the commodity after Indonesia. For the 
first seven months of 2015, Malaysia’s exports to the European Union and 
China, two of its biggest markets, were down from a year earlier (Wall Street 
Journal 2015). This caused an oversupply that created a ripple throughout the 
market making prices lower for all exporters. Also pressing on palm oil are 
cheaper soybeans. Soybean oil and palm oil make up around 62% of the 
World’s edible-oils consumption: When soy prices fall, palm oil tends to fall in 
response. Recent forecasts by the U.S. Department of Agriculture for a strong 
soybean harvest this year have added to fears of a global oilseed glut. 
Chart Analysis: To better understand how troubling iron ore, rubber, and 
palm oil exports for Liberia are one should open the market space when 
prices first started to fall from its highest price. Iron ore price was its highest in 
late 2011 at USD 179 a dry metric ton. In December 2015 the price was USD 
39 per dry metric ton. That is a 79 per cent reduction in price. Rubber was 
also at its highest price in late 2011 at USD 280 per metric ton. In December 
2015 the price was USD 55, which is a 77 per cent reduction in price. Palm oil 
in late 2011 was USD 1.23k per metric ton. In December 2015, the price was 
USD 503 per metric ton, which is 58 per cent reduction in price (World Bank 
2015). 
Looking more closely at these commodities there are clear commonalities that 
have led to the decline of their prices. Specifically, from November 2014 to 
December 2015 there were three events that weakened those markets. First, 
in February 2015 palm oil and iron ore prices began to decline sharply after 
reports of oversupply in the global market due to China’s slowing imports, one 
of the biggest markets in the world. (See #1 on chart below) Also, investors 
begin speculating that China’s market will slow in 2015. 
The second and major thread causing all three prices to plunge was in July 
2015 (See STAR on chart below). It was on this date that the International 
Monetary Fund released their revised World Economic Outlook that reported 
the slowing of China’s economy and the over valuation of the Yen. With China 
one of the biggest importers of all three commodities, prices tumbled hard. 
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Making things worse was the fact China did slow its imports as speculated in 
February 2015. 
The final thread affecting all three prices was in September 2015 (See #2 on 
chart below). It was on this date that the US and China discussed increasing 
their interest rates. The rise of interest rates affects commodity prices 
because most commodities are priced in dollars, so a rise in the currency 
makes commodities expensive for holders of other currencies (www.cnbc.com 
2014). As a result of the above events, iron ore, rubber, and palm oil were 
down for the year; -37 per cent, -26 per cent, and -24 per cent respectively.  
This is more troubling news for the ordinary Liberian workers who continue to 
hear about more downsizing and the closing of concessions, despite the 
Sirleaf administration’s efforts to gain global economic support to rejuvenate 
and service the economy. Unfortunately, that support may only come in the 
long-term, but it falls short in assisting and mitigating the conditions of 
ordinary Liberians enduring economic hardships like concession downsizing. 
The reactions of ex-combatants have been profound, resisting any attempts, 
through violent protests, to downsize them without the government providing 
them with alternative sources of livelihood. Many of these protests have led to 
the destruction of properties and injuries to the ex-combatants in their 
confrontations with the police who were also affected, and the expatriate staff. 
Arrests and prolonged detention of ex-combatants in prison without trial, 
trigger another round of violent protests from members of the ex-combatant 
communities. Liberia’s continued economic hardships are largely a result of its 
reliance on rubber, iron ore, and palm oil exports, which are experiencing very 
low global pricing. For example, global rubber prices just from November 
2014 through November 2015 experienced a 37 per cent reduction (see 
rubber price graph). This is on top of the price slide in 2014.  
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Chart 1: Palm Oil 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 2: Iron Ore and Rubber 
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Related to the foregoing, the bad economic condition is also reflected in the 
number of violent armed robbery incidents that have occurred between 
November 2015 – February 2016. 
Analysis 
The analysis covers a period of four months, highlighting the number of 
incidents, kinds of weapons used in the commission of the robbery and the 
location of their occurrence. A total of 47 armed robberies were committed 
within the five Counties of which 38 occurred in Montserrado (Monrovia), six 
in Margibi and one each in Bomi, Sinoe and two in Grand Bassa Counties. 
Additionally, two incidents involved the use of AK-47 assault raffles, 23 the 
use of single barrel raffles and 19 the use of cutlasses/knives. Multiple 
weapons (shot guns and cutlasses/knives) were used to commit six of the 
robberies, and eight were committed with unidentified weapons believed to be 
shot guns. 10 of each of the robberies occurred in November and December 
2015, while 23 and 3 occurred in January and February 2016 respectively.  
Montserrado constitutes 80.85% of the total robberies, while Margibi accounts 
for 12.77%, and 2.13% each for Bomi and Sinoe counties and 4.26% for 
Grand Bassa. Also, November and December 2015 account each for 21.28%, 
while January and February 2016 account for 6.38% and 53.19% 
respectively. 
While there is no evidence to suggest that ex-combatants are the 
masterminds of these armed robberies, which can be attributed to limited 
research in this field and in Liberia generally, there are indicators to show that 
ex-combatants may constitute the majority of the perpetrators. First, 
telephone calls from community members to UNMIL operation/situation centre 
(not even to the local police due to lack of confidence in them) seeking 
intervention for an ongoing armed robbery incident have often alleged that ex-
combatants are “terrorizing” them, meaning that they are the perpetrators of 
the robbery. On further probing why they think that ex-combatants are the 
perpetrators, the response is always: “they live among us and they are the 
only group that knows how to shoot”. Although this perception may be wrong 
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the fact that community members harbour this type of negative sentiment 
against ex-combatants within the same community means that ex-combatants 
are yet to be fully accepted within communities and the hatred may be due to 
their continued use of violence against other members of the community. 
Second, in February 2016, the Liberia National Police investigated and 
dismissed seven of its senior officers for the supply of assorted weapons to 
unidentified individuals for the commission of armed robbery (New Dawn 
2016). This followed the arrest of individuals who upon interrogation 
confessed that some members of the police force supplied them with 
weapons in exchange for money plus the loot from their robbery. Investigation 
also found out that some of them have backgrounds as former fighters and 
are linked to some of the defunct factional groups. This revelation may have 
confirmed the perceptions of community members that ex-combatants 
constitute the majority of armed robbers. Third, the availability of weapons in 
Liberia used in the commission of these robberies is known in the country, 
particularly concerning fleeing Liberian ex-combatants during and after the 
civil conflict in Cote d’Ivoire, where they fought for the different protagonists. 
Managing Violence and Peacebuilding in Liberia 
This section discusses the strategies for the management of violence in 
Liberia, including through the peacebuilding approach. The peacebuilding 
initiative is seen as an effort to address the root causes of violent conflicts and 
their transformation, and therefore, the discussion in this study is important in 
order to gauge its strength and weaknesses in mitigating post-war violence in 
Liberia. In discussed peacebuilding in order to demonstrate the various 
perspectives and interpretations by scholars and how these have manifested 
in the Liberian situation. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) 
assigned different responsibilities to various national institutions and 
international partners in pre and post DDRR era. These include the National 
Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), the United Nations, International 
Contact Group for Liberia (ICGL), the ECOWAS/ECOMOG, and the 
Government of Liberia (GoL). The exile of Charles Taylor to Nigeria on August 
11, 2003, the signing of the Accra Agreement on August 18, 2003, and the 
United Nations Resolution 1509, which established a stabilization force, on 
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September 19, 2003, led to a new era of hope and peace in Liberia. Seizing 
the opportunity created by these initiatives, the National Transitional 
Government of Liberia (NTGL), with the support of the international 
community, developed the Result-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF) as 
the overarching framework and planning tool for setting goals and actions in 
ten priority areas called clusters. A key cluster focuses on disarmament, 
demobilization, rehabilitation, and reintegration (DDRR). In the Community 
Resettlement and Reintegration Strategy (CRRS), developed by the NTGL 
and the international community, the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-
combatants was aligned with the cluster which dealt with refugees, returnees, 
and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The reintegration of ex-combatants 
was linked to the resettlement process as a way to create a strong framework 
that will accommodate all groups and facilitate the physical, economic, and 
social reconstruction of the entire society. This approach was justified by the 
experiences the 1997 DDRR process, which showed that “programmes aimed 
only at ex-combatants divided communities and caused considerable 
resentment on the part of civilians who received no special assistance” 
(OXFAM, 2004).  
The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) 
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2003) under Article 1V, the 
Government of Liberia, the LURD, MODEL and the Political Parties in the 
conflict, agreed for the deployment of an International Stabilization Force 
(ISF) in Liberia. Accordingly, the parties requested the United Nations in 
collaboration with ECOWAS, the AU, and the ICGL to facilitate, constitute, 
and deploy a United Nations Chapter V11 Force in the Republic of Liberia to 
support the transitional government and to assist in the implementation of the 
agreement. With regards to the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization, 
rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, the parties further 
requested, in Article V1, the ISF to conduct the disarmament of all combatants 
of the parties including paramilitary groups. All arms and ammunition are to be 
placed under constant control by the ISF, and it is to deploy troops to all 
disarmament and demobilization locations in order to facilitate and monitor the 
programme of disarmament. Following this request, the UN Security Council 
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Resolution 1509 of September 19, 2003, established the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia, with 15,000.00 troops. The resolution clearly stipulates the 
mandate of UNMIL which includes: 
 (a) “to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement 
and investigate violations of the ceasefire; (b) to establish and maintain 
continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all the parties’ military forces; 
(c) to assist in the development of cantonment sites and to provide security at 
these sites; (d) to observe and monitor disengagement and cantonment of 
military forces of all the parties; (e) to support the work of the Joint Monitoring 
Committee (JMC); (f) to develop, as soon as possible, preferably within 30 
days of the adoption of this resolution, in cooperation with a Joint Monitoring 
Committee (JMC), relevant international financial institutions, international 
development organizations, and donor nations, an action plan for the overall 
implementation of a disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and 
repatriation (DDRR) programme for all armed parties; with particular attention 
to the special needs of child combatants and women; and addressing the 
inclusion of non-Liberian combatants; (g) to carry out voluntary disarmament 
and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized 
DDRR programme; (h) support the reform of the security sector by assisting 
“the transitional government of Liberia in monitoring and restructuring the 
police force of Liberia, consistent with democratic policing, to develop a 
civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of 
civilian police, in cooperation with ECOWAS, international organizations, and 
interested States” (UNSC, 2003:4). 
  UNMIL faced several challenges in supervising the disarmament and 
demobilization of combatants. In the immedate period following the signing of 
the CPA, the ex-government forces of Charles Taylor were still enaged in 
fighting with LURD and MODEL rebel factions, and there were instances of 
abduction, looting and harrassment of the civilian population. Although UNMIL 
has an enforcement mandate to use force under Chapter V11, that was not 
applied, as the Mission reasoned that it may escalate the situation and further 
put the civilians at risk. The then Special Representative of the Secretary 
General (SRSG) in Liberia, Jack Klein, warned that “those who are formenting 
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trouble will be held accountable for any crimes committed”. Factional leaders 
who were still unleashing violence in many parts of the country were 
persuaded to cease hostilities. Following this appeal, factional leaders and 
fighters showed up for disarmament at Camp Sheifflin, in the outskirts of 
Monrovia (ICG 2004; Nichols, 2005)). Ex-combatants commitment to the 
process was a mix of fear and expectation. Given the unpredictable and 
spontaneous nature of Liberia’s wars, many ex-combatants feared that a re-
surgence of war may put their safety in danger, and thus they were reluctant 
to surrender their weapons inspite of the financial rewards and the promise of 
reintegration (ibid). This was a major challenge to UNMIL. Although, the 
cantonment sites were closed on 4 November 2004, certain disarmament 
activities continued to take place. Consequently, the same month, the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) announced that: 
 “There will be a grace period when weapons and ammunition 
can be handed in at any UNMIL check point voluntarily without 
prosecution. Handing in weapons in this manner will not be 
eligible for entry into DDRR and cannot receive any of such 
benefits. Simiarly, any person caught with weapons during this 
period not in process of handing them in voluntarily will come 
under Liberian Law covering illegal gun ownership. Mop-up 
operations dealing with caseloads in specific remote locations of 
Liberia will continue until these are completed. The people 
entering DDRR via this route will be given the benefits of a 
normal combatant in the programme. As of 1 December 2004, 
all illegal gun ownership comes under the Liberian law as the 
grace period for voluntary handover ends” (UNMIL, 2004). 
 
In its determination to remove weapons from post-war Liberia, UNMIL 
embarked on “cordon and search operations” to look for weapons, but this 
achieved limited success as most combatants concealed their weapons in the 
forests and inaccessible locations within communities. Further, the UNDP 
launched a programme of “weapons for development” within the broader 
context of “Disarmament and Community Development” aimed at encouraging 
community members to disclose locations of weapons and surrender them to 
the United Nations in exchange for development of their communities. Again, 
this approach did not yield substantial results as most community members 
were afraid that disclosure might put their lives at risk with ex-combatants who 
live in the same communities (UNDP 2012). In this connection, it should be 
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recalled that in 2005 community members in the in the Old Road Municipality, 
disclosed to security officials where weapons were buried in a graveyard for 
possible use by former rebel groups. This generated tension and 
subsequently led to violent attacks on suspected community members who 
leaked the information. However, the UN continue to discover and take 
possession of hidden and abandoned weapons in remote locations, but 
weapons, particularly locally made arms, remain in circulation throughout 
Liberia and are mostly used by criminal elements to commit crimes. 
Institutional corruption within the relevant national agencies participating in the 
DDRR process seriously undermined the ability of UNMIL in its monitoring 
roles. This is not surprising in an improvished post-war country, where many 
people thought that the DDRR process was a source of making quick money, 
and therefore seen as a continuation of the “grabbing and looting” that 
characterized the civil war years (Students 2013; Heritage 2012). There was 
practically no mechanism for accountability and, regrettably, the international 
community was focused on the urgent need to complete the DDRR in order to 
pave the way for Presidential and Legislative elections in 2005. This apparent 
haste to complete the programme and pull out by avoiding further spending 
has been one of the major sources of criticisms against the United Nations 
and other international actors operating in post-conflict environments (Daboh, 
et.al 2010:10).  The UNMIL mandate also covers issues such as police and 
defence reform, restructuring, training, and operational support, assistance in 
the restoration and reform of judicial and prison systems, support for the 
restoration of state authority and administration capacities at  government and 
local levels, good governance, support for civil society, and assistance to 
constitutional processes. The CPA makes specific reference to the security 
agencies to be restructured, including the Liberia National Police (LNP). 
Article VII refers to the Liberia National Police and other security services 
such as the Immigration Service, Special Security Services, Customs Security 
Guards, and other statutory security entities (CPA 2003). During the civil 
wars, police in Liberia (like the other security services) reportedly abused 
human rights and used official powers for private gains. There was no 
effective law enforcement, and mob justice was rampant. The population was 
deeply mistrustful of the Liberian National Police (Malan, 2008). The RAND 
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Corporation’s report provided guidance on the role and functions of the new 
LNP: 
The primary missions of the LNP are (a) to prevent and fight 
crime and (b) to maintain public safety. These missions call for a 
light but sizable, community-friendly police force that can earn 
the confidence and cooperation of the Liberian people. 
Anticipating occasional civil disorder, the LNP should also have 
a branch capable of riot control—e.g., the police support unit 
(PSU) (Gompert, et.al 2007:25-26). 
 
In 2004, the United Nations Mission Police (UNPOL) began, in accordance 
with UN Security Council Resolution 1509 and the CPA, to reform the LNP 
from scratch. UNPOL was required to assist the LNP in maintaining law and 
order, restructuring, retraining, and re-equipping the police service. At that 
time, public confidence in the LNP was “zero.”  During this period some of the 
police personnel had no uniforms, and the majority had not been paid for the 
past few years. They had survived mainly by extracting bribes from members 
of the public whom they were supposed to serve and protect. 
UNPOL faced an extremely difficult task. It did not have an executive 
mandate, granting UN Police powers of arrest. This power was reserved for 
the same police that they were required to reconstitute.  Due to the bad image 
of the force, UNMIL started reintroducing the LNP to the public through a 
sensitization programme, supported by the UNMIL Public Information Section, 
emphasizing that UNPOL was acting in support of the new LNP, and not as 
an independent law enforcement agency. The selection and vetting criteria 
agreed by UNMIL and the Government of Liberia are similar to those in most 
African countries. The Liberia National Police has been increased to a total of 
more than 4,000 trained and deployed personnel. This represents a police to 
citizen ratio of 683, whereas the UN generally recommends a ratio of one 
police officer per 450 citizens. UNMIL and the Government of Liberia have 
estimated that the total police force needs to be increased to 8,000 to ensure 
public security and that this needs to occur prior to full UNMIL departure.  The 
LNP is clearly not quite there yet. The existing ranks remain, however, both 
quantitatively and qualitatively insufficient. More training, resources and 
infrastructure support are needed to enable the LNP to be effective. 
Additionally, the LNP remains over-represented in urban areas, particularly in 
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and around Monrovia while deployment throughout the country continues to 
lag.  Liberians remain unsatisfied with limited police presence, slow police 
response to crime and high rates of corruption among the ranks. There is still 
a widespread sense of insecurity in Monrovia, in particular, and of 
unacceptably high rates of armed robbery and gender based violence (UN 
SG’s Report (2014:4). UNPOL has been working with the LNP to improve 
police responses to calls for assistance by the public. However, the biggest 
problem with the LNP at present is low morale and poor discipline, on the one 
hand, and extremely poor leadership and management on the other (Malan, 
2008). This assertion made by Malan has not changed, and if anything, it is 
only marginally better in the area of training which is provided by the United 
Nations Police. But the payment of salaries and other benefits remains a 
problem. This creates avenues for extortion and involvement in other criminal 
activities such as drugs trade as I have reported in the course of my official 
work in Liberia. 
With regard to the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), real progress has 
been made with a completely reformed force consisting of new recruits. The 
AFL comprised of 1,900 soldiers as of February 2014, with plan to reach 
2,200 by the end of 2015 (UN SG’s Report, 2014:11).  The AFL has recently 
achieved responsibility – both financial and functional – for its own training 
having taken over from the US Army Training and Evaluation Programme. 
However, gaps in the strength of the force remain, including high rates of 
attrition, and gaps in discipline and professionalism (UNMIL 2012:11).  
Outside of the army and police, it is important to consider the broader context. 
Historically, politicization of the military has helped to drive conflict. There 
continues to be weakness in civilian oversight of the security sector, coupled 
with a public and civil society that does little to hold the sector to account. 
Although there are various legislative committees set up to provide oversight, 
they remain weak and ineffective. While some steps have been taken to 
enhance civilian capacity, these remain insufficient. In addition, the lack of 
effective civilian oversight impacts upon public confidence in the armed 
forces. The result of all these has been a continuation of violence in different 
forms, particularly within the capital city Monrovia and its environs (Malan, 
2008). 
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The Government of Liberia (GoL)  
The holding of an election in 2005, signalled an end to war, optimism to end 
mismanagement in government, and a new beginning based on peace, 
inclusive economic opportunities and respect for justice based on human 
rights. At the inception of the new government, the DD component has been 
concluded, while the RR aspect which is supposed to be a long-term exercise 
was terminated after one to two years due to lack of funding. The 
implementing agency, NCDDRR was dissolved. These actions arguably 
questioned the regime’s commitment towards addressing the plight of ex-
combatants in post-war Liberia. However, several short-term and medium-
term development plans, the types that are characteristic of Africa states and 
governments, have since been initiated arguably to address these important 
post-war challenges. In 2006, the government launched a 150-Day Action 
plan which provided the first glimpse of hope to war-torn Liberians, that the 
new democratically elected government would protect basic rights and restore 
vital social services. Indeed, the 150-Day Action Plans and subsequent plans 
were a precursor to other plans such as the Interim Poverty Reduction 
Strategy (iPRS) of 2007 and the Lift Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 
of 2008-2011.  
These strategies and plans provided stimuli to the already struggling 
and weak economy. They also sought to strengthen the rule of law and 
improve the national security environment. However, descent into conflict 
occasioned far more significant damage to infrastructure and institutions than 
the gains from the period of recovery have been able to resolve. The path 
from recovery to prosperity demands a greater quality of public investment 
that has not been possible so far. By the United Nations Development Index, 
Liberia remains one of the poorest countries in the world (AfT 2013). 
Significant stretches of the struggling rural agrarian economy are cut off from 
urban Liberia (which of course is just the capital Monrovia) during the rainy 
season due to the deplorable road conditions. Unemployment remains very 
high, especially among the country’s youthful population, rampant corruption 
remains high in government and other public institutions, and human 
insecurity is exacerbated by the deteriorating economic conditions. Faced by 
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multiple problems, particularly how to provide sustainable livelihood for the 
large number of un-integrated ex-combatants, and internally displaced 
persons (IDP’s), coupled with enduring incidence of violence, the government 
sought to adopt a holistic approach to deal with these issues. Under the PRS, 
the government developed a framework of four pillars for development, 
namely; peace and security, economic revitalization, governance and rule of 
law, and infrastructure and basic services.  
The central goal of the Peace and Security pillar was to create a 
secure and peaceful environment, both domestically and in the sub-region, 
that is conducive to sustainable, inclusive, and equitable growth and 
development. The economic revitalization pillar focused on achieving growth 
and development. The Governance and Rule of Law pillar envisages 
enhanced participation in the ownership of government, building effective and 
efficient institutions, and strengthening and enhancing the effectiveness and 
integrity of legal and judicial institutions, amongst others. Finally, the 
infrastructure and basic services pillar seeks to achieve substantive 
development in the construction of roads and bridges, transportation, energy, 
post and telecommunications, water and sanitation, public buildings and 
housing, health, and education (LPRS 2008). 
In spite of what appear to be progressive steps encapsulated in the 
PRS document towards achieving economic recovery and growth, the 
strategy did not yield substantive results, and was therefore hugely criticized 
by many national stakeholders (ibid).  Marginalization of youth and women, 
and the mismanagement of natural resources remain widespread. The 
situation of the youth and ex-combatants remains a critical security challenge, 
and continues to manifest in the increasing risk of violence. Gender based 
violence, which was used as weapon of war during the two-decade period of 
unrest, remains widespread in post-war Liberia. There is still over-
concentration of power and corruption, restricted access to the decision 
making process, and limited space for civil society participation in governance 
processes. In the light of all these challenges, accentuated by a deteriorating 
situation and violent protests across the country, the government needed a 
robust policy response to convince the population of its commitment towards 
improving their livelihood and peaceful co-existence. Consequently, in 2013, 
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the government launched a development strategy – the Agenda for 
Transformation (AfT). The AfT is the government’s five-year development 
strategy. It allows for the three year (2008-2011) Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(PRS), which transitioned from post-conflict emergency reconstruction 
towards achieving economic recovery. The AfT will not deliver transformation 
by the end of the next five years, rather it is assumed to be the first step 
towards achieving the goals set out in the so-called Liberia Rising 2030, that 
is, Liberia’s long-term vision of socio-economic transformation and 
development. However, the success of the AfT will inevitably entail making 
hard choices and taking deliberate and bold steps to ensure that resources 
are directed in a transparent manner towards priority areas and interventions. 
Aid resources are particularly important in this regard, since AfT financing is 
expected to rely heavily on funding from development partners (AfT, 
2013:154-155).  
 
The Peacebuilding Approach 
The DDRR programmes are seen as an essential part of peace-building, and 
without efforts to assist former combatants to reintegrate into society, their 
potential volatility could provide the opportunity for conflict to reignite. What 
then is peacebuilding, and what does it look like? Is it high-level diplomats 
working out a regional and international plan for addressing the conflict in 
Syria? Is it civil society organizations bringing religious leaders together to 
dialogue on Islamist militant Boko Haram in Nigeria? Or women’s groups 
working together across the lines of conflict in Israel and Palestine to deliver 
humanitarian aid to families in Gaza? Peacebuilding is all of this, and much 
more. Post-conflict peacekeeping developed into something of a growth 
industry for international forces in the 1990s. The first major operation 
involving international UN troops was deployed in Namibia in 1989, followed 
by missions in Nicaragua (1989), Angola (1991), Cambodia (1991), 
Mozambique (1992), Liberia (first 1993), Rwanda (1993), Bosnia (1995), 
Croatia (1995), Guatemala (1997), East Timor (1999), Kosovo (1999), and 
Sierra Leone (1999). In total, fourteen peacekeeping operations were 
deployed from 1989-1999 to territories that had recently experienced civil 
conflict (Paris, 2004:3).  
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The questions related to peacebuilding are debated among scholars 
and policymakers in many places around the world, and they relate to a more 
general set of questions. Is violence something to be managed, mitigated, 
negotiated, mediated, resolved, prevented or transformed? Is peace 
something to be kept, made or built?  The field of peacebuilding did not 
originate out of a central place. Rather, the work of peacebuilding took root in 
different cultures around the world. It is not surprising then that peacebuilding 
practitioners have developed different terminology. Some use the term 
“peacebuilding” to refer to post-conflict work. Others use it as an umbrella 
term for all work geared toward social change at all levels of society and in all 
stages of conflict. There is an increasing sense of confusion about the 
terminology or language in the field of peacebuilding, and these challenges 
impact coordination efforts. The table below explains the range of differences 
in meaning of the term peacebuilding. However, many of the different uses of 
this term also equally apply to other terms that are used as “umbrella 
terminology” such as conflict resolution, management or prevention. 
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Table: 3
Spectrums of Meaning in Peace building Terminology
Focus on post-conflict time span Focus on all stages of conflict
Narrow focus on specific kinds of 
activities
Wide focus on a range of activities 
including peacekeeping , human
rights monitoring, mediation, 
development, education, 
governance, etc.
Immediate focus on ending direct 
violence
Long-term focus on addressing root 
causes of violence, including 
structural injustices
Outcome-oriented focus on solutions Process-oriented focus on 
transformation
Focus on the role of outside experts, 
“intervening” in local conflicts
Focus on the role of insiders and 
increasing their capacity for building 
peace
Focus on high level national and 
international interventions
Focus on all levels of interventions, 
from the community, regional, and 
national levels
Focus on military peace operations Focus on non-military approaches to 
building peace and security
Source: adapted from Lisa Schirch (2008) Strategic Peacebuilding: State of the 
Field, Peace Prints: South Africa Journal of Peacebuilding, Vol.1 No.1 Spring.  
Other scholars insist that the term peacebuilding must also include efforts to 
address the root causes of violent conflict. The Carnegie Endowment’s 
Commission on the Prevention of Deadly Conflict defined peacebuilding as 
“structural prevention” which consists of the strategies to address the root 
causes of deadly conflict (1997).  In addition, the Joint Utstein study of 
peacebuilding concludes that “peacebuilding attempts to encourage the 
development of the structural conditions, attitudes, and modes of political 
behaviour that may permit peaceful, stable and ultimately prosperous social 
and economic development (Joint Utstein Study 2003).” It states that there 
are four main headings related to peacebuilding: to provide security, to 
establish the socioeconomic foundations of long-term peace, to establish the 
political framework of long-term peace, and to generate reconciliation, a 
healing of the wounds of war, and justice (Utstein Study, 2003:4; Smith, 
171 
 
2003:10). The Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy states that there are three 
broad types of peacebuilding: 
 a. Political peacebuilding is about agreement and legal issues, and includes 
formal negotiations, diplomacy, etc. 
b. Structural peacebuilding is about infrastructures and includes building 
economic, military, social and cultural systems that support a culture of peace 
through activities such as voter education, disarming warring parties, police 
training, building schools, and good governance. 
c. Social peacebuilding is about relationships and includes dealing with 
feelings, attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and values through dialogue processes, 
community-building activities and training (Schirch, 2008:5). 
Fukuyama’s argument is important for setting the scene about the 
phases of the discourse and evolution of contemporary peacebuilding since 
1990. This relates to the conceptual and practical (policy) transition from 
traditional peacekeeping to state (institutional) building and to 
humanitarianism (Ismail, 2008:11). The other transition moves the discourse 
and practice from “sheer” humanitarianism to political realism or militant 
humanitarianism or the relief and reconstruction of complex environment 
(Bello 2006:281), and to a technology of normalization and security for liberal 
peace (Duffield 2001, 2007). Yet, the advent of an asymmetrical agenda of 
peacebuilding in the global conceptual and policy agenda hardly precluded 
contestations about its meaning, strategies and, lately, its ideological 
underpinnings (Ismail, 2008). To foreground these contestations, Keen 
(2000:14), in seeking to problematize the phenomenon of War and Peace, 
raised the crucial observation that “we hear about rehabilitation, 
reconstruction, resettlement and all the various ‘re-s’ of post-conflict work. But 
if you could recreate and reconstruct the exact social and economic 
conditions prevailing at the outset of a civil war, would it simply break out all 
over again – for the same reasons as before?” 
The intellectual foundation of contemporary peacebuilding appears to be 
rooted in peace research and conflict-resolution literature and the writings of 
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peace theorists. According to Miall et al. (1999:36), peacebuilding refers to 
“the attempt to overcome the structural, relational, and cultural contradictions 
which lie at the root of conflict”. While it is acknowledged that actions, 
including diplomatic negotiations such as shuttle and two-track diplomacies, 
are historical phenomena and elements of broader peacebuilding, the 
conceptual foundation of contemporary peacebuilding is often related to 
Galtung’s tripartite approaches to peace – peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. Miall et al. (1999:186–7) reproduced aspects of Galtung’s 
(1975) thesis that defined peacekeeping as actions seeking “to halt and 
reduce the manifest violence of the conflict through the intervention of military 
forces in an interpository role”; peacemaking as actions that are “directed at 
reconciling political and strategic attitudes through mediation, negotiation, 
arbitration and conciliation mainly at the elite level”; and peacebuilding as 
actions and propositions that addressed “the practical implementation of 
peaceful social change through socioeconomic reconstruction and 
development”. Other peace theorists reinforce this narrative by linking 
contemporary peacebuilding to the distinction between structural and direct 
violence, and between negative and positive peace. (Galtung  (1964:95).  
From a considerable hands-off approach to international 
“peacekeeping” during the Cold War, mainly as a result of geo-political 
considerations and concerns about state sovereignty, “peacebuilding” has 
emerged as a key focus of international attention beginning in the 1990s, with 
the United Nations playing a leading role. Since then, the concept of 
peacebuilding and its agenda have evolved significantly. Building on UN 
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros Ghali’s 1992 An Agenda for Peace, 
peacebuilding was originally associated with the (post-) conflict phase in 
countries that had experienced internal warfare, and was defined as “actions 
undertaken by national or international actors to identify and support 
structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a 
relapse into conflict” (Call and Cousins 2007:3). These early interventions in 
war-torn societies tended to focus on the establishment of a “negative peace” 
(i.e., absence of, or prevention of a relapse into, armed conflict) and operated 
under very short-term timeframes. The emphasis of this “liberal peace-
building” model (Paris 2004) was on holding a successful post-conflict election 
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as soon as possible (usually within a year or two of the signing of a peace 
agreement) and on laying the foundations of a market-oriented economy, with 
the assumption that these provisions would prove sufficient in themselves to 
enable host societies to embark on a road towards lasting peace almost 
automatically (Paris and Sisk 2008). 
While some scholars/institutions have used the liberal peace thesis as 
the appropriate and sometimes acceptable model for development, peace and 
stability, others have criticized it for a variety of reasons. Richmond and 
MacGinty looked at the most significant contributions made by the critique of 
the Liberal school. The persistence of liberal peace ‘solutions’ closes the door 
on political and on difficult discussions about sustainable forms of peace, 
legitimacy, responsibility and inequality (Richmond and MacGinty, 2014:1).  
Both noted that liberal peace has attracted criticisms from realist, Marxist, 
liberal, constructivist, critical and post-colonial scholars, for a range of often 
similar reasons. It has also attracted the attention of many students, scholars, 
and policymakers, including from the post-conflict and developing world, and 
appears to have become a central debate in international relations (ibid, 2).  
In my argument, I nevertheless noted that this has not been able to 
address many of the problems that it has generated, neither has it gained 
universal acceptance. For instance, most of the development agendas 
undertaken in post-war Liberia by bilateral and multilateral institutions, 
including the United Nations, appear to have adopted the liberal peace as the 
best approach. But this has equally been criticized at the national level. For 
instance, during a workshop sponsored by Liberia’s Governance Commission, 
a Liberian scholar, Yarsuo Weh-Dorliae, criticized the United Nations led 
liberal peace approach in the security sector reform programme. He noted 
that the diversity of trainers for the Liberian National Police, from contrasting 
policing jurisdictions, produced an outcome that lacked a country-specific 
context for Liberia, and that the Liberian government failed to take ownership 
of its training programme (Weh-Dorliae, 2015:4). 
Therefore, the most important contribution made by the critique of the 
liberal peace has been the construction of a framework of analysis allowing 
scholars to unpack the evolving nature of various forms of peace activity. This 
has been carried out in its wider historical, ideological, and methodological 
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contexts, and has mounted a challenge to the liberal peace framework over its 
claim to represent the most emancipatory peace framework in history on a 
universal basis (Richmond and MacGinty, 2014:4). 
But, the mixed results of “first-generation” missions, with the relative 
success of the mission in El Salvador contrasting sharply with the renewal of 
violence in Liberia and Rwanda in the early 1990s, for example, led to a 
substantial rethinking of the complexity of post-conflict transitions, and of the 
challenges embedded in bridging the gap between relief and development 
(Wyeth and Sisk 2009). Perhaps the most crucial insight or lesson to emerge 
from these experiences was that promoting political and/or economic 
liberalization without ensuring that a sufficiently strong and effective formal 
institutional framework was in place to channel new rights, freedoms, 
demands and expectations peacefully could lead to considerable instability 
and even fuel further conflict (Menocal, 2010:2). This led to a growing 
recognition that rebuilding or establishing at least a minimally functioning state 
was essential to undertaking political and economic reforms and maintaining 
the peace, especially in the long term (Call and Cousens 2007, Paris and Sisk 
2008). As a result, from the late 1990s onward, the concept of peacebuilding 
became more expansive and more consciously focused on the importance of 
state institutions, while it continues to emphasize the centrality of non-state 
actors, mainly civil society and bottom-up processes as key to building 
sustainable peace. 
 At its most ambitious, peacebuilding has shifted from the relatively 
minimalist focus on “negative peace” towards the maximalist goal of 
transforming society by strengthening human security and addressing 
fundamental grievances, horizontal inequalities, and other root causes of 
conflict (Menocal, 2010). Thus interpreted, peacebuilding is a multifaceted 
endeavour that includes building democratic governance, protecting human 
rights, strengthening the rule of law, and promoting sustainable development, 
equitable access to resources, and environmental security (Barnett and 
Zürcher 2008). On the other hand, as Charles Call and Elizabeth Cousens 
(2007) have suggested, it may be wiser to steer away from either a minimalist 
or a maximalist conceptualization of the term, and to opt for a middle ground. 
As such, peacebuilding can be defined as: 
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“those actions undertaken by international or national actors to 
institutionalize peace, understood as the absence of armed 
conflict (‘negative peace’) and a modicum of participatory politics 
(as a component of ‘positive peace’) that can be sustained in the 
absence of an international peace operation” (Call and Cousens 
2007). 
Peacebuilding requires a range of approaches. While many actors engage in 
multiple categories of peacebuilding, the figure below (figure 1) highlights the 
unique goals of different approaches to or categories of peacebuilding.  
Figure 1  
 
Source: adapted from Lisa Schirch (2004) The Little Book of Strategic 
Peacebuilding: A vision and framework for peace with justice, Intercourse PA: 
Good Books. 
Therefore, I argue that the challenges of reintegration and how DDRR can 
successfully address long-standing and wide range of societal problems 
define the role of transformative peacebuilding. This would require a process 
of building relationships and institution that support the peaceful 
transformation of conflict. In explaining this process, the study adopts two 
models of transformation in post-conflict environment, namely; Lederach’s 
(1997) pyramidal and Sawyer’s (2005) polycentric strategies. 
Figure 2 
176 
 
 
Source: John Paul Lederach (1997) Building Peace: Sustainable 
Reconciliation in Divided Societies, United States Institute for Peace, 39. 
The missing relational dimension of peacebuilding in Galtung’s formulation is 
included in Lederach’s conflict transformation approach to peacebuilding that 
emphasizes the transformative goal of peace building. It sees peace building 
as transcending the resolution of specific problems to focus on the content, 
context, and structure of relationships. Hence, “conflict transformation 
envisions and responds to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life-giving 
opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, 
increase justice to direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-
life problems in human relationships” (Lederach 2003: 14). Through this, 
peace theorists identify reducing the relapse into direct violence and 
contributing to conditions for socioeconomic and political recovery and 
reconciliation as the primary goals, and the transformation of relationships 
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and society as the ultimate goal of peacebuilding (Ramsbotham 2000:172; 
Miall et al. 1999:60). 
At each level of the pyramid above, there are people capable of 
inspiring and leading social change efforts. At the top level, the United 
Nations, national governments etc. participate in official dialogue, negotiation, 
and mediation to address conflicts such as a political crisis. At the middle 
level, national and regional organizations, businesses, religious bodies, the 
media etc. lead policy and programme initiatives, such as providing regional 
coordination for relief aid for a humanitarian crisis. At the grassroots or 
community level, a variety of local groups carry out relief and development 
programmes, civilian peacekeeping, dialogue, trauma healing, training and 
education programmes, and other projects (Schirch, 2004:71). 
 Lederach proposed four key principles that complement the three 
levels of the pyramid: (1) A horizontal capacity: a horizontal capacity for peace 
building is a set of relationships within each level of the pyramid that allows 
leaders to coordinate with each other in peace building programmes across 
lines of conflict, ethnicity, religion, or other social divisions. Most current 
peacebuilding programmes foster horizontal capacity. People-to-people 
dialogues between citizens from India, Pakistan, and Kashmir, for example, 
develop a vision and capacity for working together for change when they 
come together to share their experiences of violence. (2) Vertical capacity: a 
vertical capacity for peacebuilding is a set of relationships between top, 
middle, and grassroots leaders that recognizes their different and 
interdependent contributions to peace building. Increasingly, people at all 
levels are recognizing the need to have relationships with people working at 
other levels. For instance, the United Nations is increasingly showing interest 
in working with regional organizations and their grassroots partners in setting 
up early warning networks to alert the international community of impending 
violence. (3) The middle level: the middle level category, such as some 
businesses or religious leaders, are most likely to have access to and 
relationships with those at both the top and grassroots levels. Working with 
the middle level, then, requires strategic planning to foster vertical 
cooperation. The West Africa Network for Peacebuilding is an example of a 
mid-level organization that has access both to grassroots people and groups 
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working for change, and to high-level government and UN diplomats. (4) 
Vertical and horizontal integration: this is a set of relationships between 
individuals, networks, and organizations that allow people at all levels to work 
together to bring about peace in a violently divided society (Lederach, 1999).  
Lisa Schirch (2004:74-5) argues that peacebuilding requires the 
inclusion of Moderates and Extremists, as well as Insiders and Outsiders. 
Both leaders who instigate violence and those who already support peace 
need to be involved in peacebuilding processes. Far too many programmes 
involve only those who are predisposed to peace. Pro-violence leaders are 
often left out as they are seen as “spoilers” capable of hijacking, side-tracking, 
or even rejecting peace processes. Yet, if they are not included, peace 
building programmes have little chance of success. Schirch notes that 
insiders and outsiders participate in peace building in different ways. Insiders 
are people who live within the conflicted community and call it home. They 
generally make a long term commitment to the work and have more at stake if 
peacebuilding succeeds or fails. Insiders have a deeper understanding of 
local culture, context, the conflicts, and local resources for peace. They are 
more likely to hold credibility and trust with local people and to have extensive 
networks of relationships. On the other hand, outsiders are people and 
organizations who travel to the conflict region specifically to participate in 
peacebuilding. Outsiders are likely to have a larger set of economic and 
political resources, which allows them to raise international awareness about 
the conflict and about how local participants are working at peacebuilding. 
They can help influence national and international powers to address the 
conflicts and find funders to give financial resources. 
 In this connection, what is needed is polycentric approach that 
analyses each task, identifying its components and seeking appropriate 
institutional remedies (Sawyer, 2005) as illustrated in table 4 below. Each 
peacebuilding task is performed at different level, making the process 
representational and inclusive.  
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Table: 4 
Source: adapted from Amos Sawyer (2005) Beyond Plunder: Towards 
Democratic Governance in Liberia, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, 
London. 
The critical point here is that peacebuilding activities must be seen as 
foundations for long-term governance and not as an assortment of vital 
activities undertaken eclectically for post-conflict recovery and as donor 
resources become available (Sawyer, 2005). Post-conflict peacebuilding 
activities must be designed to constitute the foundations for democratic 
governance, and the people of the country must be central to the processes of 
designing and implementing peacebuilding tasks with participation from the 
local levels through a series of stakeholders to the international levels. Each 
component is expected to play a critical role in this multi-level arrangement. 
The argument being made here is that the local people are central to this 
approach, and they must be seen as co-providers and co-producers as well 
as consumers of peacebuilding activities and of the outcome of such 
activities. Local people cannot be left as spectators in the peacebuilding 
process. When this is done correctly, the task of the polycentric strategy will 
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be achieved. Finally, when peacebuilding successfully address the problems 
arising from the poor implementation of the DDRR programme, the chances 
of reverting to violent and conflict are substantially eliminated. 
Conclusion 
The occurrence of violence has remained a disturbing issue in post-war 
Liberia. The occurrence has taken different forms and shapes, including 
sabotage of infrastructure, physical attacks on individuals and community 
members, arson, looting, armed robberies, attacks against law enforcement 
personnel, including violence that has resulted in deaths. These violent 
occurrences are raising fear among the population that the departure of the 
United Nations peacekeeping operation will create a huge security vacuum. 
Fearing this imminent security gap, in a meeting on 11 March 2016 with the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General in Liberia, a coalition of 
civil society organizations and political parties called on the UN to extend its 
mandate in Liberia beyond 2017 in order to observe the conduct of the 
Presidential and Legislative elections slated for that year. The key conclusions 
drawn from this chapter are that the contemporary political and economic 
structures of Liberia which arguably are an inheritance from the pre and war 
years, have continued to create conditions for the production and reproduction 
of violence. Second, it is clear that the DDRR programme was poorly 
implemented and this made the reintegration of ex-combatants unsuccessful, 
leaving them vulnerable to engage in a variety of negative activities, including 
engaging in violence. The next chapter will discuss the data gained from the 
fieldwork.  
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Chapter Six:  
Presentation and Analysis of Research Data 
 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the data for this analysis come from face-to-face interviews 
conducted with ex-combatants and focus groups discussions with a 
combination of predominantly ex-combatants and a mix of other groups.  
Overall 60 ex-combatants and 10 others (leaders/commanders) were 
interviewed, and 175 people participated in the focus group discussions in the 
identified locations of the research. The questionnaire was administered to ex-
combatants who had participated in the conflict and DDRR process in Liberia. 
The study included questions on basic biographical information, the 
individuals’ experience in the war (which faction they fought in, locations of 
fighting and rank for example), their participation in the DDRR programme, 
what they are currently doing for livelihood, their perception about the 
government and their former factional leaders, the perception about their re-
engagement in violence, and whether they feel a sense of re-marginalization., 
and how they think they can avoid being re-marginalized. Re-engaging in 
violence forms the key variable for this analysis.  
 
Analysis of fieldwork  
About 80% of all the respondent categories, ex-combatants and non-
combatants, including focus group participants expressed disappointment in 
the DDRR programme, particularly the reintegration component which failed 
to properly absorb them into the society and provide them with sustainable 
livelihood opportunities. Some respondents feel they are rejected by their 
communities and family members, while others expressed some degree of 
acceptance, but are still viewed as potential enemies. Further, 70% 
respondents (respected and known ex-combatants) still considered 
themselves as having control and influence over members of the ex-
combatant group in their locality. They hold the view that they are capable of 
mobilizing them for insurgency should the need arise. About 62% of the 
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respondents stated that clemency should be granted to all those that 
participated in the civil war as a means of healing the nation. They strongly 
believe that national peace and reconciliation can only be achieved if there is 
forgiveness but underline that ex-combatants need to be rewarded because 
they fought to liberate the country from the hands of greedy and vicious 
leaders. Some claimed that they were under-age when they were forcefully 
recruited against their will, and cannot be held liable for the atrocities 
committed during the war.  
On the other hand, 45% of the respondents expressed their regret for 
participating in the civil war. They strongly held the view that their involvement 
was a mistake, others felt disadvantaged and marginalized within the society 
and had to participate, yet many were victims of peer pressure as one of the 
driving forces behind their involvement. Only 15% of the respondents held the 
view that the establishment of a War Crime Court will be the best way to 
investigate those who committed war crimes, and that this will serve as 
deterrent to any individuals or groups that may want to destabilize the country 
in the future.  
The data revealed that ‘idleness’ and ‘unemployment’ have led to frustration 
of ex-combatants that frequently manifests in aggression and violence in 
different forms.  Liberia’s post-conflict policymakers appear not ready for or 
committed to tackling idleness and unemployment brought about by poor 
DDRR programmes, and insensitive that this has the potential to make ex-
combatants to pick up arms again. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 
 
Fig 12: Respondents and their factional groups 
 
Fig 13: Ex-combatants factional group and level of participation 
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Table 6: Main factional groups in the Liberia’s civil war 
 
 
 
 
 
NPFL 
 
 
 
 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
       
INPFL 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
 
ULIMO-J 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy 
 
ULIMO-K 
United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy 
 
LURD 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
LPC Liberia Peace Council 
AFL  Armed Forces of Liberia 
 
 
Fig 14: Ex-combatants seeking livelihood – “No work, no peace” 
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Fig 15: Ex-combatants who benefitted from reintegration display their 
carpentry skills. 
Figs 1 and 2 above show the percentage of respondents in their membership 
of the dominant factional groups in the Liberian civil war. There are other 
small but dangerous units that committed various war crimes and human 
rights violations, such as the Lofa Defense Force (LDF), the Small Boys Unit 
(SBU), and the notorious Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SATU), which was 
commanded by Charles Taylor’s son, “Chuckie” Taylor, who is serving a 
prison sentence of 97 years in the United States. The respondents from the 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) of Charles Taylor represent the 
highest number in the samples as well as in the country, with 33%, because 
of the use of child soldiers and forceful recruitment during the war. In addition, 
the membership of NPFL cuts-across the 16 ethnic groups of Liberia. The 
NPFL received external funding and support, notably from Libya, Burkina 
Faso, including blood diamond funding from Sierra Leone. Elements from the 
Liberian Armed Forces (AFL) make up 5% of the respondents. The AFL was 
politicized during the war and their participation compromised the neutrality of 
the force, and undermined their constitutional role of protecting the country 
from external aggression. Although the disarmament and demobilization 
programme was concluded eleven years ago, these factional groups are still 
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“active” and maintain their network. For instance, as explained elsewhere in 
this study, many of them were recruited as mercenaries to fight in Cote 
d’Ivoire following the 2010 post-election crisis, and they have continued to 
cause destabilization in the west of the country.  
Ex-combatants, Re-marginalization, and Violence: Identifying the Causal 
Mechanisms 
As stated previously, while the four dimensional factors in this research 
remain significant in how they interact to generate violence, I have focused 
specifically on advancing the marginalization factor because of its broad 
usage by participants in the research during interviews and focus group 
discussion. It also forms a representational factor to the other three 
independent variables. I note that political and economic violence falls in the 
context of analysis. I have posed the following questions: 
1. Are ex-combatants experiencing re-marginalization in post-war Liberia, and 
how do we know this? 
2. What are the political and economic sources for re-marginalization of ex-
combatants? 
3. Are re-marginalized ex-combatants likely to engage in violence? 
(Re-) marginalization can be understood as persistent inequality and adversity 
resulting from discrimination, social stigma and stereotypes (NDI 2016) 
Understanding the nature and depth of re-marginalization of ex-combatants is 
the first step towards combating it. This is aimed at seeking solutions towards 
reversing stigmatization, discrimination, exploitation and political exclusion of 
ex-combatants.  
The study found that ex-combatants are experiencing re-marginalization and 
this was made clear during the focus group discussion when many of the 
participants, speaking in agitated and rebellious tones stated why they feel 
marginalized: 
 People don’t want to know about us. 
 People don’t want us and the things that we do in our communities, 
sometime we take marijuana to cope with frustration and community 
members report us to the police. 
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 People don’t want to talk to us. 
 When we apply for jobs and they find out that we are ex-combatants, 
they don’t accept us, even when we are “qualified”. But we see 
ourselves as “war affected persons”. 
 Community members feel we are hostile. 
 But when it comes to politics, politicians will need our services to help 
fight opponents and when they win, they will forget us. 
 They said the Truth and Reconciliation is to forgive each other. But the 
war is over but they still have not forgiven us 
 Even in the communities where we live, the government wants to 
demolish the houses. The government said they are slums, but we 
have not been provided with alternative locations, just because they 
don’t want to see our presence again. 
 For those of us who operate pempe – commercial motorcycles- we are 
always being harassed by the police for not having licenses and not 
being registered, and they collect money from us always. 
The political and economic sources for the re-marginalization of ex-
combatants were identified through two approaches. The first corresponds to 
the concept of relative frustration as it was adumbrated by James Davis and 
Ted Gurr (1962), for whom violence is the result of a gap between 
expectations and the possibility of seeing them met. The second approach 
does not ignore the concept of frustration but lays special emphasis on the 
uprooting process which forms one of the spontaneous explanations of 
violence (ibid). In this perspective, the protagonists of violence are found 
among frustrated individuals perturbed by social change and more particularly 
by the clashes of modernity and tradition (Apter, 1997:303). Although the 
frustration theory was severely criticized by authors such as Charles Tilly 
(1978) who mainly reproached them with not taking into account the fact that 
political violence was instrumental by nature, that for the protagonists it 
constituted a way of achieving their objectives. And in their views (Utas, 
2005:144; and Njeru, 2010:29) reintegration failures lead frustrated ex-
combatants to threaten renewed violence. 
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 Ex-combatants identified multiples sources of their re-marginalization. 
First, they see themselves as being put at the edge, making them less 
important in a country where they feel and see themselves as “liberators” – 
meaning that their acceptance of ending the war has not been fully 
recognized. They feel excluded and their needs have been ignored, their 
opinion less recognized. Second, ex-combatants continue to experience the 
process of political and economic re-marginalization. Since the coming into 
power of President Sirleaf’s government, ex-combatants claim that they have 
been neglected and have no access to political decision making processes. 
Ex-combatant choice and preferred candidate to lead the country, Mr. George 
Weah lost the election twice, first as a presidential and second as a vice 
presidential candidate. As a result of this the hope of ex-combatants voices 
being heard and their participation in decision-making were dashed.  
 Ex-combatants also report a sense economic re-marginalization 
derived from the lack of political representation. Their interests were never 
taken into consideration in the national budget appropriation and spending, 
while the employment of this group never became an issue of national 
concern to the government. They were not given economic assistance to 
reintegrate, and because of the absence of a national programme to 
reintegrate ex-combatants, they rely on self-employment such as commercial 
motorcyclists. Ex-combatants are also dismayed over rampant corruption at 
all levels of the government which is another way of re-marginalizing them 
economically. The economic re-marginalization of ex-combatants has induced 
poverty within their community. Poverty and re-marginalization have led to 
deficits in their livelihoods, education, health and access to other basic 
services, and these deficits are in turn often connected to their exclusion from 
political decision-making as mentioned earlier. Perhaps the views expressed 
by ex-combatants that most clearly articulate the link between the four 
explanatory factors was when they stated that they will resist any attempt to 
make them suffer in a country where everybody has equal rights. The lack of 
security is also of concern to ex-combatants. They feel intimidated, harassed 
and brutalized by state security officials in their communities. Some of them 
complained about the maltreatment their members receive at the hands of 
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security forces when they are arrested and thrown into prisons, just for 
protesting against the policies of the government. 
 Participants allege that when they protest to demand their rights and 
benefits, particularly those related to their reintegration, the state views this as 
unrealistic demands coming from criminal elements, and this serves as a 
source of the economic neglect. For the participants, economic security is the 
basis for their survival, and in this regard, they can only continue to seek 
means of resisting attempts to make them economically insecure. The violent 
reaction of ex-combatants to the quarantine measures in the West Point 
Community during the Ebola crisis which denied them access to food and 
water appears to be one of the many ways they hope to respond to their 
conditions of economic insecurity. The participants also expressed 
displeasure with the re-criminalization, and indicated a feeling of helplessness 
due to their vulnerability and lack of political and economic power, but also 
reassured themselves of continuing “fight’ against those elements that re-
criminalize them. 
The question whether ex-combatants are likely to engage in violence in 
the light of their re-marginalization did not receive explicit and direct 
affirmation. However, outspoken ex-combatants indicated to me that the use 
of violence is not their exclusive preserve, and that any group can engage in 
violence. They cited the examples of ex-members of the Armed Forces of 
Liberia who have often carried out violent protests to demand the payment of 
their severance benefits, In spite of their non-committal stance, documented 
actions of ex-combatants point to the fact that their continued subjection to the 
four explanatory factors inevitably leads them to acts of violence. This is 
further demonstrated in the actions of one of the important but high risk 
segment of ex-combatants – the commercial motorcyclists. 
They are important in the sense of providing cheaper means of public 
transportation to the poor in the society. But highly risky in some of their 
actions which are further explained below. During the research, ten ex-
combatants–turned –commercial motorcyclists were interviewed. They belong 
to the umbrella body called the Liberia Motorcyclist Taxi Union (LMTU), a 
well-organized group with a strong network. Commercial motorcyclists are 
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known to be one of the sources of violence, particularly mob violence, against 
members of the public and security personnel, usually in defence of their 
members and actions. For politicians, members of the motorcyclist union are 
easy recruits to provide support for political activities during elections, some of 
which have turned violent. Of particular challenge to the state is the mob 
dimension of their activities. The membership of the LMTU in Montserrado 
County (Monrovia), the location of the research, is between 12,000 and 
15,000 (LMTU 2015). When I asked about the dominance of ex-combatants 
within the LMTU, its Chairman was a bit reluctant to provide details. However, 
he acknowledged the existence of ex-combatants within the Union but noted 
that it was difficult to give the exact number. He feels that the ex-combatants 
among them probably give the Union bad reputation because of their 
occasional resort to violence when they feel aggrieved, particularly over the ill-
treatment meted out on them by security forces  
There is a growing concern amongst the majority of Liberians and 
members of the international community over increasing mob violence 
incidents in Liberia. For instance, the Liberian National Police (LNP) statistics 
indicate that between January and September 2013, incidents of mob 
violence increased by over 40% compared to the same period the previous 
year (UNMIL-JMAC Report, 2014). Mob violence typically causes 
considerable bodily harm to victims, and incidents appear to be escalating in 
terms of level of violence, which are increasingly leading to deaths of victims 
and/or to mobs turning against security agents who try to restore order. This is 
particularly concerning given the scheduled UNMIL troop reductions 
associated with the transition; typically, national agencies lack the capacity to 
deal with these issues and it is becoming increasingly difficult for UNMIL to 
respond in support of the Government as its military presence thins across the 
country. For instance, at the start of the UN Mission in 2003, its military 
strength was 15,000 troops deployed throughout Liberia (UNSC 2003) As of 
August 2015, it has 3,779 military personnel. But the UN Police has increased 
from its initial number of 1,115 in 2003 to 1,383 personnel as at August 2015, 
to support the national police in the maintenance of law and order throughout 
Liberia. Ultimately, as the UN continues its draw down, the number of its 
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police will reduce. On 22 September 2013, a serious mob violence incident 
involved over 300 motorcyclists in the city of Gbarnga, Bong County, about 
195 kilometres from Monrovia. The city was the headquarters of Charles 
Taylor’s National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) rebel group, where over 
twelve thousand ex-combatants live, many are self-employed as commercial 
motorcyclists. That year, I travelled to Gbarnga, on an assessment mission; I 
interviewed an ex-combatant leader who informed me that although the 
government documented twelve thousand as the official number of ex-
combatants in that county, there are actually over twenty thousand, and many 
remain unemployed. The Gbarnga violent incident occurred because 
motorcyclists were demanding the release of their colleague, who was 
suspected as a thief, from Liberian National Police (LNP) custody. After the 
LNP refused to release the suspect, the crowd, armed with cutlasses, axes 
and other metal weapons pillaged the town, destroyed shanty homes, and 
“terrorized” the population. One person was killed and many others sustained 
injuries. Furthermore, these hostile actions are frequently turned against 
intervening security forces, including UN personnel when the target of the 
mob justice is taken into custody for safety (The Analyst 2013). In February 
2012, Liberia’s Inspector-General of Police warned motorcyclists to avoid 
being used by criminal elements to “terrorize” peaceful citizens (UN Report, 
2012). He made the statement against the backdrop of complaints received 
from communities that commercial motorcyclists connive with criminal 
elements to break into homes and in the process harm their victims. In my 
comparative assessment (UN Report) of the operations of commercial 
motorcyclists in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Cote d’Ivoire, and Nigeria, I 
found that Liberian ex-combatants-turned motorcyclists are more disposed to 
engage in violence. This could probably be linked to the fact that most of them 
had participated in the war, but those in Sierra Leone who also went through 
war, do not display such high levels of violence.  
This is what two ex-combatant motorcyclists said during an interview: First 
respondent-  
“We have been neglected and rejected by the government 
because we fought in the war. The money given by the 
international community (US and London) was shared by our 
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leaders. No reintegration. We struggled and bought 
motorcycles to work and feed our family, now the police is after 
us, arresting us and taking bribe from us, claiming we violated 
traffic regulations. We will not allow them, we will fight back. I 
said this, my name is Zikky.”  
The second respondent was more agitated:  
“UN will leave Liberia and we will deal with all the leaders who 
have put us in this condition. Remember how former President 
Samuel Doe publicly executed 13 Ministers in 1980. This is what 
will happen to some of them.”  
 
Yet, other respondents simply commented:  
“Please UN should tell the police and the government to stop 
harassing us, and leave us alone so that we can do our 
business and send our children to school. We are not 
politicians and we don’t want positions in the government. But 
we support politicians who fight for our interest.”  
When asked about his views on the DDRR in Liberia, an ex-combatant 
student informant stated: 
“I wasted my entire youth life fighting for this country and after 
myself and other gallant fighters succeeded in removing greedy 
dictators; more vicious dictators have emerged, favouring family 
members, friends, and the elite group, snatching out money 
abroad. Those who presided over the DDRR squandered the 
huge money contributed by the international community. I 
remember that several donor conferences were held abroad to 
raise funds for Liberia’s reintegration process, but the money 
went into private pockets. We will continue to use all means in 
our disposal within the platform of the student’s body to 
advocate for the emancipation of ex-combatants who fought for 
the country, and one day all of them in government will pay the 
price of their actions” 
This was one of my students who could not hide his feelings about the state of 
affairs in the country and how the DDRR programme re-marginalized ex-
combatants and made them worthless within their communities. His education 
is being funded by an International NGO which he did not disclose, but he is 
equally concerned that at the completion of his Master’s Degree studies, at 
which time he will be 55 years old, he is not likely to get a job. He has fears 
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that his four children might not get education. When asked what he meant by 
the “use of all means” he resorted,” “Sir, you know we have been trained in 
that act and we will still do it, even though we are getting old, our younger 
fighters are still around”.  
In my interaction with various actors I have identified the following factors to 
be responsible for the occurrence mob-related violence:  
- Dissatisfaction with law enforcement’s inability to provide proper security to 
community members against criminal elements, while ex-combatants hold the 
view that, as agents of the state, security personnel are their greatest 
enemies who continue to harass and prevent them from achieving their goals. 
- Dissatisfaction over persistent harassment and extortion of money from ex-
combatant commercial motorcyclists by the police,  
- Frustration with an ineffective justice system, linked to an inability to 
consistently prosecute and imprison known community criminals, e.g. Isaac 
Chegbo (aka Bob Marley) and Augustine Vlayee (aka Bush Dog), etc.. 
- A growing class divide, lack of progress and deplorable living conditions, 
making the less fortunate desperate and violent,  
- Community practice, inappropriately labelled “jungle justice” such as through 
the “Sassawood” – the local administration of poisonous local liquid to 
individuals (by drinking) who are suspected to have committed serious 
offence.  
- A volatile society, where violence runs close to the surface and explodes 
during such incidents,  
- Possible post conflict trauma, leading to rapid escalation of violence.  
Table 7: below shows some incidents of mob violence that are linked to the 
ex-combatant commercial motorcyclists who operate within Montserrado 
County (Monrovia). These types of mob violence occur throughout the country 
where motorcyclists operate, particularly in areas where there is less 
presence of security personnel. 
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Table 7:  Some incidents of mob violence linked to motorcyclists. 
 Date Location Description of Incidence Action/Outcome 
1 10 Jan 
2013 
Monrovia, 
Montserrado 
County 
20 commercial motorcyclists 
assaulted a man for attempting 
to steal a car battery on Randall 
Street. 
Victim was injured. No 
arrests were made 
2 18 May Monrovia, 
Montserrado 
County. 
Two men attempted to rob a 
commercial motorcyclist, the 
motorcyclist held on to one of 
the men and an angry crowd 
responded in Brewersville City. 
The victim was killed. 
3 20 May Monrovia, 
Montserrado 
County. 
A UN vehicle was involved in a 
road accident on Somalia drive 
which led to the death of a 
commercial motorcyclist. About 
100 angry members gathered 
and threatened to destroy the 
UN vehicle and harm the driver. 
Reinforcement of 
security stopped their 
action. No harm was 
done. 
4 18 Jun Monrovia, 
Montserrado 
County. 
A commercial motorcyclist and 
two passengers were assaulted 
by a mob after one of the 
passengers was accused of 
theft. 
Victims sustained 
injuries. No arrests 
were made. 
5 13 Sep Monrovia, 
Montserrado 
County. 
A man riding a motorcycle was 
beaten in Gardnersville City by 
a crowd for stealing a laptop 
computer. 
Victim was injured. No 
arrests were made. 
6 13 Sep Monrovia, 
Montserrado 
County. 
A man riding a motorcycle was 
beaten in Gardnersville City by 
a crowd for stealing a laptop 
computer. 
Victim was injured. No 
arrests were made. 
7 20 Sep Gbarnga, 
Bong 
County. 
Following an assault on a 
commercial motorcyclist by 
some military officers, a mob of 
some 200 motorcyclists went on 
a rampage destroying several 
properties. 
The police arrested 
four individuals for 
rioting, one was 
beaten to death, and 
two others sustained 
severe injuries.  
8 16 April 
2015 
Paynesville 
City, 
Montserrado 
County 
A commercial motorcyclist was 
shot and killed by police due to 
the violation of a traffic 
regulation. Over 150 
motorcyclists staged a violent 
protest that led to the closure of 
They destroyed five 
sub-police stations 
and burnt one. They 
also freed several 
criminals detained at 
the stations. The 
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many businesses, and caused 
insecurity to the population.  
Police arrested 30 
motorcyclists involved 
in the incident. 
9 20 April Rehab 
Community, 
Montserrado 
County 
Unspecified number of 
commercial motorcyclists 
engaged in violent protest to 
demand the release of their 
members detained by the 
police, and the restrictions 
placed on their operations.   
They blocked the main 
junctions to the 
International Airport, 
just few kilometres 
from the residence of 
the Vice President of 
Liberia 
10 21 April Iron Gate, 
Lower 
Virginia, 
Montserrado 
County 
Several commercial 
motorcyclists protested against 
the arrest and detention of one 
of their colleagues who later 
died from injuries he sustained 
from the hands of the police. He 
was arrested by police on 
allegation that he stole 
motorcycle.  
A crowd made up 
largely of commercial 
motorcyclists 
threatened to burn 
down the police 
station. A member of 
parliament intervened 
to calm the angry 
crowd, and promised 
them that justice will 
be done. 
Source: Documented records ‘data collected in my official role’ 
During his statement to the parliament on the activities of motorcyclists on 
April 22, 2015, the Liberian Minister of Justice, Benedict Sannoh, referred to 
commercial motorcyclists as another group of ‘warring factions’ who can 
easily be mobilized. In my view, this description by the Minister is 
inappropriate because, as I stated earlier, some of the motorcyclists may have 
been combatants, but they are no longer “warring factions” because they have 
gone through the process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
into civilian life. However, they could be referred to angrily as “warring 
factions” due to their violent behaviours and conducts reminiscent of warring 
factions in the war years. Although, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
used the phrase “warring parties” to describe those who were involved in the 
war, in some instances too, “warring factions” is dominantly used locally in 
post-war Liberia to describe a rebellious group. Public criticisms of the 
Minister’s comments have been profound: for instance, a civil society and 
human rights activist, who was also a former Minister of Public Works, 
through the electronic media, deplored the statement by the Minister, while 
the New Democrat Newspaper (June 2015:9) described the statement as the 
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inability of the government to deliver justice to motorcyclists and their families 
who have been injured and murdered at the hands of brutal police officers. 
Another group referred to government officials as the main “warring factions”, 
whom have become vampires, killing the national economy through 
uncontrolled stealing of money without being prosecuted (ibid). 
These groups of motorcyclists fall under the category of vulnerable 
self-employed population which the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-
Information Services (LISGIS) put at 75%. Some of the motorcyclists are, 
nevertheless, college students, and graduates seeking self-employment 
because their elected officials and the government have not delivered 
economic and social services. Motorcyclist respondents who are former 
combatants argue that taking up the job as a commercial motorcyclist is a 
self-reintegration measure in the absence of government support. 
Some of the respondents informed me of how they were recruited as 
mercenaries to fight in the post-election Ivoirian civil war. That country 
continued to face several attacks on its western borders with Liberia 
spearheaded by Liberian ex-combatants. For instance, on 16 May 2015, three 
known ex-combatants at command positions were arrested by the Liberian 
National Police (LNP) in Fish Town for allegedly recruiting ex-fighters in 
Wlebo District, River Gee County, to engage in cross-border attacks in Côte 
d'Ivoire. The suspects included Powell Solo, a.k.a. “General Power”; Dennis 
Slayah, a.k.a. “Charles Ble Goude”; Augustine Vleyee, a.k.a. “Bush Dog”, all 
of whom belonged to the defunct factional group, Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia (MODEL). In statements to the LNP, the suspects confirmed that they 
had met with ex-fighters, but claimed that they were running an agreed 
“covert” operation for the National Security Agency (NSA) on Liberia’s border 
with Côte d'Ivoire in the southeast, aimed at discouraging former combatants 
from engaging in the Ivorian conflict, rather than to recruit them for mercenary 
activity (New Dawn Newspaper, May 2015). The NSA denied the claim of the 
suspects (NSA 2015). 
Another previous mercenary activity involving one of the arrested ex-
combatants reveals the likely awareness by the government of their activities. 
In April 2011, Augustine Vleyee (Bush Dog) was arrested by the Liberian 
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authorities. He was in a command position with mercenary and militia forces 
implicated in atrocities in and around the Ivorian town of Bloléquin. After his 
arrest, Vleyee was released because the investigation was alleged to have 
been “hampered by a lack of proper evidence and contradictory statements by 
officials of government” (The Analyst et.al 2011). 
The salience of these incidences is that the government is aware of the 
activities of influential rebel commanders. They may indeed even be receiving 
financial incentives from the regime in order to discourage and prevent the 
lower–level ex-combatants from engaging in acts of internal or sub-regional 
destabilization. For instance, during my interaction with some influential rebel 
commanders who are not in government, they disclosed receiving some 
financial support from their colleagues/leaders in the government so that they 
can maintain the peace and to discourage the lower-level ex-combatants from 
fomenting trouble. In the same vein, my discussion with former rebel leaders 
in government confirms that, indeed, they provide financial support those ex-
combatants who have no jobs, as they (ex-combatants) continuously threaten 
to derail the peace in Liberia. In other words, the militant value of these ex-
combatants, especially their knowledge of the location of arms caches, and 
ability to foment trouble through militia activities, placed them in an 
advantageous negotiating position. The claim that they are working for the 
NSA, could also provide an insight into how former fighters are being utilized 
by the state in support of the security information network. On another note, 
these former fighters could also provide their services to the highest bidder, a 
“double agent” approach to earn a living.  
From my interviews and discussions, it appears there is still some level 
of command/control, and networks of rebel leaders and ex-combatants. This 
prevailing atmosphere makes it easy for quick mobilization of ex-combatants 
by their leaders for any activity. Some of them disclosed to me that they are 
sources of “foot soldiers” for their leaders, politicians, particularly during 
elections, and for politically motivated protests and demonstrations directed at 
the government.  This appears to conform to the comments of one of their 
leaders in a media interview. The former leader of the rebel group – Liberia 
United for Reconciliation and Development (LURD) – Danmate Conneh, 
stated this about his former fighters/ex-combatants:  
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"They are ready," "If I were a troublemaker, we would have 
trouble here every day because, as combatants who are ready 
for trouble, they talk to me every day," "They don't have money 
and they are frustrated. They can do anything. I tell them no, we 
can't do that now; we need peace in this country. "There are a 
lot of people who, as combatants, there are no jobs for them, no 
programmes for them. Everybody is abandoned," people have 
suffered in this country a lot.” (Conneh 2014) 
 
The comments by Conneh come at the time the UN mission is drawing down, 
preparatory to exit from Liberia. Many Liberians have expressed fears that 
with the prevailing threats of violence in the country, UNMIL withdrawal may 
leave a security vacuum that could be exploited by defunct rebel groups such 
as the LURD to plunge the country into another civil war. The statement by 
Danmate Conneh is also an indication of the growing discontent among ex-
combatants. Deep psychological and physical scars persist after the civil wars 
that ran from 1989 to 2003 and claimed a quarter of a million lives. Numerous 
rebel factions raped, maimed and killed civilians, some made use of drugged 
child soldiers, and deep ethnic rivalries and bitterness remain across the 
country of about 4.5 million.  
During an interview with a rebel leader who is serving in government 
and was indicted by the Truth and Reconciliation Report (TRC) for 
prosecution, he informed me that “if anybody tries to arrest him, he will resist it 
by all means through the support of his former combatants”, thus 
underscoring the continuing violent nature of ex-combatants. He did not 
elaborate more when I inquired about the nature of resistance. Although the 
war in Liberia has ended, the country still remains extremely fragile given the 
presence of key rebel leaders who serve in the government, and who still 
enjoy the loyalty and support of their former fighters, and have the capacity to 
mobilize them when faced with imminent danger. This finding concurs with 
Soderberg-Kovac (2008:141) who argued that the emergence of rebels as 
new-born democracies in post-war politics gives rise to a number of 
challenges for both democratic progress and sustainable peace.  
During the focus group, the key participants were ex-combatants. 
However, I created an atmosphere where other informants could also provide 
useful information for the research. In the light of this, non-ex-combatants (as 
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indicated in the methodology) also participated and this combination provided 
different interesting perspectives that enriched the data. In some instances, 
heated arguments ensued between ex-combatants and non-combatants, at 
which point I intervened and discussions continued in a calm atmosphere.  
 
Table 8:  Focus group codes placed in five categories 
Number in 
focus group 
Number of 
codes 
Respondent codes Categories  
          
         
       35 
 
          
       5 
 
We were organized (10) 
No skills for job (7)    
Fear/uncertainty/mistrust (4) 
Forgotten/abandoned (9)     
Difficult conditions (4)   
 
 
Conditions 
 
         
 
 
       36 
 
 
 
        6 
    
 
Working together (10)    
Positive attitude (2)   
Non-violence (2)  
Learning a skill (4)  
Reached out to ourselves (8) 
Used our knowledge from the 
war (10)   
 
 
 
 
Strategies 
 
        
           
 
        35 
 
          
 
         8 
 
Receives help from people (2) 
Employment still a problem (4)   
Stigmatization continues (6) 
We’re in charge of our future 
(3)  Engages in political 
struggle (4)   Feel betrayed, let 
down (3)  Violence continues, 
just a different type (10)  
Don’t rely on the state (4)   
 
 
 
Consequenc
es 
 
          
 
         
        36 
 
 
 
          6 
 
Poor leadership/representation 
(9) 
Repression by state security 
(5) Failure to address the 
causes of conflict (6) 
Corruption remain high (4) 
Nepotism/Cronyism in 
governance (6) 
 
 
 
Perception 
of the States 
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No plans for ex-combatants 
and their families (6) 
          
 
         
        
         33 
 
 
  
 
5 
 
Stay united (7)  
Adopt any means for survival 
(10) Work with other ex-
combatants in the region (5) 
Ready to fight again if the 
need arises (8)  
Apathy, cynicism (3)   
 
 
Reactions/R
esponses 
 
Total 
participants: 
175 
    
 
In table 8 above, a total of 175 people participated in the focus groups in the 
five sites. In the coding, I conducted a category analysis in which I created 
five categories. During the focus group discussion, some participants narrated 
their war experiences and the challenges that post-war presented. Statements 
by participants within the five research sites presented complex and broader 
narratives which need to be simplified in categories. For instance, when 
participants state that “in post-war Liberia, peoples’ living conditions have not 
improved, it only made us worse-off, and more determined to fight for our 
rights at all cost”, this presents a worrisome picture. Therefore, in order to 
capture the wider range of issues and challenges of the discussions, I created 
five categories based on recurring themes which brought the data together in 
a meaningful and coherent relationship. 
The categories are: 
i. Conditions,  
ii. Strategies,  
iii. Consequences,  
iv. Perception of the State,  
v. Reactions/responses.  
First, Conditions, which is in 5 codes, describes the current state of affairs of 
ex-combatants, and their feelings of vulnerability as they entered into civilian 
life. The ex-combatants had nothing, coming out of war, losing their weapons 
in the disarmament process and receiving a meagre Transitional Safety 
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Allowance (TSA) of $300 each person for surrendering ten guns and without 
sustainable reintegration. They did not have the experience to engage in 
negotiating the reintegration process, and they felt judged, forgotten and 
abandoned. Ex-combatants therefore remain in the official category of 
vulnerable. Second, the Strategies category describes the participants’ 
perceptions of working hard, connecting with each other, learning a skill, and 
continuing with the ideological struggle. Third, the Consequences category is 
probably the largest obstacle facing ex-combatants. Many comments reflected 
a sense of disappointment with the lack of change, economically and socially, 
within the larger Liberian society: lack of employment, lack of support, 
continued stigmatization of ex-combatants which is linked to a bleak future for 
them and their families, and the inevitability of the continuation of violence.  
Fourth is the Perception category. There is a perception among 
respondents that the state has failed because it did not deliver the promised 
reintegration to ex-combatants, even with huge international support to the 
government in the post-war era. Though there was poverty before, now there 
is extreme poverty. The number of people living in poverty has increased. The 
group noted that corruption and nepotism are deeply entrenched in the 
government, and that this condition could create an atmosphere for future 
crisis in Liberia. Finally, the Reactions/responses category ranges from being 
united to adopting various means in order to ensure their survival. Further 
probing to seek explanation on the notion of “various means”, produced more 
disturbing comments from an ex-combatant, who prefers to be called “Risky 
Commander”, when he stated:  
“You will know what we mean when the United Nations leaves 
the country, and if this nonsense continues we will go back to 
the bush and teach these leaders lessons. My good friend from 
Nigeria (referring to me) anywhere you are, you will hear the 
news, and if you decide to come back, we will tell you more 
stories.”  
It is also pertinent to know that there is solidarity with ex-combatants from 
countries within the region. The notion of solidarity is based on participants’ 
views that they were fighting/fought for the same cause and anything that 
affects one person affects others. It will be recalled that during the post-
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election crisis in Cote d’Ivoire, Liberian ex-combatants were activated through 
their leaders to support various factions that fought on the side of President 
Alhassan Outtarra and former President Laurent Gbagbo. Some of the 
comments by respondents are not surprising and apparently grew out of their 
disappointment and frustration with the peace accords process and its 
implementation by the state and the international community. Specifically, 
there was distrust about the promises that were not delivered.  
Female ex-fighters found sections of society unyielding. Seven out of 
the ten female’s ex-combatants that participated in the focus group discussion 
reported that they faced reintegration constraints by virtue of society’s 
misperception that they played unwomanly war roles, and because they were 
despised as being too independent, rough, ill-educated and unfeminine to be 
good wives. Most female ex-combatants who returned with fatherless children 
were disowned by their own families and lived as misfits seeking solace in 
drug and alcohol abuse, as government did not offer them specific assistance 
(Sadomba and Dzinesa 2004). Another area that was of great concern, and 
discussed extensively during the focus group session was the link between 
ex-combatants, rape, and HIV/AIDS transmission. The greatest risk of 
HIV/AIDS may occur in a post conflict phase, as returning ex-combatants who 
have been reintegrated into the society are likely be carriers of the virus 
because of their sexual life style during the war including rape and, in Liberia, 
the level of infection remains high. Another dimension to the risk posed by 
HIV/AIDS in post war era, relates to the role of peacekeepers in sexual 
exploitation and abuse of the local population in exchange for favours or 
money. Reports of sexual exploitation in some UN missions are well 
documented, e.g., in Congo DRC, Haiti, Central Africa Republic etc. This is 
why the United Nations has continued to emphasize and implement zero 
tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse within its peacekeeping 
missions world-wide. 
Discussions during the focus groups also focused on disabled ex-
combatants, many of who have turned street beggars, recruits for politicians 
to disrupt electoral activities, and those who engage in drug selling and 
consumption. Equally, many have engaged in sporting activities such as 
soccer and have become members of the Liberia Sport Association. Through 
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this means, they are paid a monthly stipend for their livelihood. There were no 
long-term specific provisions for the reintegration of physically disabled ex-
fighters with specific needs. A National Rehabilitation Centre established for 
ex-combatants lacked a coherent plan and has since remained in limbo.  
At a more familial level, there were cases where families and returned 
disabled combatants both found it difficult to cope with the new situation. 
Disabled ex-combatants, who were disillusioned at the lack of community 
acceptance and were angry, resorted to anti-social and violent behaviour that 
led to anti-ex-combatant sentiments. Disabled ex-combatants sometimes 
engage in protests such as road blocks to raise attention to their specific 
needs, and this frequently raise a red flag. Being unemployed and disabled 
meant that the frustrated former combatants were vulnerable to taking 
recourse in antisocial behaviour. The absence of community-based 
reintegration decreases the communities’ absorptive capacity thereby creating 
potential for violence.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented data obtained during the fieldwork, from 
interviews conducted and focus groups discussions, along with observations 
and data collected in my official capacity. I have also provided broader 
analysis of situations to support my data. In my finding, I concluded that ex-
combatants are dissatisfied with their conditions and no longer want 
palliatives of token cash, bags of rice, and empty promises from the 
government of a better future. The study found out that ex-combatants want 
the benefits of reintegration (sustainable employment); democratic dividend 
(inclusion and participation in the political process); economic security (better 
living conditions); and safety and security (absence of brutality by the agents 
of the state). Discussion in the final chapter of the thesis undertakes further 
analysis and conclusions. 
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Chapter Seven:  
Conclusions and Thesis Output 
 
Introduction 
On 25 June 2016, I visited the West Point community to see the participants 
in this study and to find out if there has been any change in their lives and 
perceptions about them since I last interviewed there in 2012-2013. I met one 
of the key respondents who was happy to see me again. He sat in a “pool 
betting” office with others smoking marijuana. I indicated to him that I was not 
comfortable sitting there, and he took me to a small hut with leaking roof and 
the floor was water-logged, as this turned out to be his house. I asked: tell me 
my friend, how have you been, have things changed for better since my last 
visit here about three years ago?  He responded: 
 “Oh, you can see yourself the condition we are living here, we 
have been completely forgotten by the government. The entire 
community is flooded as a result of the rainy season. We are 
frustrated and I tell you even though some of us are getting old 
and may be tired to fight war again, the same reasons that led 
us to fight are still there. We will support our younger ones to 
fight if things do not change to see our economic conditions 
better and send our children to school. We are marginalized 
more than ever” (Boley 2016). 
 
The above statement indicates the contusing challenges faced by the society 
when ex-combatants are not successfully reintegrated. Distrust towards ex-
combatants by other members of the society continue to exist, and the ex-
combatants knows this and therefore responds to the society’s rejection 
through violence means. The chapter is primarily concerned with crystallizing 
the links between the four dimensional analytical framework in order to 
effectively present answer to the research question.  
It further presents a summary and main findings of the study. The 
analysis shows that the reintegration component of the DDRR programme did 
not have any significant impact on ex-combatants. While it is likely that the 
programme, even though with a short-lived training, may have helped some 
participants in finding jobs, those jobs were not particularly sustainable. With 
limited employment or no opportunities, participants are rendered vulnerable. 
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While it is not politically feasible to get jobs for all Liberian ex-combatants, 
participants in the focus group study alleged a complete re- marginalization of 
ex-combatants by the political elites. They argued that no percentage of the 
ex-combatant community benefits from the government employment 
schemes, rather beneficiaries are friends and relatives of politicians and the 
political class.  Muggah (2009: 1–29) suggests that the DDRR approach 
needs to be reconsidered in the light of failures to deliver real results to the 
participants. It is therefore appropriate to state that in Liberia, the DDRR may 
have failed to produce better economic outcomes for the participants.  
Ex-combatants remain a challenge to post-war Liberia, and despite the 
threat they pose to the nascent democracy, peacebuilding efforts have thus 
far been unable to offer better livelihood opportunities for ex-combatants. 
Thus this study has attempted to fill the gaps in understanding of the roles 
and ambitions of ex-combatants in post war Liberia by responding to the 
research question: What are the perceptions among ex-combatants about 
their re-engagement in violence in post-war Liberia? The study has sought to 
arrive at a theory that explains how the four dimensional factors interact, and 
how response to these factors, lead ex-combatants to re-engage in violence. 
This was done through face-to-face interviews, focus groups study, and being 
a participant observer, interacting and studying the participants for over ten 
years. While the findings in this study will engage the academic community 
towards further research in this field, it will also be beneficial to policy-makers. 
 
Summary of major findings 
The study has made a contribution to the literature on DDRR by explaining 
the inefficient and ineffective DDRR initiative in Liberia and how this led to the 
unemployment of many ex-combatants. This situation has posed threats in 
undermining the national security. In the light of this, ex-combatants have 
formed the bulk of criminal elements in Liberia, and been available for 
recruitment as thugs by the political class during elections and as mercenaries 
to fight in neighbouring countries as exemplified in the war in Cote d’Ivoire in 
2010-2011. The study also shows that most of the respondents are yet to be 
fully accepted and reintegrated into their communities. Some of them alleged 
that they are still being discriminated against by community members. The 
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short time frame of the reintegration process, the lack of commitment and 
transparency in the programme, donor fatigue and dwindling political will at 
national and international levels, all combined to cause a failure of the 
reintegration programme in Liberia. Indeed, ex-combatants criticized the 
securitized conception of reintegration as ‘time–buying’, just as critiques of 
reintegration call into question the track-record of neoliberal, macroeconomic 
interventions to deliver real benefits to individuals in war-affected 
communities. As Porto et.al (2007) argued, the lived experience of 
reintegration from the point of view of ex-combatants remains ‘fundamentally 
unexamined’ in policy and academic literature. 
Through the adoption of the four explanatory factors of re-
marginalization, re-criminalization, exploitation and economic insecurity, the 
study constructed a theory that explains why ex-combatants in Liberia re-
engage in violence. First, it contends that ex-combatants suffer from political 
exclusion and lack of representation. This occurs despite the roles they play in 
support of political leaders to win elections. The Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement provided for the participation of former factional groups and their 
members in politics, and to occupy political positions. However, the low 
ranking majority of ex-combatants were excluded and re-marginalized.  
Because ex-combatants have no resources they generally do not aspire to 
political positions, but only provide support through political campaigns and 
offering their votes to candidates of their choice who are then expected to 
seek for their wellbeing once in power. Secondly, ex-combatants face re-
criminalization through their recruitment as mercenaries, and the push to 
engage in crimes such as drugs consumption and trafficking. Thirdly, ex-
combatants face exploitation through unfavourable wage labour and service 
delivery. Finally, they suffer from hunger, poverty, and lack of economic 
resources. Ex-combatants lack personal security for themselves and their 
families, and are harassed and brutalized by state security. This has elicited 
reciprocal revenge by ex-combatants which manifests in violent undertakings 
targeting the state and sometimes community members who may have 
served as informants to state security.  
Over ten rebel factions participated in the Liberian conflict, each 
expressing a different ideology. This state of affairs made the war to be 
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protracted and it lasted for fourteen years. Each rebel faction claimed 
superiority over the others, and the killing of fighters and the civilian 
population took the same pattern. The study found that in post-war Liberia, 
ex-combatants have not only demonstrated unity of purpose, but have also 
professed a common ideology, that is, a struggle for political and economic 
emancipation no matter the location where they may find themselves. For 
instance, ex-combatants who were able to enrol in the University through 
family and charity support, refer to themselves as political and economic 
”freedom fighters”. Also within the University, another group made of ex-
combatants call themselves “intellectual militants”. When they are ready to 
confront state security, they usually appear in unique uniform (Khaki and 
red/black beret), and this is said to reflect their militant and organizational 
character. In my personal observations in the University and other locations 
with concentration of ex-combatants, they exhibit the same character of 
aggressiveness which makes them easy to identify. Although, someone who 
has not lived in the society for a longer time will assume they are just group of 
people who just expressing political and economic opinion. 
The study makes another contribution by showing how ex-combatants 
have become a vibrant social movement in the absence of credible opposition 
groups to challenge the state in the fight against political, economic and social 
exclusion and re-marginalization. In other words, ex-combatants have 
epitomized social struggle in Liberia as increasing numbers have rejected 
rural life, flocked into the urban areas for employment, and the agitation for 
increased political rights and participation (Bolten, 2012). Ex-combatants 
continue to aspire to recognition and to overcome their war-time history, to be 
seen no longer as fighters but as members of the civilian community. The 
research found that the systematic application of the four dimensional factors 
by the state against ex-combatant communities potentially led to their 
radicalization. This has reinforced group identity and ultimately led to criminal 
networks, which, as indicated previously in the study, involve senior police 
officials who supply criminal elements with weapons which they use for the 
perpetration of crimes and other violent activities.   
The research inquiry reveals how ex-combatants’ intentions were 
suppressed through the “purchase of their violence” often mediated through 
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the brokerage system by their former leaders and commanders. The study 
also shows how ex-combatants continue to reject re-marginalization because 
they fought in the war. In my interview and interaction with some of the ex-
combatants, rather than seeing themselves as rigidly ex-combatants, in some 
instances they want to be referred to as “war affected”  This concurs with 
Shepler’s  (2005:197) adoption of the “discourse of abdicated responsibility” 
namely that because they were under age for much of the war, they were not 
responsible for their actions.  
Through the adoption of the re-criminalizing factor, the study established the 
phenomenon of recruitable and migratory ex-combatants. Hundreds of 
unintegrated and unemployed ex-combatants became readily available for 
recruitment in insurgency and civil wars in neighbouring countries such as in 
Cote d’Ivoire, while some migrated as far as Mali engage in the war for 
financial gains. At the local level, ex-combatants are recruited and financially 
motivated by opposition politicians to participate in violent protest against 
alleged unfavourable policies of the government. In addition, they may be 
recruited to carry out ritualistic killings, which are widespread in Liberia. For 
instance, on 30 September 2015, violent protest erupted in the city of Ganta, 
Nimba County, after a commercial motorcyclist was killed for ritual purposes. 
This followed a wave of ritualistic killings that had occurred in the area in the 
same year. Although there was no hard evidence to prove that the 
perpetrators were ex-combatants, community members alleged that it only 
them that have the experience and skills to embark on such acts, in addition 
to their link with the sponsors of the killings. The sponsor of the Ganta killing, 
a known local businessman, Prince Howard, was arrested. The incident led to 
the destruction of several properties, including the vandalization of a police 
post, release of prisoners, and the death of two persons during the violent 
protest.  Whereas ex-combatants gain the opportunity to engage in violence 
when domestic and regional elites (entrepreneurs of violence) recruit them for 
personal political and economic interests, ex-combatants go against these 
elites when there is a perception that they are being exploited (Daily 
Observer, 2015). 
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The study has also built on existing theory by highlighting the persistent 
challenges to the neo-patrimonial state structure in Liberia which continues to 
marginalize the less privileged members of the population, particularly ex-
combatants. It noted that the increasing “elitisation” of the society and their 
control of the country’s enormous resources accentuated by patrimonial 
governance system have inevitably resulted in the deepening of violence in 
post-war Liberia. 
I have advanced an argument that although peacebuilding can 
transform post-war society into a developed and peaceful entity if well 
implemented, peacebuilding efforts in Liberia have not been successful in 
mitigating violence. Respondents in the study did not recognize the efficacy of 
peacebuilding in responding to their needs. I noted that although the 
international community is supposed to be promoting peacebuilding, its 
policies on ex-combatants in Liberia have not been substantially felt. I noted 
that high-profile incidences of violence can have negative impacts on 
peacebuilding activities and the society at large. The study findings therefore 
agree with the view that a realistic implementation of any peacebuilding 
programme in Liberia must take into consideration Laderach’s pyramidal and 
Sawyer’s polycentric transformation strategies of peacebuilding that involve a 
range of participants from critical members of grassroots communities to the 
top-level national and international stakeholders.  
While the study noted the existence of political cleavages and divisions 
in Liberia, it builds on patrimonial and clientele system which has been 
exacerbated in the post-war era. There is constant and fierce competition 
between the Americo-Liberians and the nativists. The former have dominated 
political leadership since the declaration of the country as a Republic in 1847, 
while the latter remain at the margin of national political leadership. The 
nativists comprise 15 ethnic groups, and provide the bulk of the ex-
combatants. Their future aspiration is to overthrow the political hegemony of 
the estimated five percent Americo-Liberians. Therefore, the current study 
provides an early warning to the Liberian state and members of the 
international community about the potential and real dangers of continued re-
marginalization of ex-combatant communities.  
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The study has established a causal link between the consumption of 
drugs and the motivation to engage in violence. Interviewing law enforcement 
officials across Liberia, it was noted that ex-combatants are major hard drugs 
carriers and consumers. They possess weapons and are feared, as they 
threaten those who stand in their way. Law enforcement officials are not 
equipped to confront and arrest ex-combatants engaged in drug deals. 
Marijuana is cultivated domestically in huge quantities in Liberia and this is a 
source of livelihood for many families, and, because they are feared, ex-
combatants become major drug runners.  
In terms of policy implications, the study shows that the government of 
Liberia is yet to advance a realistic policy framework that will address ex-
combatants’ sustainable reintegration and how violence-induced crisis can be 
managed and prevented. This perhaps calls for a future research undertaking. 
The study has also come up with new observations. First, ex-combatants 
remain highly connected to their former rebel leaders, commanders and 
factional groups, and the dissolution of the factional groups was merely 
symbolic. Second, the majority of the people serving in the government (over 
80 percent) including the President have links to the war (President Sirleaf 
had confessed during the TRC testimonies to her financial contributions to the 
war, allegedly on humanitarian grounds). These individuals may therefore not 
be different from ex-combatants. Perhaps the only difference is their financial 
loot which the ex-combatants do not possess. Third, unemployed youth are 
getting increasingly frustrated and appear to have identified with, and joined, 
ex-combatants in their political and economic struggle for survival. Fourth, 
violence often creates significant shifts in policy directions, not as a 
permanent solution for addressing the grievances of ex-combatants, but as a 
measure to deploy excessive force to counter the violent activities of ex-
combatants. In turn, ex-combatants develop new strategies of 
disproportionate violence. In a sense, ex-combatants have become agents of 
political obstructionists.  
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Conclusion 
The high expectations for a comfortable post-election livelihood vanished 
among many disenchanted ex-combatants who failed to reintegrate fully into 
Liberian society. The euphoria of the end of war, and the democratic 
elections, were replaced by varied socio-economic hardships and vices 
including depression, alcoholism, and recourse to violent behaviour. One 
major problem researcher’s encounter in many countries in Africa is lack of 
official statistics. This problem is compounded in Liberia by a protracted 14-
year civil war during which all state structures and institutions were uprooted 
by rebel groups. As a result, this study relied significantly on information 
gathered from my interviews and discussions with the research participants, 
and my engagement over a long period as a participant observer. The study 
found that the Liberian conflict was the direct result of many years of 
marginalization, oppression, and exploitation of indigenous Liberians by the 
Americo-Liberians. The study also found, in the post-war era, a lack of 
concrete economic recovery and development programmes, making it difficult 
to find alternative reintegration for the large number of demobilized ex-
combatants. 
This study discussed the outcome of ex-combatant reintegration and 
the occurrence of violence in post-war Liberia using a four dimensional 
analytical framework, consisting of: (a) re-marginalization (b) re-criminalization 
(c) exploitation, and (d) economic insecurity. I found this framework a useful 
tool in capturing various micro–macro processes and dynamics which have 
affected the reintegration programme as well as individual ex-combatants in 
different ways. It has shown that, at the outset, successful reintegration 
depended on the overall political context in which the entire DDRR 
programme was implemented. In this regard, the study noted that the 
politicization of the reintegration programme was a contributing factor for its 
failure which then left ex-combatants unintegrated and highly vulnerable. 
While physical violence may not be endemic in all ‘post-conflict’ 
countries, it is a problem in Liberia given its history of violent conflict, and a 
risk of relapse into armed conflict is potentially present. The intensity of 
violence is an important indicator which must be taken into consideration, and 
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the political and economic context of violence must be understood as 
important elements of redress in order to sustain the post-war peace and 
stability. Through violence and the use of arms (mostly locally made single 
barrel short guns which exist in large numbers), ex-combatants can reverse 
the relationships of dominance and marginalization that they suffer under the 
state in the post-war dispensation. It can also give them power to extract 
revenge on individuals who wronged them in the past (Keen, 2000:23-25; 
Lyon, 2004:269-271). Therefore, this analysis provides a basis for the 
development of intervention strategies as well as for prevention of the 
occurrence of violence in Liberia. 
Ex-combatants may be pressed to seek for funding and support 
(internal or external) to confront the regime. The study therefore raises 
concerns of radicalization along religious lines - a problem that was 
highlighted by Ellis (2007). On this note, the research sites are the first 
potential hotbed for radicalization, as they are providing increasing space for 
its occurrence. For instance, these are sites where you have frustrated ex-
combatants, joined by unemployed youth and other dissatisfied groups. 
Combined, they continue to express extreme political views, and therefore 
becomes susceptible for political manipulation to engage or be used for 
instance, in electoral violence against perceived opponents or the regime. In 
particular, ex-combatant’s radicalization becomes possible because they are 
mainly drug addicts, and observing their behaviours, they appear lost in life 
and trying to find their identity within the society. In my interaction with many 
of them, and in my observational study, they feel rejected by the culture that 
surrounds them, and this makes them to develop resentment and rage. The 
flashpoint of their radicalization appears to occur when spoilers and 
opposition elements make them feel included as individuals, and legitimize 
their resentment. 
Finally, political attention is increasingly focused on the 2017 
presidential and general elections, which will be held in a complex political, 
social and economic environment marked by external economic shocks 
resulting from the drop in global prices of raw materials. There is public 
concern in Liberia over the drawdown and closure of the United Nations 
Mission in Liberia, as well as the challenges posed by the security transition to 
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state institutions, and the increase in public order incidents across the 
country. This fear runs deep in the minds of the majority of Liberians ̶ that the 
national security institutions will not be able to fill the vacuum that will be 
created following the exit of the United Nations and this will further put the 
country at increased risk of violence by ex-combatants. 
Issues for further research 
I have provided different perspectives about ex-combatants’ tension and 
violence which form part of the governance crisis in Liberia. I have also 
provided a new way of thinking about ex-combatants and their values in the 
society. It is clear that past paradigms of using combatants as spoils of war, 
and abandoning them are outmoded because they have the capacity to 
challenge post-war dynamics and destabilize the peace. I have invited new 
eyes, new sights, and new insights to other issues that generate violence in 
Liberia, which have the propensity to induce conflict in the medium to long-
term. There are issues that cannot be fully addressed in this study owing to its 
limitations but they require further research. 
It is important to conduct further research on the spread, strength, and 
cohesiveness of ex-combatants, nationally and at sub-regional levels, 
including the diaspora connections. There appears to be a common pattern 
and motivation for civil wars in the Mano River Union area, and most of the 
fighters have received training and indoctrination from the same ideological 
schools, particularly under Muammar Gadhafi’s Presidency. The existence of 
the group called the Liberian‐Ivorian Mercenaries Association (LIMA) is 
perhaps indicative of the cohesiveness of an assortment of ex-combatants, 
militias, and mercenaries. The United Nations Panel of Experts observed that 
Liberian mercenary command structures in the Ivorian conflict were fluid and 
relied on an alliance of generals who often activated their own recruits, mainly 
drawn from unemployed Liberian ex-combatants. The Panel also obtained 
testimony concerning the substantive overlap between the military operations 
of Liberian mercenaries and certain pro-Gbagbo Ivorian militias, whose forces 
are now residing in Liberia, intermingled with Ivorian refugees (Panel of 
Experts 2013). In the event of an escalation of violence which may lead to 
war, ex-combatants could easily have access to weapons which appear to be 
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in circulation within the sub-region. For instance, the Panel of Experts also 
identified one significant arms embargo violation committed by Liberian 
mercenaries and Ivorian combatants in River Gee County, Liberia, in May 
2011. It noted that an arms cache was discovered near the Liberian-Ivorian 
border, comprising 74 assault weapons and associated ammunition. There 
are several inaccessible locations in Liberia’s border towns where the panel 
suspects the deposit of arms caches.  
The place of female (women) ex-combatants in post-war Liberia 
remains a concern. Although women generally comprise between 10 and 30 
per cent of armed forces and groups (Bouta, et.al 2005:9), and tend to be 
younger than their male counterparts, surprisingly little research has been 
done so far on the lives of female ex-combatants in post violent armed 
conflicts. However, this research noted that, the contributions of Irma Specht 
(2006) “Red Shoes: Experiences of girls ex-combatant in Liberia “, and those 
of  McKay and Mazurana  (2004) "Where are the Girls?" highlighted the 
presence and experience of girls in armed forces and groups, within the 
context of Mozambique, Northern Uganda, and Sierra Leone. In spite of these 
efforts, many questions remain unaddressed with regard to female ex-
combatants in Liberia. For instance, what has been the outcome of their 
participation in the peace deal? How has the war affected their personalities? 
How are they coping after the war, particularly in highly dominated patriarchal 
society? Are they able to use their experiences to increase gender equality? 
or do they go back to their earlier status of inequality?, and how well did the 
DDRR processes and programmes address their needs? Liberian female ex-
combatants played different and vital roles during the war, such that some of 
them earned the titles of “Commanders and Generals”. But in post-war era, 
their visibility and role appears to have diminished significantly. 
As indicated earlier, violence against foreign concessions is a huge 
problem, and fears are being expressed by many Liberians, including the 
government, that if this continues, it might force the closure of some huge 
investments in Liberia. Liberia has great mineral wealth – iron ore, gold, 
diamond, and (oil and gas) which are currently under exploration. Exports of 
rubber and iron ore represent 95 percent of its total export, and Liberia has 
attracted foreign direct investment (FDI) in several non-traditional sectors 
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including petroleum, palm oil, hotels, finance, industry, and infrastructure in 
the amount of US$16 billion (AfT 2013). However, tension and violence within 
concession areas throughout Liberia have remained enduring. As a matter of 
fact, post-war concessions, be they agriculture like palm oil or rubber, or 
industry like mining, are all protest-prone to the extent that fire-arms violence 
erupts at different times. In 2007, an anti-expansion protest against the Liberia 
Agriculture Company (LAC) led to the killing of a Belgian Plantation Manager, 
Bruno Mitchell. Expatriate staffs of concessions are always in fear about 
actions of ex-combatants when community members are denied corporate 
social responsibility benefits, and these are instead channelled to the 
government. This approach not only excludes and marginalizes the affected 
communities, but also encourages their continued impoverishment. 
 Finally, I have argued in this study that there are many variants of neo-
patrimonialism in Liberia, but this is insufficient to explain the phenomenon of 
violence in the country. The Liberian state is characterized by its 
contradictions and cannot be reduced to one logic. A country that prides itself 
as the oldest African Republic of 168 years of “independence” remains 
economically backward and politically divided and unstable. While it can be 
argued that Liberia has made some progress in state-building, its democracy 
will continue to feature a system of elite privilege based on privatization of 
public office and prevention of effective rule of law where it threatens elite 
interest. The nexus between violence and development remains fundamental. 
The United Nations Millennium Declaration, part of which coalesced into the 
Millennium Development Goals (MGDs) was to be achieved by the year 2015. 
Sadly, even though the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 2000) 
Resolution prominently speaks of peace, security, and disarmament, the 
MDGs themselves were wholly uninformed regarding the effect of war and 
violence on poverty. They reflect an appalling lack of comprehension that so 
long as there is violence, there will be no development. This is inevitably true 
of Liberia.  
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Post Script 
A very recent update in my research discusses the challenges in the 
implementation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report. The 
problem is that there is a deepening of Liberia’s fluid political and fragile 
security environment with a looming crisis capable of degenerating into violent 
conflict. The context under which this could occur is the numerous calls by 
Liberians for the implementation of the TRC recommendations, including the 
establishment of a war crimes court, in Liberia to prosecute perpetrators for 
human rights violations and war crimes. This call is strongly resisted by those 
indicted by the report in a manner that threatens the fragile peace in the 
country.  
 The TRC report has remained in limbo since its publication in 2009 
raising concerns, among Liberians and members of the international 
community, about the implementation of its recommendations, particularly the 
aspects of prosecution as a means of addressing the atrocities committed 
during the war. However, in a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representative, President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf presented a progress report 
on the implementation of the recommendations and urged the lawmakers to 
deliberate on the matter and identify an appropriate approach for further 
implementations of the recommendations. Part of the President’s letter stated: 
“As regards prosecution, as you may recall, in my report of 
March 2010, I suggested that the establishment of an 
Extraordinary Criminal Court requires joint effort of the Executive 
and the National Legislature, which has the constitutional 
mandate for establishing courts, and for the civil society through 
participation with the Liberian National Bar Association. At the 
same time, we note the importance of restorative justice that is 
ongoing under several of the policies, programmes and 
initiatives covered in this report. This is without prejudice to any 
future consideration by you in the establishment of Special 
Courts as recommended by the TRC report.” (Sirleaf 2015). 
The submission of the report at this time in Sirleaf’s Presidency, and her 
comments on prosecution, ignited the political atmosphere, with sharp 
divisions apparent amongst the population, as some welcome prosecution 
while others spoke vehemently against it in a manner that threatens the fragile 
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peace. This context is exacerbated by the imminent departure of the United 
Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) somewhere between 2016 and early 
2017. This is going ahead notwithstanding the circumstance, because the 
Security Council noted that there is overall progress towards restoring peace 
and security in Liberia, and commended the enduring commitment of the 
people of Liberia to consolidate peace and advance democratic processes 
and institutions. But the Security Council also expressed concern regarding 
the significant challenges that remain across all sectors, including continuing 
problems with violent crimes, in particular the high rates of sexual and gender-
based violence, especially involving women, children and girls. 
Several factors now constitute real threats to the TRC report’s implementation 
in post-UNMIL dispensation: 
1.  The decision by the United States Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), 
through its International Human Rights Unit, to continue tracking records of 
individuals living in the U.S who might have committed war crimes back in 
their countries of origin (New Republic 2015). In particular, the focus on 
Liberia derives from the US government’s decision through the FBI to re-open 
investigation over the five American Catholic Nuns that were killed by a rebel 
group in Liberia during the war in 1992 (The Times 2012). Before the FBI 
involvement in the tracking of war criminals, some Liberians residing in the 
United States became active in seeking justice and the need to address war 
impunity. In groups, they filed complaints against individuals in the U.S who 
they claimed caused unbearable sufferings for them during the civil war in 
Liberia. It was in the light of this complaint that Mr. Thomas Woewiyu, a 
former Charles Taylor Commander/Defense Spokesman of the factional 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), was arrested in the U.S. He was 
charged with lying on his application for U.S citizenship by not disclosing his 
alleged affiliation with a violent political group in Liberia. Weowiyu was key 
actor in the rebel faction NPFL when, in 1992, the group carried out a brutal 
military campaign during which perceived adversaries were tortured, civilians 
were executed, girls and women were raped and forced into sex slavery, and 
humanitarian aid workers were murdered (New Republic 2015). Thomas 
Weowiyu remains in a US prison. 
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2.  The submission of the TRC report by the President to the Legislature for 
action elicited criticisms on the grounds that some members alleged that she 
violated the TRC recommendation that barred her from political activities for 
30 years, by contesting the 2011 Presidential election. In particular, one of the 
key rebel leaders, Senator Prince Johnson, of the defunct Independent 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), described the TRC report as 
“material that grossly violated the rights of people who dedicated their time to 
appear before the Commission to give their sides of the story, and noted that 
the TRC also violated the Liberian Constitution, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and the Act that established the TRC” (New Dawn 2015). The 
position of Senator Johnson is not surprising. In 2010, following his 
threatening comments in the media about the proposed prosecution of those 
involved in the war, and the tension that it generated in Liberia given his 
antecedents, I went to his office to interview him on the issue. In his 
statement, he indicated to me that he will strongly resist any attempt to arrest 
him for prosecution, and reminded me that he has a large number of 
supporters who will join forces to resist such arrest, apparently referring to the 
large number of former fighters who still remain active and maintain contact 
with him.  
3.  At the national level, President Sirleaf has been under intense pressure to 
ensure that the TRC recommendations are implemented. Although the 
government has taken minimal or cosmetic measures towards addressing key 
elements of the recommendations, such as reconciliation (through the “palava 
hut” process – equivalent to “Gachacha” in Rwanda), historicity and 
memorialization, critical issues of reparation and prosecution remain distant. 
Given the complexity of the Liberian conflict, and the intractable nature of its 
socio-cultural interactions, it will be difficult to achieve the Rwandan model of 
reconciliation through the so-called palava hut mechanism.  As one Liberian 
victim of the war stated:  
“You know, a warlord raped my aunt and she never recovered, 
she died in 2007. We don’t know him, (the warlord), whether he 
is living or dead, but we know the faction he was fighting for and 
their leader is enjoying government today. The President, 
Senator Johnson and many other people who should be in jail 
219 
 
for killing or helping to kill Liberians are today big, big shots 
riding in fine, fine cars around here, It is not right” (Inprofile Daily 
2015).  
At the international level, the pressure on the government may have 
emanated from the need to avert a repetition of the past, and to ensure that 
the money spent by bilateral and multilateral institutions on the TRC process 
is justified. Critically, President Sirleaf would like to maintain a positive 
international posture and credibility by ensuring that the process for the 
implementation of the report is at least in progress before the end of her 
tenure in 2017. This is also coming in the light of a recent media report in 
which her name was mentioned among four other female candidates, 
including German Chancellor Angela Merkel, EU Foreign Affairs Chief, 
Catherine Ashton, UNESCO Director General, Irina Bokova, and UN 
Development Programme Administrator, Helen Clark (Washington Times 
(2015) as a possible successor to current UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-
moon. Her success in this race is not likely, given the zoning methodology for 
the appointment of the SG which means it is not the turn of an African 
candidate. Nonetheless, she may stand a chance of being appointed as a 
Special Envoy of the SG at the end of her Presidency. The pressure on the 
regime may also have come from the United Nations Security Council. In its 
progress report on Liberia, the Council noted that the situation in Liberia 
continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region, and indicated that it:  
“Look[s] forward to a comprehensive, inclusive constitutional 
review process as well as the implementation of the National 
Reconciliation Roadmap, urging efforts to strengthen the 
Independent National Commission on Human Rights which 
could play a key role as a publicly accessible human rights 
institution and as a mechanism to monitor and follow-up on the 
implementation of the recommendations of the TRC, and 
stressing that the responsibility for the preparation, security and 
conduct of a free, fair and transparent 2017 presidential election 
rests with the Liberian authorities” (UNSC 2015).  
While the United Nations recognizes the need for the implementation of the 
TRC recommendations and the need for genuine reconciliation in Liberia, the 
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organization remains ambivalent in taking practical steps to ensure that 
Liberian stakeholders and international partners are engaged in the 
scrupulous implementation of recommendations and perhaps taking the 
responsibility for the establishment of a war crime court as it did in Sierra 
Leone. It is important to underline that Charles Taylor was tried and 
prosecuted because of war crimes and crimes against humanity that he 
committed in the Sierra Leone war. Thus far, no individual or group has been 
indicted and arrested in Liberian territory or prosecuted for their role in the 
Liberian civil war.  
4.  Debate over the President’s letter has commenced and both Houses of the 
Legislature are divided over the issue of prosecution and the establishment of 
a War Crimes Court. The presence of perpetrators of war crimes in the 
Legislature is likely to prevent any tangible outcome and will probably delay 
the process until the tenure of the current regime comes to an end. This 
process is likely to be complicated by the recent Security Council de-listing of 
suspected war criminals from the assets and travel ban sanctions (UNSC 
2015). One of the obvious implications of this decision is that individuals and 
groups at home and in the diaspora will now have access to looted wealth and 
use it to engage in political activities, as politics and access to power in 
Liberia (as in many African countries) are determined by money. For instance, 
in October 2015, Mr. Benoni Urey, who is arguably the richest serving 
politician, and a close association of Charles Taylor, was allegedly aware of 
the whereabouts of his (Taylor’s) wealth abroad, and reportedly recruited 
Taylors former fighters as his bodyguard during the official opening of his 
party’s office in the Southern Maryland County of Liberia, in preparation for 
the 2017 Presidential election (UNMIL Report 2015). The lifting of the assets 
and travel sanctions ahead of the election, and UNMIL security transitioning to 
the government, are both likely to have a security impact on Liberia as its 
national security institutions remain weak and lack the capacity to take full 
responsibility. 
5.  In the light of the renewed calls by many Liberians for the establishment of 
a war crimes court, and fearing prosecution, the former rebel leader of the 
defunct Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and 2005 
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Presidential candidate, Sekou Damate Conneh, stated that he is prepared to 
lead a peace and reconciliation process in Liberia. Conneh indicated his 
intention to engage with other rebel leaders such as Prince Johnson, George 
Boley, Alhaji Kromah, and Cyril Allen, to organize a national taskforce to 
promote peace and reconciliation in Liberia (UNMIL-JAOC Report 2015). 
6.  Returning to the criticism of President Sirleaf’s action mentioned in number 
two above, during public testimony to the Commission in 2007/8 President 
Sirleaf conceded that she had made financial contributions to the amount of 
ten thousand dollars to the Charles Taylor-led insurgency on humanitarian 
grounds. Most of her critics, and those who also participated in the war such 
as Senator Johnson, allege that she played a more active role in the war than 
merely a financial contribution. But on account of her confession and role in 
the war, she was barred from participation in politics for 30 years in the TRC 
recommendations. In her determined effort to remain in politics and retain the 
presidency, she sought the intervention of the Supreme Court, which then 
ruled in her favour to allow her to contest the 2011 election.  This decision by 
the Supreme Court dramatically changed the political landscape and 
undermined the TRC report. The Supreme Court was heavily criticized by 
many Liberians for this alleged unjust decision which saw the politicization of 
TRC report and largely eroded public confidence in the judiciary. Many of the 
warlords are likely therefore use the decision of the Supreme Court as an 
excuse to make an argument for non-prosecution. 
7. To underscore the potential danger that the TRC report poses to peace and 
stability, the Chairman of the Commission Mr. Jereme Verdier, has fled the 
country into exile since the publication of the report because of threats to his 
life and family, allegedly by those marked for prosecution. The threat by rebel 
leaders to cause destabilization if they are arrested for prosecution remains 
credible. With the divisive and confrontational politics in Liberia the TRC 
report remains a potential source of violence and conflict.  
 All these current factors must be considered to add to the security risks 
posed by the structural position of the ex-combatants outlined in my thesis, 
making Liberia a country very likely to return to conflict. 
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